Yesterday, I began my critique of John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira's "Back to the Future: The Reemergence of the Emerging Democratic Majority." I indicated that Judis and Teixeira made at least four inferential errors in their article, and I outlined two of them. First, they fail to give a compelling reason to accept - in lieu of subsequent election returns - why 2006 should be understood as a realignment. Second, they engage in special pleading to explain previous elections that are inconsistent with their thesis.

Today, I shall complete my critique by outlining the third and fourth errors I see in their work.

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(3) They fail to account for the possibility that the Republicans will adapt to the demographic changes that they cite, and therefore retain their competitiveness.

They do not accept what has become a nearly axiomatic assumption in the study of the contemporary political party. That is, political parties are strategic pursuers of electoral majorities. The goal of the major parties, they should have assumed, is to win elections. Ideologies serve the purpose of electoral victory - not vice-versa. Political parties are not going to endorse ideologies that are guaranteed to induce electoral defeat. Rather, they try to craft issue platforms that they believe will yield victory. Accordingly, Judis and Teixeira should account for the possibility that the GOP might adapt successfully to the political environment. If they wish to argue that there is some reason not to expect the GOP to adapt - as one might argue about the Whigs in the 1850s, the Democrats in the 1890s, or the Republicans in the 1930s - I would be interested in such an argument. But they have to make it to predict the Democratic dominance they envision.

An implicit requirement here is that they must view the parties through a non-ideological lens. This is the case even if they can't stand one party or the other because of the issue positions it takes. A strange kind of "good faith" assumption is needed here. They largely should assume that the parties are not ignorant purveyors of narrow-minded ideologies, or angels sent from on high to deliver the nation from the evil woes of the other party. They should assume that the parties are "crass," that they are goal-oriented (they want electoral victory) and strategic (they take issue positions to achieve this victory).

Judis and Teixiera fail to make these assumptions about the GOP. They offer what seems like reams of demographic data, but no hint of recognition that the Republican Party might be able to adapt to these trends if - in fact - the trends are as they think they are. They write:

American politics became dominated by concerns over national security, an issue on which Republicans had enjoyed voters' confidence since 1980. Some voters who might have supported Democrats were distracted from economic or social concerns that had favored Democrats. They ignored Republicans' religious intolerance and indifference to environmental pollution, rewarding Republicans instead for their presumed success in the war on terror. In 2004 George W. Bush won victories in swing states like Ohio, Iowa, and Florida largely because of these voters' defection.

This is clearly insufficient. It is also unfair and uncharitable. It indicates to me that personal feelings are far too involved in their analytics. Not only do they fail to account for the strategic innovations we should expect - they seem to me to be too inclined to slip into "the-GOP-is-a-force-for-evil" talk. This is a hallmark of polemic, not sound analysis.

What is particularly interesting is that they nevertheless assume that the Democrats can be flexible and strategic.

To win elections, a Democratic candidate for Congress or governor has to maintain the support of the party's base while reaching a sufficient percentage of the swing voters in a given state or district. In Ohio, Iowa, or Indiana, that can mean appealing to white working-class voters in small towns. In Colorado, Arizona, or Montana, that can mean appealing to libertarian independents. In these local and state elections, Democrats can run candidates who reflect the special political mix of their state or congressional district. For example, in Ohio last year, Democrats ran a gubernatorial candidate who opposed gun control and a Senate candidate who campaigned against free trade. In Colorado, Democrats ran a gubernatorial candidate who opposed abortion and gun control. In Pennsylvania, Democrats ran a Senate candidate who was pro-life who appealed to working-class Catholics. And in every one of these cases, the Democratic candidate was elected.

Are Republicans not equally capable of such strategic positioning?

(4) They take rhetorical advantage of their vague terminology. "Realignment" is an inherently vague term, and it needs to be specified as fully as possible. They fail to do this.

Judis and Teixeira argue:

None of this suggests that the Democrats can't win the White House. Indeed, they will enter presidential elections with a slight advantage because of the tilt in the country toward the political center. But whether they can win will depend on how well they can maintain the Democratic base while reaching out to swing voters, and on the strength of the opposition. Republicans, obviously, will face problems of their own in placating their conservative Christian and pro-business base while reaching out to suburban professionals and the white working class in the North and West.

So, this will be a realignment in which the unfavored party can still be expected to win the White House about as often as the favored party? What kind of realignment is that?

They answer:

If the Democrats are limited to incremental reform, what we foresee is a realignment similar to the Republican realignment of the 1980s but different from the massive, dramatic realignment that occurred in the crisis of the 1930s. Democrats will hold Congress and the White House for most, but not all, of this period, and they'll suffer intraparty recriminations (as the Democrats of the 1990s did) from their failure to do better. But if they are able to anchor their majority in landmark legislation, they could achieve the kind of historic realignment that Franklin D. Roosevelt's Democrats enjoyed. At minimum, that would require Democratic politicians to put aside their own differences and mobilize pressure from below. The past record on this is not encouraging, but there's always the chance that today's Democrats will rise to the occasion.

The problem with this analysis is that 2006 is the first indication of a budding electoral realignment - if indeed there is one. 1980, on the other hand, was not.

There were realigning elements to the 1980 election. This is certainly true. The Republicans made significant and lasting gains in the Mountain West and, to a lesser extent, the South. However, 1980 was not a critical realignment. The GOP had slowly been making gains in these areas during the entire postwar period. Thus, 1980 was a punctuation in what has been an ongoing, secular realignment that had been punctuated by a GOP boom in both regions in the mid-60s (and was punctuated again in 1994). So, the roots of what happened in 1980 go very deep.

That is not the case with 2006. The realignment that Judis and Teixeira claim they see now is a critical realignment - one that emerges without electoral precedent. And so, 1980 is not the proper basis of comparison. The only election year in the postwar period that has shown any evidence of that phenomenon - a shift in the voting patterns without much prior indication - was 1958. The Pacific West lurched leftward that year.

Thus, to compare the realignment that Judis and Teixeira see this year to the realignment of 1980 is not a valid comparison. If they had made a more modest argument - perhaps correlating Democratic gains in the Northeast last year as another major step in the secular decline of the GOP in that region - the comparison would have been apt, and I would have probably agreed. But their comparison is not modest, and therefore it does hold up under scrutiny.

This problem is not limited to mere rhetorical imprecision. In lowering their sights about what they mean by "realignment," they lose any basis to justify their prediction of sustained Democratic domination. Grant the similarities between 1980 and 2006, for the sake of argument. As I said, whatever realigning forces that existed in 1980 were relatively modest. Thus, no one could - at the time - make a reasonable argument to expect, based upon demography alone, the political events of the next decade. If you retain the same demographic basis for each party, you can easily envision a different decade after the 1980 election.

