GOP Foreign Policy in Opposition
Published Sept. 21, 2011 • Read time: 14m
Foreign policy issues played a remarkable role in the first two GOP presidential candidates’ debates this month – remarkable for how little attention was paid to foreign policy. This Thursday night, during the next such debate, one of those candidates onstage could very well be the next leader of what remains the world’s only superpower. Yet the format of the debates thus far has been structured so as to minimize discussion over Republican foreign policy alternatives, and this is no doubt a reflection of the fact that GOP primary voters right now really are focused on domestic conditions.
There was however something of a foreign policy bombshell within the September 12th debate, even though it received little journalistic coverage. This was Texas Governor Rick Perry’s statement that “it’s time to bring our young men and women home” from Afghanistan.
Perry is as likely to win the Republican nomination as anyone, and Obama is looking beatable next fall. The standard Republican position for the past few years, especially among the party’s leadership, has been that America needs to stick it out in Afghanistan. So when Perry says that it’s time to come home, then it’s time to pay attention to what he is saying.
To be sure, Perry added in that same response that “it’s also really important for us to continue to have a presence there” (i.e. in Afghanistan.) But the overall gist of his remarks was unmistakable, as he took the opportunity to conclude on the same note: “bring our young men and women home.” Nor was this a one-time comment off the cuff. In a recent interview for Time magazine, Perry said “I think we need to try to move our men and women home as soon as we can….I don’t think keeping a large force of United States uniform military in Afghanistan for a long period of time is particularly in the interest of the U.S., or for that matter, in Afghani interest.”
Obviously this raises the question of how U.S. troops can withdraw from Afghanistan, under current conditions, without leaving that country to the Taliban and other Islamist extremists. When former Utah Governor Jon Huntsman was asked that very question by a young woman from Afghanistan during the same September 12th debate, his answer was essentially to smile and say: you’re on your own.
To be clear, the reason U.S. troops are in Afghanistan in the first place is not primarily out of human rights concerns, but to prevent that country from once again becoming a haven for anti-American terrorist attacks. If the Taliban recover power, there is no reason to think they will be any less hostile to the United States than they were on September 11th, 2001. But the American public including a growing percentage of Republicans are getting very tired of Afghanistan – tired of U.S. casualties on behalf of a difficult ally, and tired of the expense in a period of economic recession. No doubt the Perry campaign is aware of all the above, which is why it is trying to carve out a distinct position on this issue.
Perry is critical of Obama’s declared timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, in that the precise dates involved obviously have more to do with Obama’s electoral considerations than military realities. The Texas governor also calls for a close look at U.S. economic aid to Afghanistan. He and his advisers say they are against any “precipitous withdrawal” from that country. He says that the president needs to listen more carefully to what his generals are telling him about military needs on the ground. Each of these points is quite right. The question then is whether Perry believes existing U.S. troop withdrawals are happening too slowly, or too fast.
There is always a tension, especially early in a campaign, over how specific to be on certain issues. Politicos like to keep their options open. Policy wonks thirst for detail. It is not as though voters are looking for a PowerPoint presentation. At this stage of the game, broad themes are perfectly appropriate. Voters are just getting to know Perry, and contrary to a lot of the press commentary afterward, he did fine in the first two September debates, coming across as a happy warrior and a genuine, straightforward conservative – a good fit for the mood of GOP primary voters right now. But if Perry is going to be commander-in-chief, at some point he will need to fill in the blanks on issues like Afghanistan, and tell people in a little more detail what he plans to do.
More broadly, Perry’s comments on Afghanistan reveal the current flux within the Republican Party over questions of foreign policy. The various GOP candidates epitomize a range of possibilities. Representative Ron Paul (R-TX) argues for a new policy of strict non-intervention. At the other end of the spectrum, former Pennsylvania U.S. Senator Rick Santorum calls on Americans to “spread our vision to the rest of the world.” The debate format so far has minimized foreign policy discussion. Is this the future direction of the GOP on international and security issues - to be indifferent, disengaged, or divided? And if not, how might such issues interact with Republican electoral politics in 2012? One way to help answer those questions is to look back for precedent from similar periods when Republicans were out of power, in opposition to Democratic presidents such as Truman, LBJ, Carter, and Clinton. Several timely lessons emerge from the comparison:
First, differences among conservatives and Republicans over U.S. foreign policy are usually not as great as the media suggests.
