Conservative Foreign Policy and Reagan's Legacy, Part 2
Published March 30, 2011 • Read time: 12m
President Obama's intervention in Libya has raised a familiar cluster of difficult questions about how to handle U.S. military action, democracy promotion, and nation building overseas. Last week, in trying to piece together part of a conservative response to these questions, I outlined what Ronald Reagan's example implied on issues of democracy promotion. The conclusion was that Reagan's first inclination was always to be tough on U.S. adversaries, but supportive of U.S. allies - and that American foreign policy makers today would be well advised to remember that distinction as they attempt to navigate the "Arab spring." This week let's look at what Reagan's example suggests on current issues of military intervention, especially with regard to Libya.
Reagan believed in the necessity, utility, and beneficial role of American military power in world politics. He celebrated the U.S. armed forces as a source of national pride, and led the largest peacetime military buildup in American history. Reagan's hawkish, pro-defense instincts long predated his time in the White House. During the late 1960s, like many other conservatives, he called on the Johnson administration to unleash U.S. airpower more aggressively against North Vietnam. America's ultimate failure in that war left a strong impression on Reagan, who believed that U.S. soldiers should not be ordered to fight under overly burdensome political, multilateral, or legalistic restrictions. Once the United States was committed to combat, his core inclination was toward the bold, robust use of force to ensure success. Reagan also understood that military power has multiple uses, whether to defend, deter, compel, or reassure. As president during the 1980s, he pursued an overarching national security strategy deliberately designed to pressure the Soviet Union and its allies into major Cold War concessions. The use or threat of revitalized U.S. military strength was a central component of this strategy. Clearly, in comparison to post-Vietnam liberal Democrats, Reagan was a foreign policy and national security hawk, comfortable with the use of force and unapologetic about it.
At the same time, when it came to the prospect of large-scale, direct military interventions overseas, President Reagan in practice was genuinely careful. He had no objection to the energetic use of force, but generally avoided protracted, failed, or militarily improbable entanglements abroad. Reagan was among other things a shrewd politician with an excellent feeling for American public opinion, and he understood the limited popular appetite for such entanglements. There were no truly large-scale military interventions or nation building efforts along the lines of Vietnam or Iraq on his watch. Where possible he preferred indirect military support to American allies, a policy he pursued aggressively for example with respect to anti-Communist insurgents in Nicaragua and Afghanistan. He avoided direct military intervention in cases such as Nicaragua. Those direct U.S. interventions that did occur under Reagan tended to be brief, decisive, relatively small-scale, and domestically popular - and when these conditions did not obtain, he either avoided them, or extricated himself.
For the most part, Reagan's approach toward the use of military power carried rich dividends. Most obviously, he helped pave the way for America's Cold War victory over the Soviet Union, without firing a shot against that country - a historic achievement in itself. The avoidance of protracted warfare overseas also helped ensure his re-election, along with the continuing implementation of a conservative domestic agenda by an invigorated Republican Party. In terms of the specific military interventions that Reagan did authorize, most had salutary effects. The 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada rescued American citizens and toppled a radical leftist junta astride Caribbean sea-lanes at relatively little cost to the United States. And the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986 put Muammar Qaddafi on notice that terrorist attacks against Americans would be severely punished. Reagan demonstrated in both cases that he was not wedded to international applause as a necessary condition for intervention. But in each instance, he rallied a majority of the American public to his side, by striking U.S. enemies in a way that was short, sharp, and effective.
The one notable example of a failed military intervention under Reagan was in the case where he ignored his own best instincts: Lebanon. In the early 1980s, that country was wracked by a longstanding civil war, in which Israel and Syria were both directly involved. Concerned by the expansion of Syrian influence, President Reagan was persuaded - against the recommendation of key military advisers - to authorize a modest American deployment to Lebanon under tight political restrictions as part of a multinational peacekeeping force. U.S. Marines in Beirut were under vague, contradictory instructions to keep the peace somehow without becoming too deeply involved in Lebanon's wider civil war. Inevitably, the Marines were drawn into conflict with local militias. In October 1983, a suicide bomber attacked and destroyed a Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over 200 U.S. servicemen. Reagan, like all Americans, was stunned by this attack, and he authorized immediate retaliation. Over the ensuing months however it became clear that there was no way for the Marines to remain in Lebanon without risking further U.S. casualties, and the mission grew deeply unpopular within the United States. Reagan was loath to withdraw American forces under pressure, but finally did so early in 1984. Islamist terrorists and militants drew the obvious conclusion that the United States could be successfully coerced through the infliction of American casualties - a conclusion that could never have been drawn had U.S. ground forces not been deployed under such unpromising conditions in the first place.
What does Reagan's example suggest with regard to U.S. intervention in Libya? Surely one central lesson is: either win, or stay home. In other words, be very careful about intervening militarily overseas in the first place, and then either do it in a serious, robust and decisive manner, or don't do it at all. This was absolutely Reagan's own gut instinct, an instinct he usually followed, with great results. In the leading case where he ignored that instinct, in Lebanon, he failed. Overall, Reagan was clearly comfortable and unapologetic about the exercise of U.S. military power, willing to act without United Nations approval, and disinclined to place America's armed forces in open combat under absurdly tight or contradictory rules of engagement. For the most part, he avoided prolonged, half-hearted military stalemates or U.S. nation building exercises. In relation to Libya, President Obama might have chosen to model himself on Reagan's overall approach toward military power and intervention, or for that matter on any one of Reagan's multiple national security successes. In practice, he has not. Instead, the one Reaganite example that Obama's Libyan intervention most resembles right now is the one worth avoiding - that of Reagan in Lebanon. An equally bad outcome may yet be avoided in Libya, but only through a much more decisive and coherent political-military strategy. The indications so far are not encouraging. There has been plenty of confusion about the exact purpose and scope of this intervention, and despite his customary eloquence, the president's Monday night address in substance did little to clear it up.
