Michigan, Too?
Indeed, it appears that Michigan is going to move its primary foward, too. This is from the Detroit Free Press:
Michigan leaped to the head of the presidential primary lineup Thursday, setting a Jan. 15 election that could become the biggest primary in state history and a key battleground for the Republican and Democratic nominations.But Michigan's move -- supported by large majorities in the state House and Senate and backed by Gov. Jennifer Granholm -- will almost certainly be countered by other states, especially Iowa and New Hampshire, which are intent on preserving their traditional primacy in the presidential selection process.
Assuming Granholm approves the measure as expected, Michigan -- for now -- would have the first primary and third nominating contest, behind caucuses for Wyoming Republicans on Jan. 5 and for both parties Jan. 14 in Iowa.
Lawmakers supporting the move said it was crucial that Michigan concerns be placed on the national agenda and before the presidential candidates as soon as possible.
"When they're making promises ... we want to make sure they're not just making promises to Iowa, New Hampshire and South Carolina," said state Senate Minority Leader Mark Schauer, D-Battle Creek.
Senator Schauer's comment is helpful in elucidating exactly what is going on here. I think it should also make clear why I have been so strongly in favor of the parties taking a clear and credible stand against these states.
The interaction between the states on the question of the primary schedule is a pretty straightforward collective action dilemma. Exactly what does that mean? Simply stated, it is a situation in which if all parties coordinated their actions, the group as a whole would do quite well. However, given the coordination of all and sundry, each individual actor has an incentive to "cheat" on the agreement. If everybody cooperates except that one actor, that one actor will do much better. He gets all the benefits of their cooperation without paying the cost of his own cooperation. However, because all actors have such an incentive, coordination is not sustainable.
It can be modeled by a simple prisoner's dilemma game. Imagine a primary contest consisting of two states. The states are deciding when to place their primary. They've worked out a tentative agreement in which they both agree to hold it on February 5th. Each of them must decide whether to cooperate with the agreement or to cheat and hold it on an earlier date. If both of them stick to the agreement, they each get five "utils" (a generic term used to denote benefit). If one of them cheats on the agreement, the cheater gets ten utils because his primary influences the other's. The one who sticks to the agreement therefore gets zero utils. Finally, if they both cheat on the agreement, they still get some benefit - two utils - but it is diminished because the early date has put undue pressure on their party, and also the influence of the contest on the nomination is now diminished because it is now so early.
In that instance, we could model the "game" in the following manner:
[State One's choices are denoted by the rows, and its payoffs are the first numbers in the cells. State Two's choices are denoted by the columns, and its payoffs are the second numbers in the cells.]
In this game, the equilibrium position is the one in which both sides cheat. The reason for this is that, regardless of what State Two does, State One will always improve its utility by cheating on the agreement. If State Two cooperates, State One gets ten utils for cheating or five utils for cooperating. It therefore chooses to cheat. If State Two cheats, State One gets two utils for cheating or zero utils for cooperating. Again, it chooses to cheat. The same goes for State Two. Regardless of whether State One places itself, State Two should cheat on the agreement.
This is a collective action dilemma. There is a public good that will benefit all actors. However, it is in the interests of neither actor to provide the good. And so, the good is not provided, and the outcome is socially inefficient.
One of the ways to get around the problem of collective action is via a central authority that places penalties upon those who fail to do their part. This is why the IRS can arrest you. Your tax dollars go to the government, which uses them for the good of all (in theory, at least!). But, it would be in your individual interests not to pay - were it not for the IRS. You have a reasonable expectation that, should you withhold your tax payment, the IRS will come after you. Thus, it is in your individual interests to pay your taxes.
The DNC is serving a similar function regarding the states and the primary calendar. The punishments of the DNC - at least in theory - reconfigure the game into the following interaction.
In this game, the equilibrium position is altered. Now, both states have an incentive to cooperate regardless of what the other side does. Thus, the DNC's role in doling out punishments can help achieve the socially beneficial result.
The question is: can the DNC actually do it? Can it recreate the interaction so that it is modeled by something like the second graph? That depends upon whether its threat is credible, which in turn depends upon it sticking to its word when it comes to punishing Florida (and, so it appears, Michigan).
-Jay Cost