Kissinger Discusses Rumsfeld's Memoir
Published Feb. 14, 2011 • Read time: 7m
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said he believes that as defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld didn't overrule the generals running the Iraq war often enough and should have insisted on the alternative to nation-building that Rumsfeld favored, turning the war over to the Iraqis quickly and avoiding the problems that came with nation-building.
Kissinger - who doesn't give many interviews these days - spoke to me about his long-time friend (and sometime adversary) Donald Rumsfeld and his recently-released memoir, "Known and Unknown" in an interview last Tuesday. Speaking to him evoked memories of his roles in Nixon's opening to China, the Vietnam peace talks and the invention of airborne "shuttle diplomacy." Kissinger's 1973 Nobel Peace Prize - shared with North Vietnamese ambassador Le Duc Tho - was awarded for what he had done, not in anticipation of what he might do.
Kissinger advised Rumsfeld to not gloss over things in writing the book, and Rumsfeld didn't. "Known and Unknown" - and the accompanying archive of documents posted at www.Rumsfeld.com - reveals much about the internal tensions that often overcame George Bush's decision-making after 9-11.
Of the Iraq War leaders, the memoir of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, "A Journey", came first detailing his personal political history and his chronicle of a faithful ally who clearly understood the war, its ideological component, and the gaps in our strategy. Soon after came President George W. Bush's "Decision Points." But Bush's book - choppy and incomplete - widened many of the gaps left by Blair and added a few more. Bush may have agonized over decisions, but didn't really explain the deliberations behind them.
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Historians should be grateful for the Rumsfeld memoir because it fills in many of the gaps and explains much of what Bush and Blair left out in exhaustively-documented detail.
In my conversation with him, Kissinger dispelled some of the media-created mischaracterizations of his friend.
Rumsfeld, often characterized as the perfect antidote to diplomacy, has many times served as a highly effective diplomat. Few realize, for example, that Rumsfeld's skillful negotiations with the Russians made it possible for President Bush to pull America out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Kissinger remembers Rumsfeld's term as ambassador to NATO in the last years of the Nixon presidency. He told me, "At NATO he was practicing diplomacy. He did the job more intensely than most of [the other US ambassadors to NATO] and he was in a very difficult period when our relations with France were very complicated. And he managed to establish a relationship with the French ambassador [Francois de Rose] which has lasted to this day." Kissinger added, "On that occasion he was a very effective diplomat."
George W. Bush's National Security Council, as Rumsfeld recounts at length, wasn't as much a high-level committee as an assembly of warring feudal states. A Rumsfeld writes, as Bush's National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice was the source of the problem. Instead of focusing issues in a timely manner with clear alternatives that the president could decide between, time and again Rice delayed and tried to craft consensus. As a result some decisions were so delayed that they were overtaken by events.
Kissinger's friendship with Rumsfeld began under similar circumstances in Richard Nixon's cabinet. At their first encounter, as Rumsfeld wrote, Kissinger was the National Security Advisor trying to deal with clashes between State and Defense. When the question was raised on how Defense, State and the NSC were working together, Kissinger slipped a note to Rumsfeld that said, "As a team of barracudas."
That problem, Kissinger told me, is built into the NSC system.
He disagreed with my characterization of the Bush NSC as dysfunctional, saying, "I don't think ‘dysfunctionality' is right but I think competitiveness is built into the system." Is that competitiveness a good thing? "Well it depends on the president, it depends on the security advisor," he said adding "It can be a good thing if the president gets involved in the final decisions."
Rumsfeld details several major issues in which Rice failed to frame issues clearly and present them to Bush for a decision. Kissinger agreed, in principle, that if the decisions are clouded or not presented properly it's a disservice to the president.
Rumsfeld quotes Kissinger as saying (on Rumsfeld's announcement of his intent to resign in 2006), "The irony is you are being attacked for overruling the generals, and, the truth is, if anything you may have overruled them too little." He may have been thinking of the media-contrived 2006 "revolt of the generals" when Rumsfeld was attacked for ignoring military advice on the war plans for Iraq and that the protracted conflict was taking too great a toll on the force.
How so?
Kissinger said that although he was an outsider, he had been consulted by Rumsfeld who opposed nation-building in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Kissinger said, "[Rumsfeld] wanted to turn it over to the Iraqis on one level but he also wanted as long as we stayed there to conduct aggressive operations. He wanted to turn over authority [to the Iraqis] as soon as we got in. And I know because he came and spent a weekend with me before we went in to discuss some of these things."
George W. Bush campaigned against nation-building, and in his memoir he explains his change of mind in just one paragraph. Bush wrote that, after 9-11, he changed his mind when we had to topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan: "We had liberated a country from a primitive dictatorship, and we had a moral obligation to leave behind something better." Two years later, when we invaded Iraq, he apparently didn't seriously consider an alternative. He wrote, "Some in the administration suggested that we turn over power immediately to a group of Iraqi exiles. I didn't like that idea."
When I spoke to him, Kissinger had read only about one-third of Rumsfeld's book so he couldn't know that it wasn't only some generals who favored the extended occupation of Iraq it: the prime movers were Bush, Powell, and Rice.
Kissinger thought that Rumsfeld should have overruled the generals who favored it. He said, "Well, I thought that for a while the military were waiting to turn the responsibility over to the Iraqis were not aggressive enough, and this is before Petraeus came in. And I thought, and I said it to him at the time, that he perhaps should have been more insistent on the strategy which I know he wanted.'
Kissinger said. "I didn't participate in the decision, so I only know what I saw from the outside. But my impression was that Rumsfeld wanted to get in and out and that he wanted to turn it over to Iraqis as quickly as possible."
Was nation-building a bad idea? Kissinger told me, "I wouldn't say it [nation-building] was inadvisable. I would have said, if you do that you will be engaged in something of unlimited duration. Certainly a duration going beyond the term of office and therefore ...I was not in favor of it." Neither was Rumsfeld.
Kissinger found irony in Rumsfeld being accused of choosing it as a post-Saddam strategy. Bush's insistence on nation-building was probably the greatest mistake we have made since 9-11.
Kissinger said Rumsfeld is "...a man of great patriotism. He's a man of enormous dedication. One quality of a leader is to make subordinates do things they didn't know they could do. He fulfills that superbly. He is a difficult bureaucratic colleague, but that is part of life because he is a man of commitment."
History has the advantage of time and perspective, which the daily media do not. Rumsfeld's memoir adds significantly to that perspective on the author, the presidents he served, and the wars he fought.

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