To see what I mean by this, try the following though experiments. Extend the 1982 recession by a couple of months, and we would remember our 41st President, Walter Mondale. In 1988, make the aggressive Lee Atwater a little too aggressive, take Michael Dukakis out of the tank and make him think a little bit more about that death penalty question from Bernie Shaw, and we might remember him as our 41st President. In 1994, have the Clinton Administration recognize the implications of the 1992 Perot vote, and have the President govern as the New Democrat he promised to be (didn't he promise a middle class tax cut?) - and we might be celebrating the eighteenth year in Speaker Tom Foley's tenure.

If we are now in a period like the 1980s, Judis and Teixeira cannot make predictions about who will retain the balance of legislative power based solely upon demographic trends. The demography of the 1980s was not a sufficient condition for the political events of that period. Accordingly, they cannot justify their predictions about 2006-2022 by comparing it to 1980-1996.

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This last objection is a good indication of my overall take on their argument. I think it is confused. There is a confusion here about what "realignment" is, and what it implies. Judis and Teixeira think that this is a realignment like 1980. But if 2006 is indeed a realigning year as they think it is, it is quite different from 1980. On top of this, if 2006 is as modest a realignment as 1980 was, they really have no business making predictions about the next decade. The political shifts in 1980 were far too modest to have been a sufficient condition for the next 12 to 16 years. So, how are the shifts in 2006 a sufficient condition?

This is the basic problem I see in all four of my objections. They are confused about what kind of data needs to be offered to make their point. They are confused about what should, and what should not, count as data. They are confused about how to view the parties. And, as I said, they are confused about what they mean by "realignment."

Mind you, I am not necessarily rejecting their argument. Their thesis might be true. But the justification for it is so riddled with theoretical and methodological confusion that we have no business accepting their thesis based upon the justification.

This confused article should, I think, serve as a cautionary tale to all and sundry who wish to go off proclaiming incipient realignments. It is a dangerous undertaking - much harder than many obviously think. This is one of those instances where our desire for foreknowledge must give way to the sober realization that our ability to know is limited, and that all the wishing in the world will not change this frustrating fact. There are some things that we just can't know. So, before we start talking realignment, how's about we let the voters vote?

Footnote: Yesterday, I incorrectly credited V.O. Key with the four-fold typology of elections. In fact, the typology I referenced was partially created by Key in his 1955 Journal of Politics article, "A Theory of Critical Elections." Key identified elections as critical or reinforcing. However, it was Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes who noticed that some elections - such as the 1956 presidential election - were deviating elections, while others - like the 1960 presidential election - were reinstating elections. Interested readers can check out their seminal work, The American Voter, or their 1961 article in The American Political Science Review, "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election." Also, for anybody who is interested in a recent, and very excellent, review of realignment in the postwar era, I would recommend an article by Charles Bullock, Donna Hoffman, and Keith Gaddie entitled "Regional Variations in the Realignment of American Politics, 1944-2004." It appeared in the September, 2006 edition of the Social Science Quarterly.

Posted by Jay Cost at 12:00 AM | Permalink

This essay is a response to a fascinating article by John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira entitled "Back to the Future: The Re-emergence of the Emerging Democratic Majority." Judis and Teixeira argue that the 2006 election signals a realignment that favors the Democratic Party. I think their theory is underdetermined, and in this essay I shall offer my justification for that position.

First, let me make clear that what follows is a non-partisan critique. I am not going to try to convince you that the facts point toward the opposite of what Judis and Teixeira argue. I'm not going to try to convince you that the GOP is on the rise, and that 2006 was an aberration. I am, rather, going to argue that the epistemological foundation of their entire project is unstable, and - as a consequence - Judis and Teixeira fail to support their hypothesis. Simply stated, this kind of argument is very tricky, and Judis and Teixeira fail to make it.

I shall spread my response over today and tomorrow.

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What is a political realignment? To put it succinctly, a realignment is a broad-based, deeply-felt, and long-lasting change in the partisan orientation of a segment or segments of the electorate. Realignments can be one of two types: secular, or slow-moving evolutions in partisan preference that occur over a period of time; critical, or sudden shifts to one party or another that do not have a historical antecedent.

Lots of people like to predict realignments. Every post-election political science conference you attend, you will find at least one panel with at least one person pushing the idea that the last election was a signal that a new realignment might be a-comin'. I avoid those panels. I think that predicting realignments as they are starting to occur, as opposed to identifying them after the dust has largely settled, is exceedingly difficult. I think that you are far too likely to make a major inferential error when you argue for a prospective realignment. Judis and Teixeira make at least four.

(1) The great Harvard political scientist V.O. Key differentiated four types of elections. On the one hand is a realigning election, along the lines of what we just discussed. On the other hand is a set of elections that revolve around realigning elections: reinforcing elections in which the party favored by the alignment maintains its position, deviating elections in which the party not favored by the alignment makes gains without bringing about a new alignment, reinstating elections in which the party favored in the alignment returns to its position after a deviation.

How can you differentiate a realigning election from the rest? A realigning election is, as I said, broad-based, deeply-felt, and long-lasting. All of these imply a temporal distinction. Many voters must make the same kinds of political choices in multiple contests in cycle after cycle. How do we know if a given event was indeed broad-based, deeply-felt and long-lasting? We have to wait and see if large numbers continue to vote the same way over many offices again and again.

How can you do this before you have observed multiple elections? What would a critical test be, right now in 2007, to corroborate the theory that 2006 was a realigning election? I cannot think of one that does not require the assistance of Doc Brown, Marty McFly, and a flux capaciter. Maybe one is possible, but a prospective argument for a realignment is, I think, a dangerous undertaking. Minimally, you have to offer some fairly compelling evidence in lieu of future returns.

Obviously, since Judis and Teixeira think this Democratic majority is "emerging," they see a realignment that is just starting to happen. Of course, they do not have future election returns to offer, so what is their compelling. alternative piece of data? They argue:

We take a different view [than the view that 2006 was an "an event-driven election"]: that this election signals the end of a fleeting Republican revival, prompted by the Bush administration's response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the return to political and demographic trends that were leading to a Democratic and center-left majority in the United States. In 2006 the turn to the Democrats went well beyond those offices directly concerned with the war in Iraq or affected by congressional scandals. While Democrats picked up 30 House seats and six Senate seats, they also won six governorships, netted 321 state legislative seats, and recaptured legislative chambers in eight states. That's the kind of sweep that Republicans enjoyed in 1994, which led to Republican control of Congress and of the nation's statehouses for the remainder of the decade.