American political history buffs know that Ohio Senator Robert Taft and General Eisenhower battled for control of the GOP at the party’s convention in 1952. Less well known is that even during the great intra-party struggles of the early 1950s, the vast majority of Republicans actually agreed on much, including a vigorous anti-Communism, a hawkish foreign policy, and reduced government spending. Both GOP internationalists like Eisenhower and Midwesterners like Taft agreed that Soviet power needed to be contested at significantly less cost to the United States. During the mid-1960s, a clear majority of Republicans supported President Johnson on Vietnam and called, if anything, for increased escalation against Hanoi in order to secure American objectives. President Gerald Ford, though criticized by Ronald Reagan in 1975-1976 for inadequate responses to Soviet expansionism, was essentially a Cold War hawk when compared to his liberal critics. And during the 1990s, for all of the attention on Pat Buchanan’s neo-isolationist challenges, the fact is that most Republicans agreed on a great deal, including a continued global role for the United States, a military second to none, a hard line against rogue states such as Iraq, and a deep skepticism regarding nation-building projects in countries of peripheral interest to America. There is little evidence to suggest that Buchanan’s neo-isolationist stance helped him to do well in New Hampshire in 1992 or 1996. On the contrary, he won votes with his economic and socially conservative populism, in spite of his stance on national security issues. Consequently, in 2000, Republicans were able to rally around a candidate in George W. Bush who initially promised caution regarding intervention alongside unequivocal support for the notion of America as the world’s only superpower.
Common media portrayals of internal divisions between Republicans are usually exaggerated, and flow in part from an eagerness to identify supposed disunity among conservatives. In fact, the great majority of conservative Republicans – today as before - are national security hawks who favor robust national defenses and a hard line stance toward threats from abroad. Genuine isolationists like Ron Paul are and have long been a minority within the GOP.
Second, foreign policy is a social issue.
A president’s conduct of American diplomacy and military policy is not unrelated to domestic cultural concerns. Harry Truman helped himself leading up to the 1948 re-election campaign by pursuing a foreign policy of vigorous anti-Communist containment. He understood that whatever the American public’s appetite for New Deal-type measures, it did not include a high tolerance for Communism – an understanding that applied internationally as well as domestically. By 1968, on the other hand, an entire wing of the Democratic Party was loudly signaling its contempt for American anti-Communism. Nor was this contempt unrelated to domestic issues of law and order. Upper-middle-class liberals disaffected with Cold War verities were often the same ones offering excuses for crime and disorder in the streets. Culturally conservative, Southern and working class white Democrats did not fail to notice the connection. They may not have been enthusiastic about Vietnam, but they were even more disgusted by anti-war radicalism coupled with rising crime and social disorder at home. Democrats lost the support of such voters in multiple elections by failing to grasp that foreign policy and defense are part of a broader set of social and cultural concerns. Conversely, Reagan polled well among these same traditional New Deal constituencies in part because he carried an unapologetic sense of national pride, strength, and patriotism.
A candidate’s position on national security issues is one of the ways they communicate that they respect and share the basic cultural sensibilities of a clear majority of Americans. Obama understands this fact intellectually, but often fails to convey it as heartfelt. Indeed he seems uncomfortable with traditional concepts of American exceptionalism, whether on domestic or foreign policy matters. This is as a cultural issue as well as an international one.
Third, national security is and will continue to be a winning issue for Republicans.
To be sure, there have been elections in the past when this GOP advantage was partially negated. In some elections, such as 1992, Americans gave Republicans the edge on foreign policy but did not vote primarily on that issue. In other elections, such as the 1962 mid-terms, competent foreign policy leadership allowed the Democrats to cancel out perennial Republican advantages. But it is very rare for voters to actually give the Democratic Party a clear advantage on foreign policy. 1964 is the one case in which voters definitely favored Democrats over Republicans; Goldwater’s statements were simply too hawkish for the comfort of a majority of Americans. In most elections, however, foreign policy and national defense have been a core Republican strength. A short list of such elections would include not only the Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan eras, but even some surprises such as 1960, 1976, and 2000. In 1960 for example, most voters gave Nixon and the Republicans the edge over Kennedy and the Democrats on foreign policy leadership, but voted in favor of Kennedy for other reasons, such as party identification. In 1976, even after President Ford’s notorious gaffe on TV in which he denied Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, voters continued to give the GOP an advantage over the Democrats as the party best able to handle US foreign policy. And in 2000, George W. Bush was given a definite edge by voters on issues of foreign policy and national defense – more than enough to put Bush over the top amidst such a close election. So even when military and foreign policy issues do not appear to be paramount, they can and often do make a critical difference for Republicans politically. Indeed there is no way to fully understand the migration of entire demographic groups such as Southern and working-class white voters from being reliably Democratic to reliably Republican, without considering the role of national security issues.
