Krauthammer On Afghanistan War
Krauthammer: McChrystal thinks it's winnable, but I think there may be two issues here: the leadership in Kabul and the leadership in Washington.
The [counterinsurgency strategy] depends on having a local government that after you clear can actually be put in place and hold. Hasn't happened in Marja. That's why we are now behind. It could be that unlike Iraq there isn't a central government capable of doing this.
And secondly, unlike Iraq, it could be that the insurgents are so embedded and indigenous that it could be a different war. In Iraq, the surge succeeded largely because we had the population--for example, in Anbar--behind us. Why? Because Al Qaeda was an alien element. A lot of soldiers from Egypt, elsewhere, Afghanistan, Pakistan, who were hated in the end.
Here the local insurgents in Afghanistan are mostly indigenous. It's not a foreign legion of Egyptians in there. And they may be so embedded that it could be a difficult win because if you want to be as protective as McChrystal is and have rules of engagement which are incredibly restrained because you don't want to hurt the locals, and the insurgents are embedded, then you can never shoot and kill and destroy an insurgent. And they rearm, they fade away, and they remain. That's been a real complaint of the troops on the ground.
Wallace: So, are you saying we're going to lose?
Krauthammer: I'm saying that this strategy to defeat them using the Iraq strategy may be one that may not be exactly applicable. It's the best option we have, and I think McChrystal would be the best commander to carry it out. But I don't know how successful it can be. McChrystal and Petraeus think it can work, and their judgment I think is probably the best around, but I'm skeptical.




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