This argument is an insufficient way to deal with our lack of knowledge about the future. Just because many seats flipped from one party to another does not mean that they will stay flipped. In 1974, for instance, the GOP took hits nationwide from the top to the bottom of the ballot in every region of the country, but the damage did not last. Extent of damage does not imply permanence.

Even if we assume the effects of 2006 are permanent (which, I expect them to be to an extent), it does not mean that it was induced by long-running "political and demographic trends" that are consistent with realignments. Eventful political years can be significant and long-lasting for a party even if the "political and demographic trends" still favor the other party. There are other features to realignments other than length of effect. They must be broad-based and deeply-felt - which means not only that voters need to vote for the candidates they elected in the first instance of the realignment, they must confirm that decision in other elections as they acquire the opportunity. The fact that officials elected in an electoral "shock" are largely retained in office is not sufficient to claim that a realignment has occurred. For instance, the GOP made slow-but-sure gains in the Mountain West and the South in the postwar period, even though 1958 was a long-lasting setback in the Mountain West and 1974 was a long-lasting setback in the South. Neither of those events were realigning events, even though their effects were long-lasting.

The essential point is that we need to see what happens next. It could largely wash out, as some elections do. It could have a lasting effect that nevertheless does not amount to a realignment. It could be a realignment. We have one data point; to arbitrate between these alternatives, we either need more data points, or a compelling reason why we do not.

Incidentally, Teixeira and Judis are just flat out wrong to argue that we should expect the Bush administration's problems not to trickle down the ballot in a non-realigning year. National politics has that effect all the time. In fact, a party's fortune on one governmental level is highly and positively correlated with its fortunes on other levels. I do not know why they would imply otherwise.

(2) Within the last few cycles, there will be at least one election that does not fit your theory of realignment. That is, the party on the losing end of the supposed realignment will have scored a least one important victory. You must explain this in a way that is not reducible to special pleading. You can do that with all of the critical realignments. You can make a convincing case why 1928 and 1932 were fundamentally different, or why 1852 and 1860 were fundamentally different. You can do it with the secular alignments - noting the slow-but-sure trends in favor of the advantaged party.

Unfortunately, Judis and Teixeira fail to do that. To explain the failure of their hypothesis over the cycles preceding 2006 (remember, they initially offered it in 2002), they invent a psychological concept.

But there was also evidence of another psychological process, which might be called "de-arrangement." The focus on the war on terror not only distracted erstwhile Democrats and independents but appeared to transform, or de-arrange, their political worldview. They temporarily became more sympathetic to a whole range of conservative assumptions and approaches. In the past, voters had trusted Democrats to manage the economy, and in 2002 that preference should have been strongly reinforced by a recession that occurred on Bush's watch.

This is a textbook example of special pleading. To invent a psychological concept to explain data that cannot otherwise be explained is spurious reasoning. I honestly find it incredible that they think this is sufficient to resurrect their theory after the setbacks it suffered in 2002 and 2004. Personally, I would have loved it if I could - in my dissertation work early last year - insert an as-yet-undiscovered psychological concept to explain the vast divergence between my initial theory and what I found in the real world. But, unfortunately for me, those stingy profs wouldn't let me! So, I had to spend six months back at the drawing board. I think that Judis and Teixeira need to try a little harder to reconcile two major falsifying instances with their theory.

Minimally, if they are going to resort to a unique psychological concept, they need to find one that does not undermine the entire premise of their account. If we assume - for the sake of argument - the facts as they present them, and the existence of the psychological concept they create, what is not to say that recent, pro-GOP adjustments in worldviews were not permanent, and the 2006 election was the "de-arrangement?" Also, what is not to say that "de-arrangement" indicates that voters lack core beliefs on many of the basic political divisions of our day, and that recent variations in party support imply this lack of grounding rather than a "coming home?" The concept of "de-arrangement," in other words, is self-immolating. They have proffered an idea that they think serves their argument, but actually burns their idea as much as the idea they are trying to burn.

At a more general level, we should be able to see here the trap that lies in wait for us if we assume that current polling data about core beliefs/values are valid predictors of the partisan preferences that the public exhibits at the ballot box over the next ten years. I think it is highly problematic to assume this. Public opinion is ill-formed in many respects - which in turn means that analysts are highly susceptible to over-reading polling results. Thus, surveys are insufficient substitutes for future election results.

People do not pay much attention to politics, and their political opinions reflect that. Opinions, even on salient issues, are subject to fluctuations and seeming irrationalities that would surprise most political elites. Even if we can identify the public as holding a discrete set of values that seem to us to imply support for the Democratic Party - it does not mean that we can assume this support will be forthcoming. The connection between avowed core values, on the one hand, and issue/candidate preferences, on the other hand, is often quite tenuous.

Multiple problems present themselves when we try to estimate a voter's electoral behavior based upon his espousing a certain "core" value - which is what Judis and Teixeira consistently endeavor to do in this essay. Any decisive values we have identified might not be as central, and therefore not as decisive, to the respondent as we think they are. To assume that they are implicitly applies a kind of psychological value structure to the respondent that might not exist. At the heart of their argument about voter psychology is, I think, an unstated left-right ideological structure that is known not to exist in the mass public. Also, the values we have identified might be in conflict with other values that we have failed to identify. Respondents can hold contradictory values without knowing that they are contradictory (after all, knowledge of the contradiction implies political knowledge, which we know to be generally lacking). Contradictory values can incline a respondent in one direction based upon how an issue is framed - and framing is essentially what the parties try to do. Also, the salience of a respondent's values might wax and wane based upon the political mood - so that they emphasize their Republican set of values when the Republicans are up, and emphasize their Democratic set of values when the Democrats are up. And so on.

Generally, making a connection between a voter psychology that manifests itself only obliquely in survey responses and electoral results over the next two decades is a highly questionable endeavor. Judis and Teixeira seem to be aware of this at least in some regard - hence their sound inclination to be wary of over-reading the pro-Republican survey results of the last few years. But they fail to hold themselves to the same standard when the data favors their side. They thus do not adhere to a key rule that separates sound analysis from polemic: standards must be applied consistently and blindly.

I will have more to say on their argument tomorrow. Stay tuned!

Posted by Jay Cost at 12:01 AM | Permalink

Recently, the FEC reported the fundraising activities through May 31 of the six national party committees.

The DCCC has raised $26 million, the DNC has raised $25 million, and the DSCC has raised $18 million, for a total of $69 million.

The Republicans have raised $72 million all told. The RNC has pulled in $40 million, the NRCC $23 million, and the NRSC just $9 million.

Once again we see what we saw earlier this month - the NRSC is lagging well behind its Democratic counterpart. Some of this is undoubtedly from the fact that there are 22 Republicans incumbents who are drawing money to themselves and away from the NRSC. But, as I argued, not all of this is explicable by that. In particular, the Senate Republican committee seems to be lagging in individual contributions - pulling in only $6 million. This might be a sign of structural problems at the committee.

