
Trump Tariffs Small Business China
Is a Tariff a Tax?
COMMENTARY
Published Nov. 17, 2025 • Read time: 6m
Many Americans have forgotten that this question, which has been in the news lately, was fundamental to the American Revolution. And among American Patriots, or Whigs, meaning those who supported the colonists’ claims against Parliament, there was almost universal consensus that they are different things, constitutionally speaking.
Throughout the Imperial Crisis of 1763 to 1776, it was the consensus position of the colonists that Parliament had the right to regulate the trade of the British Empire, but it had no right to tax the colonists. And they recognized that a regulation of trade might take the form of a duty imposed upon, for example, molasses imported from French colonies in order to favor molasses imported from British colonies over that imported from French colonies.
In the colonists’ view, the “Sugar Act” of 1764 was an unconstitutional innovation. The Act was quite explicit, stating at the top that it was passed for the purpose of “applying the produce of such duties, and of the duties to arise by virtue of the said act, towards defraying the expences of defending, protecting, and securing the said colonies and plantations.” It was the first trade act to do that.
The Stamp Act of 1765, and the reaction to it, made the protest against the 1764 Sugar Act less conspicuous. The result of the actions taken against the Stamp Act was that many in Parliament did not grasp the American argument against the Sugar Act. Hence, Parliament passed the Townshend Acts in 1767, imposing duties on lead, glass, paper, paint, and tea in order to raise revenue. When the colonists complained, many in Parliament accused the colonists of moving the goalposts. The charge was not accurate, but it did reflect what they believed. And, like many today, many members of Parliament were unable to grasp the difference between a duty imposed for the purpose of trade regulation and a duty imposed for the purpose of raising revenue.
The most famous criticism of the Townshend Acts, and the most popular writing of the era until Thomas Paine published “Common Sense” in January 1776, was John Dickinson’s “Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania.” In the second letter, Dickinson made the consensus Patriot argument logically, clearly, and eloquently. At the start of the second Letter, Dickinson explained the colonists’ logic:
There is another late act of parliament, which appears to me to be unconstitutional, and as destructive to the liberty of these colonies, as that mentioned in my last letter; that is, the act for granting the duties on paper, glass, etc.
The parliament unquestionably possesses a legal authority to regulate the trade of Great Britain, and all her colonies. Such an authority is essential to the relation between a mother country and her colonies; and necessary for the common good of all ...
I have looked over every statute relating to these colonies, from their first settlement to this time; and I find every one of them founded on this principle, till the Stamp Act administration.* All before, are calculated to regulate trade, and preserve or promote a mutually beneficial intercourse between the several constituent parts of the empire ... The raising of a revenue thereby was never intended ... Never did the British parliament, till the period above mentioned, think of imposing duties in America for the purpose of raising a revenue ...
Here we may observe an authority expressly claimed and exerted to impose duties on these colonies; not for the regulation of trade; not for the preservation or promotion of a mutually beneficial intercourse between the several constituent parts of the empire, heretofore the sole objects of parliamentary institutions; but for the single purpose of levying money upon us.
This I call an innovation; and a most dangerous innovation.* It may perhaps be objected, that Great Britain has a right to lay what duties she pleases upon her exports.
That so many today don’t seem to understand this distinction is a sign that the American bar seems to have gone Tory. The founding generations’ way of thinking about tariffs, and perhaps law in general, is in danger of being rendered foreign to our public policy discussion, perhaps even to constitutional discussion, even among people who mistakenly think of themselves as originalists.
This way of thinking, of course, says little about the current case, as the purpose of the law itself must be understood in light of the thinking of the men who passed it. But it is also true that the way of thinking that Dickinson represented, and which was broadly shared in the founding generation, might have something to say here.
The founding generation believed in the separation of powers. They recognized, as The Federalist notes, that in practice the powers will inevitably overlap, and sometimes clash. But they did operate within a way of legal and constitutional thinking that took it as a given that, in order to guard the separation of powers, any delegation of legislative powers to the executive had to be limited and focused. There was a difference between a reasonable and unreasonable delegation of powers, just as there is a difference between a tax and a regulation of trade, even if in both cases, money is raised at customs houses. The kind of delegation the Trump administration is asserting in this case is hard, perhaps impossible, to reconcile with the practice of separation of powers. Congress has no right to abdicate its obligation to set trade policy via legislation.
The Trump administration’s assertion that they have the right to set tariffs worldwide, claiming an unlimited emergency power based upon a law that was designed to delegate to the president a narrow emergency power, resembles the kind of expansive and arbitrary interpretation that the founders’ legal heroes fought. In the 1630s, King Charles asserted the right to collect “Ship Money” throughout England. By tradition, the King had the right to raise money, without Parliament’s consent, in port towns in time of war, or if war was imminent. King Charles asserted a living constitution interpretation: Given modern circumstances, he claimed that implied a general right to raise taxes if a war emergency was imminent. Dickinson mentioned the case in the first Farmer’s Letters, suggesting that there was a connection between the logic of the one argument and the other.
That we have trouble recognizing the limits of the non-delegation doctrine, just as we have trouble recognizing the difference between a duty for the purpose of raising revenue and one for the purpose of regulating trade, suggests that we have much work to do if we are truly to understand the Constitution in light of the reasoning which justified ratification by the people and which explains the reasoning and the philosophical framework, including the ideas about human nature, the nature of government, and the nature of law that are fundamental to our constitutional law.
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