Obama scored an important victory this year in hunting down Osama Bin Laden. No doubt the White House hopes this will insulate it from criticism on national security in 2012. But there are still a range of international and defense-related issues where Republicans will be able to make legitimate criticisms of Obama’s foreign policy approach. These include: the attempted engagement of Iran; the administration’s bungling of the Middle Eastern peace process; the detention and interrogation of suspected terrorists; and U.S. policy toward the long-term challenge from China. When voters today are asked which party they most trust to handle U.S. national security, they continue to answer Republican.
Fourth, Republicans will ultimately rally around hawkish criticisms of the Democrats.
There is no case in the post-World War Two era in which a GOP presidential nominee campaigned on a truly isolationist or dovish platform, and in every case, the great majority of Republicans supported their party’s nominee in the fall election campaign. In 1952, Midwestern conservatives rallied to Eisenhower after an extremely bitter nominating convention and supported him as the candidate most likely to resolve America’s Cold War challenges in Korea and beyond. Eisenhower’s stance was that the Democrats needed to do more against world Communism, not less. In 1968, both conservative and Rockefeller Republicans rallied to Richard Nixon against Democratic nominee Hubert Humphrey. Nixon’s promise was to resolve the military imbroglio in Vietnam forcefully and honorably, not to surrender or to immediately disengage. In 1979-80, Republicans rallied around hawkish criticisms of Jimmy Carter’s sorry foreign policy record. And even during the Clinton era, the mainstream conservative Republican response was to stress the necessity for strong American leadership in a dangerous world – not to follow the lines laid down by Pat Buchanan. In practical terms, most conservatives and most Republicans during the 1990s agreed on the need for increased military spending, national missile defense, NATO expansion, and a forward US presence in the world, combined with appropriate skepticism toward new multilateral legal or military entanglements.
Since Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, genuine isolationists have never won the overarching foreign policy debate within the Republican Party. They will not win in 2012. Even most tea party supporters today favor strong national defenses, robust counter-terrorist policies, and an unyielding approach toward America’s declared adversaries. Witness the response at the September 12th tea party debate when Ron Paul helpfully provided Al Qaeda’s own rationale for the attacks on 9/11. The audience booed. GOP conservative voters may be tiring of foreign wars, but they remain hawkish, pro-military, and intensely patriotic. These voters will not be drawn to a candidate who promises to abandon a legacy of American international leadership since World War Two.
Finally, it is the party’s presidential nominee that brings unity, coherence, and a clear platform on foreign policy issues.
Until the nomination of a presidential candidate, the American political system does not provide for leaders of the opposition, so strict policy clarity from the opposing party is neither possible nor necessary. Republicans were divided over foreign policy during Harry Truman’s presidency, but Eisenhower brought a remarkable degree of unity once nominated and elected in 1952. By the end of Ike’s first term, Midwestern conservatives were essentially brought into a Republican stance of Cold War internationalism. Whatever Republican disunity existed over foreign policy during the 1960s was largely ended by the nomination and election of Richard Nixon in 1968. Nixon brought most Republicans along, at least temporarily, with his first-term policies on Vietnam, China, and arms control. Reagan’s nomination brought unity and coherence to the GOP foreign policy platform in 1980. And the fact is that George W. Bush enjoyed the support of most Republicans over his foreign policy stands both before and after 9/11.
Presidents have unusually broad leeway to formulate specific policy initiatives in the area of foreign policy. Fellow partisans are often inclined to be supportive, precisely because foreign policy is not their main concern. This means that the party’s presidential nominee has considerable room to define exact GOP foreign policy positions, as long as they do not grossly offend conservative sensibilities. Until then, Republicans should feel free to debate a certain range of foreign policy stands and approaches. Hopefully this will lead not only to the strongest but the most worthy ideas winning out. The Republican Party is the hawkish party, the party of American nationalism. That is hardly about to change, but it still leaves some room for choice on specifics. In the words of a leading non-conservative Mao Zedong, let a hundred flowers blossom. If past precedent is any indication, it’s fair to say Republicans will be in good shape on foreign policy issues as 2012 draws closer.
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