While the RNC has out-raised the DNC, pulling the GOP ahead of the Democrats, this is a presidential year - and we thus should not expect as much coordination between the national committees and the two congressional committees. The national committees will be busy working on the presidential election.

This, then, is a sign that the congressional Republicans are - overall - lagging relative to the Democrats. Exactly what does this mean? Over at The Fix, Chris Cillizza argues the thinks that this spells major trouble for the GOP, noting the following:

Remember that all four of the congressional committees are first and foremost about incumbent retention. In order to get members to raise and donate money to the committees, the organizations must show a commitment to defending incumbents no matter the cost. Witness the millions the DCCC poured into four lost cause races in Texas in 2004 -- simply because the races all featured incumbents and it was impossible for the party to walk away from them even though the races were probably unwinnable no matter how much money is spent.

So, while Republicans' financial positioning seems likely to limit their ability to do much beyond protecting their incumbents, Democrats seem on pace to expand the playing field thanks to their financial edge.

I think there is a great deal of truth here. It is fair to say that there is an incumbency "bias" at the Hill committees. Endangered incumbents are given more aid than challengers with similar prospects of victory. The Hill committees are prepared to support incumbents even when all seems lost. Compare the NRCC's response to AZ 08 and IN 08 last cycle. They pulled out of the former the moment that Randy Graf won the nomination, but they supported John Hostettler to the bitter end. Mr. Cillizza makes a great point as to why this is the case. The Hill committees must show loyalty to endangered incumbents so as to enjoy the support of the members of the caucus, who are able to transfer their own campaign cash to them. Incumbents are advantaged in a different way, too. Safe incumbents can count upon a good amount of committee contributions, even if they are not endangered. Challengers who are as likely to lose as incumbents are to win do not get that kind of cash.

However, I do not think this justifies Mr. Cillizza's characterization of the "congressional committees (as) first and foremost about incumbent retention." Recent research has shown that, while there is a slight pro-incumbent bias in the NRCC and DCCC, both are remarkably strategic in their giving patterns.

For instance, in the year that he cites - 2004 - total expenditures (direct contributions, coordinated expenditures, and independent expenditures) by the NRCC for incumbents totaled $13.9 million. The same amount for non-incumbents totaled $36.7 million. Thus, the NRCC spent more on challengers than on incumbents. The story is the same at the DCCC. In 2004, it spent $9.1 million on incumbents, and $27.3 million on non-incumbents. Most of the difference between the two is due to coordinated expenditures and independent expenditures. While many safe House incumbents get a few thousand dollars from the NRCC or the DCCC, each party is much more strategic with its independent expenditures and coordinated expenditures. (Typically, direct contributions only account for a tiny portion of total party spending - just 1.1% in 2004 for each House committee.) What is more - most of the congressional campaign committees' non-financial resources are dedicated to non-incumbents because they are the ones who lack connections to donors, campaign professionals, &c.

Generally, the way I view the congressional campaign committees (the subject of my dissertation) is as Temple University's Robin Kolodny does in her excellent book on the subject, Pursuing Majorities. Their principal goal is to pursue a majority for their caucus. By pooling the "Washington resources" of the caucus party together, they solve a collective action dilemma for each member, who would be made better off to be in a majority but who cannot bear the costs of attaining it. While it is true that there is a not insignificant "incumbency bias" that can skew this goal - this nevertheless is each congressional campaign committees' major goal.

One might say that the congressional campaign committees as strategic pursuers of majorities that are "saddled" with a slightly higher-than-normal aversion to risk. They generally put the money where it will make a difference, but they nevertheless tend to believe that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush" more than most of us do. Thus, they slightly over-fund incumbents with direct contributions.

So, Mr. Cillizza thinks that these fundraising discrepancies mean trouble for the Republicans in their pursuit of majorities. I think he might be on to something, but I think he overstates the point.

Another point. It is important to note that the NRSC is the outfit that is really in trouble. The NRCC is not nearly as worse off. It is inappropriate - in many regards - to lump these two committees together, which Mr. Cillizza does in his piece, and which many are inclined to do as well. The Senate and House Hill committees should be understood as independent entities. They have separate goals. Sometimes they coordinate. Sometimes they do not. Both will occasionally help the other out to maximize contributions or coordinated expenditures to particularly endangered incumbents. Both will also presumably coordinate messages. But each committee is autonomous. And so, I am not sure that lumping the two GOP Hill committees and comparing them to the Democratic committees offers maximum clarity. For, if we separate them out, we see that the NRSC is in much worse shape than the NRCC. The NRCC and the DCCC are about even in that regard for the cycle. This is not a great sign for the NRCC, which historically outraises the DCCC - but there is a great difference between its position vis-a-vis the DCCC and the NRSC's position vis-a-vis the DSCC.

Posted by Jay Cost at 12:00 AM | Permalink

Yesterday, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, the Supreme Court struck a blow to the campaign finance regime that has been in place since 2004. Or did it?

The issue in question is whether Wisconsin Right to Life, a non-profit corporation, could run what it claimed to be issue ads within thirty days of the primary with money that came from its general treasury fund. The ads in question called upon viewers to encourage Senators Herb Kohl and Russ Feingold to vote against the filibuster of judicial nominations. They did not advocate that Senator Feingold, who was up for reelection in the fall, be defeated. At the time, the FEC ruled that these advertisements were impermissible under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), a.k.a. McCain-Feingold.

The BCRA prohibits money from corporation and union general treasuries from financing "electioneering communications" (corporations and unions must instead work through PACs). An "electioneering communication" is, according to the BCRA,

Any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which--
(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate or Federal office;
(II) is made within--
(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or
(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and
(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate.

In Wisconsin Right to Life, the Supreme Court ruled against the FEC. It upheld the blackout provision, but ruled that the ads were nevertheless permissible.

The blackout provision was one of several intended to close a loophole that parties and interest groups began to exploit in 1996. The Democratic National Committee, at the behest of Clinton-Gore '96, started spending large amounts of soft money on "issue ads" that did not expressly endorse one candidate over another, but effectively did. Soon after, the Republicans followed suit.

How could this occur? In 1979 Congress amended the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) to allow parties to spend "soft" money (i.e. money not raised under the FECA's "hard" limits on who could give and how much they could give) for party building activities. Party building included: (a) the distribution of grassroots, pro-party material that did not expressly promote the election of a federal candidate, (b) slate cards, (c) voter registration, (d) administration and overhead. Individuals could contribute unlimited amounts of soft money to party committees, and corporations and unions were not barred from contributing. In 1996 the parties started dedicating massive amounts of soft money to issue ads that were technically defined as party building, and thus not subject to the hard limits of the FECA, but were effectively expressing advocacy for a candidate's election.