In that Monday address, President Obama said that the United States had to intervene directly to protect Libyan civilians, and to stand on the side of "universal rights" in the Middle East. He also emphasized that the military mission itself would be strictly limited in scope and objective, and that the U.S. was now handing control of the mission over to its NATO allies. Finally, he stressed that while broader efforts to turn Qaddafi out of power would be welcome, they would not be supported militarily by America's armed forces.
As is frequently the case when Obama speaks, the address was delivered in an impressively calm, measured tone, but in substance it left a nagging sense of being too clever by half. The president said, as he often does, that he is determined to reject "false choices," but nevertheless there remain certain inevitable and difficult decisions he will have to make with regard to this conflict - and the sooner he makes them, the better. Both the scope and the purpose of America's military mission in this case are still quite murky and unclear. On the one hand, Obama and his advisers say that Qaddafi must go; on the other hand, they say that the military mission itself is only to protect certain Libyan civilians. In fact at this point the former objective is implicit in the latter, since from the perspective of U.S. national security interests there can now be no minimally decent outcome in Libya if Qaddafi is not overthrown.
In the interest of avoiding Orwellian verbal evasions, let us admit that the situation as it stands in Libya is nothing less than a civil war. It may conclude quickly, or it may not, but in the end this civil war will go on until one side or the other wins. If Western militaries do not help the Libyan insurgency to overthrow Qaddafi, it will likely be unable to do so, since it is relatively weak, small in number, poorly armed, and disorganized. In that case, either Qaddafi will remain in power indefinitely, or the civil war will go on, perhaps punctuated by temporary cease-fires. Libya is not going to be permanently partitioned. So whether Qaddafi remains in power or the civil war continues, the results are the same: Libya's dictator will be free to operate from his Tripoli headquarters to kill more civilians, defy the United States, and perhaps even launch or support terrorist attacks against Western targets. Supplies of oil and gas will be endangered, and refugees forced across the Mediterranean. The U.S. and its allies will then be locked into a long-term, costly, unpopular military blockade of the Qaddafi regime or rump state. Not only would such an outcome be militarily difficult, financially expensive, and deeply contentious; it would probably also lead to the death of more Libyan civilians than were rescued by Obama's initial intervention.
There is however one crucial caveat in relation to supporting the Libyan insurgency, which Obama did not mention on Monday night, namely that some of its members are radical Islamists who are violently hostile to the United States as well as to Qaddafi. This should at least give us pause about literally putting American weapons into their hands. A radical Islamist state or mini-state inside Libya, capable of threatening Western interests in the Mediterranean and beyond, would be a very poor substitute for Qaddafi. The U.S. will therefore have to ensure that rebel forces empowered by Qaddafi's overthrow do not include Islamist radicals at their head, and that American weapons are not handed over to violent extremists able to turn them against the United States. Obviously this is easier said than done - which is exactly why presidents need to be careful, and think through all possibilities, however unpleasant, before they decide on war.
The central implication of all this is that having decided to intervene, the Obama administration will have to act more aggressively in support of Libya's rebels, so that Qaddafi is toppled as quickly as possible - and without empowering radical Islamists. A tall order indeed, but this is the situation Obama and his Valkyries have put us in. The U.S. will have to further ramp up concrete forms of military, diplomatic, and financial support for the insurgents, without directly arming radical Islamists. It will have to formally recognize favored insurgents as the legitimate government of Libya; unleash more aggressive airstrikes against Qaddafi's armed forces nationwide; provide close air support for rebel advances; coordinate airstrikes with the insurgents; deploy fresh covert and special operations forces inside Libya; and target Qaddafi's own government and headquarters. If America's European and Arab allies blanch at these prospects, then they should never have called for U.S. intervention to begin with. The same holds true for liberal interventionists inside the United States, including President Obama himself. Putting the word "humanitarian" in front of the word "intervention" does not change the fact that military intervention is war, and in war, the surest and ultimately the most humane approach is frequently the robust use of force. Reagan at heart understood this, in a way that the current president does not. Reaganite Republicans are therefore right to say to Obama: when it comes to U.S. military intervention, either win, or stay home.
There is one further position that Reaganite Republicans would be entirely justified in taking on the issue of Libya, for a variety of good reasons, and that is to insist that any U.S. military intervention in that country remain sharp and decisive without spilling over into more prolonged nation building or peacekeeping exercises on the part of America's armed forces. Obama was careful on Monday night to argue against any large-scale U.S. ground commitment, but in the long term it is entirely unclear how this intervention will end. Before this is all over, there may very well be pressure on the U.S. to undertake a major peacetime military presence inside Libya, from some who currently claim to be horrified by that possibility. So let us understand there is no need to commit major American combat units to any protracted Libyan peacekeeping or nation building mission. To be sure, the Obama administration and U.S. allies overseas should start to think through what Libya might realistically look like - and not simply what we hope it will look like - if and when Qaddafi is gone. In fact such forethought is absolutely essential, in order to nudge the final outcome inside Libya away from multiple possibilities of disaster. This may require some sort of international, European, and/or Arab peacekeeping force, but U.S. combat units need not be a part of it, as we can be sure that any gratitude for their presence would be strictly short-lived. If it comes to the prospect of yet another prolonged nation building exercise in yet another Muslim country, conservatives and Republicans would be justified in saying: enough already.
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