The BCRA forbid parties from raising or spending soft money - and thus did away with soft money issue ads. To prevent non-party organizations from doing what the parties had done, the BCRA also implemented the blackout provision.

This is not the first time the Court has reviewed the blackout provision. In 2003's McConnell v. FEC the Court upheld it in principle, ruling that the FEC could prevent outside groups from funding "electioneering communications" with money collected outside the BCRA limitations. Nevertheless, the Court did indicate that "pure" issue ads would be permissible during the blackout dates. It therefore opened the door to a later challenge. Hence, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life. The FEC decided that Wisconsin Right to Life's ads were indeed electioneering, and Wisconsin Right to Life argued that they were pure issue ads.

In siding with Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court did not offer a majority opinion as to a justification for the rule. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, argued for a standard to differentiate between "electioneering communications" and "pure issue ads." Chief Justice Roberts wrote:

Because [Wisconsin Right to Life's] ads may reasonably be interpreted as something other than an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate, they are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy, and therefore fall outside McConnell's scope. To safeguard freedom of speech on public issues, the proper standard for an as-applied challenge to [the BCRA] must be objective, focusing on the communication's substance rather than on amorphous considerations of intent and effect...[A] court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. [Wisconsin Right to Life's] three ads are plainly not the functional equivalent of express advocacy under this test.

What the Chief Justice argued for here is seemingly narrow. He does not wish to overturn the blackout provision cited above. Rather, he rejects the FEC's interpretation of it. He holds that so long as one could reasonably interpret an ad as a genuine issue ad, it does not fall prey to the BCRA's definition of electioneering communication. He thus holds the BCRA to be constitutional, but the FEC's interpretation of it to be unconstitutionally broad.

Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in the ruling with the Chief Justice and Justice Alito. However, they did not join in this opinion. They want the blackout provision overturned altogether.

Thus, the ads are permissible, and the blackout provision is constitutional.

Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsberg, and Breyer view this as an overturning of the Court's ruling in McConnell, and an effective end to the blackout provision. Justice Souter wrote:

After today, the ban on contributions by corporations and unions and the limitation on their corrosive spending when they enter the political arena are open to easy circumvention, and the possibilities for regulating corporate and union campaign money are unclear. The ban on contributions will mean nothing much, now that companies and unions can save candidates the expense of advertising directly, simply by running "issue ads" without express advocacy, or by funneling the money through an independent corporation like [Wisconsin Right to Life].

Without treading too far into the thorny legal or moral debate, I will say that my intuition is that Justice Souter is being a little hyperbolic. The reason is that the political parties will not be able to participate in this kind of activity. The BCRA ban on soft money has been retained. This will do much to prevent what he fears will happen.

I agree with Souter that the Court has effectively narrowed the BCRA's intended definition of "electioneering communication." I also think that this decision - because it lacks a justification that a majority supports - confuses more than it clarifies. However, to argue that this will once again open the floodgates holding back corporation and union money is to fail to appreciate what induced these organizations to give so much in the past. Their interest in channeling soft money funds to the parties was for access as least as much as it was for electioneering. A big check to the party could get you the ear of a senator if and when you needed it. Will an independently-financed quasi-electioneering ad do the same? I do not think so. I think the latter only influences voters directly, and elected officials indirectly (and I am not sure how much indirect influence it would have over officials - I do not think those "527 organizations" have acquired much influence, despite all of their efforts). Soft money given to parties could influence officials directly.

The key difference is that today, the parties are forbidden from this kind of activity. By locking the parties out of this process - and they still will be locked out - you retain a major impediment to the kind of union- and corporation-driven money that thwarted the old FECA regime. Barring the parties from soft money means impeding corporations and unions from buying access to them. Even if this opens the way for them to participate in electioneering - that is a far cry from what most of us found to be offensive in the wake of the 1996 election. Most of us objected to the direct influence that could be wielded over government officials by massive contributions to their parties.

Where I think this could have an effect is on the role of 527 groups - which in the past have been subjected to the blackout provision. What this might do is allow these groups to engage in their so-called "issue advocacy" further into the campaign season. This is why I agree with the minority that the BCRA has been weakened here, but I do not think it has been weakened by very much. The parties are still barred from receiving soft money, which is what induced this regime in the first place.

But, then again, much depends upon how the FEC deals with this decision. There is no majority-endorsed guideline on how to interpret the blackout rule. All the Court has said here is that the blackout rule does not forbid all ads. If the FEC interprets this ruling narrowly, only a few ads might be aired in the blackout period. In that case, expect to see the Court revisit this issue in the wake of the 2008 cycle.

Posted by Jay Cost at 12:00 AM | Permalink

Last week, I started my analysis of the major presidential candidates - first with a methodological overview, and then a look at Hillary Clinton. Today, I analyze John Edwards.

I think it is highly unlikely that John Edwards will be his party's nominee next year. He is the only major candidate about whom I feel comfotable saying that. I think that his fundamental failing is that he is a poor politician.

This was not always thought to be the case about him. Michael Barone writes the following about Senator Edwards in The 2004 Almanac of American Politics,

[Edwards] was the candidate most feared by the Bush political strategists in 2002 and early 2003; they thought his Southern background, his moderate voting record on many issues and his attractive persona might put into play some Southern and Northern states which would be safe for Bush against other possible nominees.

What I think Edwards has failed to learn in these six years of campaigning is that running for political office is not perfectly correlated with persuading a jury. There are many similarities, to be sure. You "sell" a jury just as you "sell" an electorate. You sell them both on a narrative that explains why they are where they are, as well as a solution to the problem that has brought them together. However, electoral politics involves more selling than this.

What I think Edwards has failed to understand is that he himself is one of the products placed on the market. A good politician understands this. He convinces the electorate not just of the problem and of the solution, but also that he is the person worthy of the public trust to implement the solution. He thus conforms his public image as closely to his message as possible - so that the voters believe that he will do what he says he will do, and therefore that he is worthy of the office they are about to bestow upon him. This is a major difference from Edwards' previous profession. A trial lawyer must "simply" sell a jury on the problem and the solution. He need not worry about whether the jury believes that he will implement its verdict. That is up to the judge.

What is more, a trial lawyer has the advantage of a controlled environment in which he can sell. This does not exist in politics. If the rules of evidence at a trial are Lockean, the rules in politics are decidedly Hobbesian (the only real prohibitions are the difficult-to-meet standards of slander and libel). Evidence against a politician - in the court of public opinion - is whatever you can turn into evidence. There is no "fair" and "unfair" - there is only what the voters will believe and what they will not believe. [Political elites who decry this, who whine about "under-handed" politics are usually just decrying the fact that they were out-strategized. As if there is some code of manners that they would restrict themselves to at the cost of victory! For every "Swiftboating," there is an equal and opposite "Mediscaring."]

This means that - when you run for political office - you must conform your life to your political message as much as you are able. You must be the embodiment of the message that you are selling. Any small deviation or inconsistency - regardless of how irrelevant it objectively is - gives your opponent the opportunity to characterize you as untrustworthy, and therefore unworthy of the office you seek.

Edwards does not seem to me to understand this. If he did, he would not have built the 28,200 square-foot estate that he built. That mansion sends the wrong message about who he is. It allowed his political opponents to tag him as somebody who does not really believe what he says, and therefore as somebody unworthy of the office.

I personally do not think Edwards is any more of a hypocrite than any of us. Do not count me as one of the many who castigate him for the size of his house. FDR was the model of northeastern elitist patricianism, and he nevertheless made himself into the archetypical Democratic man of the people. I think there is something valid, and quite American, in that transformation. And Lord knows that - if I had tens of millions of dollars at my disposal, a cancer-stricken wife, and two young children who had just endured a two-year presidential campaign with another on the way - I would spoil them similarly.

Edwards' problem is not that he is a hypocrite per se. His problem is his lack of political insight, which allowed him to be tagged as one. He failed to realize that everything about him - including his house - would be subjected to public scrutiny, and that it all must conform to his message because, after all, the voters are judging him as much as his message.

The scuttlebutt now is that Edwards' fundraising for the Second Quarter is going to be weak. This is unsurprising to me. My intuition is that political elites in the Democratic Party are starting to understand that - however valid Edwards' message is, and to whatever extent he might be a true believer in that message - he is not the right messenger.

I think Democrats are well advised to abandon Edwards. The Republicans would decimate an amateur such as he. It would be brutal.

Posted by Jay Cost at 12:00 AM | Permalink

Yesterday's column got me thinking about the new primary regime.

The schedule is definitely different than years past. It is much more intense. The calendar itself is still in flux, but this is what I have been able to piece together.

January 14, 2008: Iowa

January 19, 2008: Nevada

January 22, 2008: New Hampshire, Wyoming (GOP only)

January 29, 2008: Florida, South Carolina (Democrats only)

February 2, 2008: South Carolina (GOP only)

February 3, 2008: Maine (GOP Only)

February 5, 2008: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho (Democrats only), Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico (Democrats only), New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia (Republicans only)

Note: Michigan might be moving its primary forward on both the Democrat and Republican sides.

Many people think that there is a collective irrationality in this schedule. Connecticut Secretary of State Susan Bysiewicz summed up the situation as follows.

In the absence of a rational primary process, we are seeing an ad-hoc national primary take shape...Connecticut didn't start this tidal wave but I cannot stand by and allow our voters to become irrelevant. Ultimately, members of both political parties must come together and enact real reform.

Is it, though? The prevailing view is that it definitely is. There is something wrong with this schedule. Maybe there is, but I think this schedule has a good bit of utility.

Americans are always tinkering with their democratic inputs. Its one of our most cherished pastimes. Yale's Stephen Skowronek has argued that - before America had a modern government - it had a modern democracy. This is most certainly true. Americans have been thinking about, and improving upon ways to vote since the election of 1800. Of the seventeen amendments we have passed on top of the Bill of Rights, nine of them concern voting [second place in the list of amendment subjects is, of course, beer]. Unsurprisingly, we have tinkered with our presidential nominating process several times. Indeed, today's presidential primary process is the product of a slow evolution that quickened after the debacle that was the 1968 Democratic Convention. For years, reformers decried the plutocratic rule of party bosses who could select the presidential candidates that they preferred. After 1968, Democrats instituted major reforms in the nominating process. Republicans soon followed - and we wound up with the system that we have.

Perhaps because only a few of us lived in a time when presidential nominees were chosen for the people instead of by the people, lots of us now object to this new system. And, we're inclined to tinker again. We replaced the plutocracy of the party bosses with a weird geographical aristocracy - in which a few, unrepresentative states make the choice for all of us.

And so, reformers are up-and-about once again. Thirty years ago, they reformed the manner in which presidential nominees are selected. Now, they want to change the schedule by which they are selected. FairVote summarizes the major reform plans:

Delaware Plan: Under the Delaware Plan, the states would be put into four groups according to population. The smallest 12 states, plus federal territories, would vote first, followed by the next smallest 13 states, then the 13 medium-sized states, and finally the 12 largest states. These four consolidated primaries would occur on the first Tuesday of each month, beginning in March and ending in June.

Regional Primary System: The National Association of Secretaries of State has endorsed the idea of regional primaries, with a series of regional primaries separated by a month and with the order of regions changing in every election cycle.

I'll be honest. I don't prefer either of these plans to the seemingly inane schedule that we have this cycle. I think they would make our nominating system less open.

This might seem counter-intuitive. After all, the more people vote - the more open it is, right? Not necessarily! The more people who are allowed to vote at once, the more pressure there will be on candidates to use television advertisements, therefore to acquire money, and therefore to court big money donors. Just because we give to the public the right to select who shall be the nominee does not mean that we have avoided the plutocratic exercise of power. As I have indicated several times on this blog - the exercise of power can be subtle. The more pressure you place on candidates to acquire big money, the more power you give political elites to set the national agenda. In other words - political elites will effectively narrow the field of choices for all of us in these schemes by supporting, or refusing to support, candidates.

This is why placing Iowa and New Hampshire early in the cycle has a real benefit. This is an opportunity for candidates to build grassroots support via retail politicking. From this activity, they can post some wins and then score some big donors. In this situation you give to Iowa and New Hampshire some of the power to set the agenda. They are empowered to review a whole host of candidates, and decide which are, and which are not, worthy of the broader public's consideration. Of course, the media and the political elites play this role in the current system, too. But, in these alternative schemes, Iowa and New Hampshire would lose what power they have, and essentially all agenda-setting power would accrue to political elites in Washington, D.C., New York City, and Los Angeles.

The problem in the last few cycles has been not only that Iowa and New Hampshire set the agenda for the rest of the public - they also effectively made the choice for all. This happened in 2004 and 2000 with the Democrats. I think this year's schedule might ameliorate much of this problem [which, recall from yesterday, is overrated - Iowa and New Hampshire have only ever effectively chosen the nominees when they act in tandem]. Iowa and New Hampshire come early, but they are almost immediately followed by a majority of the nation. This separation between the early states and Super Tuesday retains Iowa and New Hampshire's agenda-setting power. They can flag candidates as worthy or unworthy of our attention. Meanwhile, the smallness of the separation means that the race will not end before Super Tuesday happens. With just two weeks between New Hampshire and Super Tuesday - it is unlikely that the competition will fall off because of losses in the Buckeye and Granite States. The public will be able to use the early states as an agenda-setting cue, but will still be able to make a real choice.

Well, you might respond, is it not obvious that this is not going to happen this cycle? Is it not obvious that the political elites are exercising an inordinate share of power this year? Look at all of this "eye-popping cash"! Yes, there is such an influence in this cycle. I would certainly agree. But - as I argued yesterday - I do not think this is caused by the current primary system. Without such celebrity candidates, I think the usual manner of doing business in Iowa and New Hampshire, namely retail politicking, would still apply. What we are interested in is whether a given primary schedule will increase the power of political elites to set the agenda. I think both of these alternatives would increase their capacity to do that. I think that is a bad thing.

There is another idea being touted that some think might diminish the power of the elites. This is again from FairVote:

California Plan: The [California] Plan...features a schedule consisting of 10 two-week intervals, during which randomly selected states may hold their primaries or caucuses, with a gradual increase in the total population of states and territories holding primaries/caucuses. This 20-week schedule is weighted based on each state's number of congressional districts. American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, which also send delegates to both national conventions, are each counted as one district in this system.

In the first interval, a randomly determined combination of states with a combined total of eight congressional districts would hold their primaries, caucuses, or conventions. In the second period--two weeks later--the eligibility number would increase to 16. Every two weeks, the combined size of the contests would grow by eight congressional districts, until a combination of states totaling 80 congressional seats (8 x 10)--nearly one-fifth of the total--would be up for grabs in the tenth and last interval at the end of June. What ordinarily would be the 7th primary date would be switched with the 4th primary date, to give all the big states a chance at having an earlier primary.

This type of schedule could enable candidates to win votes via retail politicking. I think that is precisely its point. However, if the selection of states is random, it is not hard to envision a scenario in which you need lots of money and time simply to fly the jet (Round 1: Delaware, Vermont, Alaska, Hawaii, New Mexico). Thus, this would offer no guarantee of protection for retail politicking. Also, it is naïve to think that retail politicking can happen any where at any time. It takes strong grassroots political institutions - strong local parties, strong civic groups, etc. It also takes a public that is willing to dedicate the time and effort to evaluating these candidates in formats that are more personal than the mass media. In my dissertation, I call this the political economy of the electoral campaign. It varies from locale to locale. To think that we can pick up New Hampshire's method of politics and place it in Mississippi - without creating equally strong political institutions and a culture attuned to retail politics - is not very realistic. What is more, the variable nature of this system will make it so that only rarely will publics be able to engage in retail politics, and therefore no place will be able to retain the political and social institutions necessary for such politics.

Also, I find it hard to imagine a contest lasting past four of these ten rounds. Thus, never more than 24% of the public will essentially decide the nominees. The blindness of the scheme offers justice to all states - but justice is not the same as efficiency. One of the criticisms of the current scheme is that only a small segment of the public ever gets a say. This is inefficient, given that the President is a leader of all of us. This system fails to address this inefficiency.

It seems to me that if our goals are to diminish the power of political elites to determine who our prospective nominees are, and to open the primary system to as many as possible - a good case can be made for this year's nominating scheme. You have the "retail" states up front - Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Carolina - where you have an opportunity to catch fire, even if the elites do not prefer your candidacy. In other words - you have two paths to get yourself on the greater public's list of viable candidates. On the one hand, you can get elite endorsements, donations, etc. so that you are sufficiently high-profile and well-heeled to compete on National Primary Day. Or you can convince the good folks in Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, and South Carolina that you are worthy of their estimation - and they can put you on the national agenda. And then, almost immediately, you have what amounts to a national primary where almost everybody gets a say.

It might be hard to imagine this happening, given this cycle's events. But, as I mentioned earlier in this piece, and as I argued yesterday, the seeming domination of the elites in this cycle and the compressed schedule are not causally related. Envision this schedule minus these celebrity candidates - think of candidates in years like 1976, 1988, 1992, 2004 in this schedule - and I think you will see what I mean.

Remember that simply to give everybody a vote does not necessarily mean that you have created an open system. In a field as large as most presidential fields - somebody is going to have to pare down the number of alternatives to a viable few. Who shall accomplish that task? Right now, Iowa and New Hampshire do much of that work for us. Political elites also do much of the work. The alternatives mentioned above would, I think, place too much of this task in the hands of political elites - large swaths of primaries would require television, and therefore money, and therefore the blessing of the elites. They would thus make for a less open system - for the power to set the agenda is just as important as the power to decide on an agenda item.

Unfortunately, the public as a whole lacks the capacity to set the agenda. As E.E. Schattschneider once noted, the public has a vocabulary that is limited to two words - yes and no - and it can only speak when spoken to. So, if we want to keep a portion of the larger public involved in the process of determining who are viable candidates - and not cede this agenda-setting power entirely to political elites - we must delegate it to a few smaller, non-elite entities. Hence, we have the Iowa caucus and the New Hampshire primary. We need to protect their agenda-setting power, but make sure that the final choice is up to the rest of the nation.

I think this year's system might actually do that. This not to say that I would not tinker with it a little. It probably would be inefficient to have all states vote on the first Tuesday in February - so it might be prudent to rotate them in and out. And, anyway, you'd want a not insignificant set of states behind Super Tuesday to break ties. I'd also maybe move it back a few weeks, too. Even then, I would not argue that such a system would be maximally efficient. Iowa and New Hampshire require private payment - namely ethanol and the Northeastern Dairy Compact - for the public service they render. But I think these sorts of inefficiencies would be inevitable whatever you do. Overall, I think this cycle's schedule is not terribly bad. I prefer it to any of the three alternatives being bandied about these days.

Posted by Jay Cost at 12:00 AM | Permalink

Since he's back in the news, I thought I would flag my previous essays on his prospects. Here, here, and here.

Posted by Jay Cost at 11:26 AM | Permalink

Many analysts have argued that - thanks to the compressed primary schedule - the importance of Iowa and New Hampshire has been diminished this cycle. Has it? If so, has it been diminished because of the schedule?

I am not sure whether Iowa or New Hampshire will be diminished this cycle. My argument here is that, whatever diminution actually exists, only a little bit of it has been caused by the new calendar.

A key concept in this consideration is "importance." We cannot answer our question until we know exactly how important Iowa and New Hampshire have been in the past. So, let's start thinking about this by considering the previous (non-incumbent) winners, going back to the first year that the primaries and caucuses were fully dominant, 1976:

Democrats

2004. Iowa: John Kerry / New Hampshire: John Kerry

2000. Iowa: Al Gore / New Hampshire: Al Gore

1992. Iowa: Tom Harkin / New Hampshire: Paul Tsongas

1988. Iowa: Dick Gephardt / New Hampshire: Michael Dukakis

1984. Iowa: Walter Mondale / New Hampshire: Gary Hart

1976. Iowa: Uncommitted / New Hampshire: Jimmy Carter

Republicans

2000. Iowa: George W. Bush / New Hampshire: John McCain

1996. Iowa: Bob Dole / New Hampshire: Pat Buchanan

1988. Iowa: Bob Dole / New Hampshire: George H.W. Bush

1980. Iowa: George H.W. Bush / New Hampshire: Ronald Reagan

This should make clear that Iowa and New Hampshire have not historically been as critical as many might think. From this list, we might infer three facts about these contests:

1. A win in Iowa is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for success. You can lose Iowa and still win the nomination (Clinton, Dukakis, Carter, Bush, Reagan). You can win Iowa and still lose the nomination (Harkin, Gephardt, Dole, Bush).

2. A win in New Hampshire is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for success. You can lose New Hampshire and still win the nomination (Clinton, Mondale, Bush, Dole). You can win New Hampshire and still lose the nomination (Tsongas, Hart, McCain, Buchanan).

3. A win in Iowa and New Hampshire is not a necessary condition for success. You can lose both states and still win the nomination (Clinton). However, a win in Iowa and New Hampshire is a sufficient condition for success. If you win both states, you win the nomination (Gore, Kerry). [Though note that in 1972 Edmund Muskie won both states, but still lost the nomination to George McGovern. 1972 was the first election subsequent to the Democrats' enactment of the McGovern-Fraser Commission reforms, and so it did feature "open" selection systems and therefore a large number of causes and primaries. So, the fact that this condition holds depends upon the cut-off date.]

Right off the bat - note the limited effect of these early contests. They are only decisive when they act in tandem. If they both favor the same candidate - that candidate is advantaged. Otherwise, their effect is far from decisive. And, depending upon whether we count 1972 as the first year or whether we count 1976 - even this effect might not hold.

So, it is only in the third sense that the prestige of Iowa and New Hampshire might be diminished by this compressed primary. What pundits seem to be thinking is that Mitt Romney might win both Iowa and New Hampshire, and still lose the nomination to a candidate who loses both states. Thus, Iowa and New Hampshire will not matter as much. However, I think this is a hasty presumption. A win in both could indeed "slingshot" him to the nomination, as it did John Kerry. That is clearly his strategy. He is banking upon that third inference being true.

He could be right in this regard, but he could also be wrong. It is interesting to note that the third inference - Iowa and New Hampshire together being sufficient - is predicated upon only two observations. Only twice has a challenger ever won both Iowa and New Hampshire. So, it might not be true that wins in both states are sufficient for the nomination.

A way of answering our larger question (what effect will this calendar have on Iowa and New Hampshire?) is thus starting to emerge. What we first need to ask is whether there is a reasonable way that somebody could lose Iowa and New Hampshire to a single opponent, yet still win the nomination - regardless of whether the primary calendar is compressed or inflated. Second, we need to ask whether such candidates are present in this cycle. If there is a plausible way to win the nomination that includes ceding both states to a single opponent - and if the sorts of candidates who could do that exist in this cycle - it becomes more difficult to argue that the primary schedule has diminished the importance of Iowa and New Hampshire.

So, what would it take to win the nomination despite two losses to a single candidate? I think there are two preconditions for such a trajectory. First, you must have money. If there is no money left in your bank account, you cannot put fuel in the airplane - and your candidacy is effectively finished. Second, you must have a good reason to continue: prestige, ideological differences, a clear electability advantage (despite your recent losses), or something. If there is nothing of significance to separate you from the winner of Iowa and New Hampshire - you have no reason to continue.

Thus, I think the third inference is not necessarily true, even if it might be usually true. Regardless of what you do to the primary schedule, you could see somebody lose both Iowa and New Hampshire to a single candidate, but still win the nomination.

Furthermore, I think such candidates are in plentiful supply this cycle. This year, money abounds. So, many candidates will have the cash to continue after Iowa and New Hampshire. What is more - there are good reasons for candidates to continue campaigning even after they lose in the early states. Within both parties, there are ideological differences; there are also prestigious candidates who can legitimately say, "I am not going anywhere until the nation as a whole says no to me." These candidates - I am thinking of both Clinton and Giuliani, maybe also McCain, Obama, and Thompson - could survive early losses and still win the nomination.

In a certain sense, then, this year's crop of candidates is "larger" than these primaries. Unlike previous cycles, many in this crop seem to possess the capacity to survive losses in both to a single opponent. I think that, given these candidates, this is a year where we could expect an equally strong challenge to the importance of Iowa and New Hampshire regardless of the compressed schedule.

If, for instance, Romney were to win Iowa and New Hampshire against these high-profile candidates, and the schedule was not compressed, it would still be about as reasonable to expect a GOP candidate other than Romney to win as it would given a compressed schedule. Of course, the fact that more primaries are pushed forward might alleviate some of the pressure on a high profile candidate who loses Iowa and New Hampshire to a single candidate (and therefore diminish the importance of Iowa and New Hampshire). It might keep public opinion from "congealing" against his or her favor. But, what we are talking about is four weeks. Super Tuesday has been expanded and moved forward by four weeks. That's it. Celebrity candidates like Giuliani or Clinton are - I think - notable (and well-heeled) enough to survive an extra four weeks should they lose these two states. So, even if Super Tuesday were in March rather than February, they would probably do about as well. If Romney wins Iowa and then wins New Hampshire - Giuliani would still have about as good a shot if Super Tuesday were March 5th as he would if it were February 4th. Ditto for Clinton against a Democratic surprise victor. That's how prestigious these candidates are.

In other words, when we "control" for the candidates in the race, we see that most of the ostensible effect that the calendar has is actually ephemeral. In other words, imagine this set of candidates in a more inflated cycle. We would probably still see the same diminution of Iowa and New Hampshire because these candidates have the capacity to play beyond it.

Meanwhile, when we "control" for the calendar, and alter the candidates in it - we would see whatever diminution of Iowa and New Hampshire we have seen disappear. Imagine a compressed primary cycle like this, but without such celebrity candidates. Imagine a set of candidates akin to the Democrats in 1976 or even in 2000, and ask yourself: are Iowa and New Hampshire diminished in a year like that? I'd answer no - that, in fact, they would become more important when none of the candidates are larger-than-life people like Hillary Clinton, Rudy Giuliani, John McCain, Barack Obama, and Fred Thompson. Those "second-tier" candidates would become highly dependent upon wins in Iowa and New Hampshire.

And so at first blush, it seems like it is the calendar affecting the importance of Iowa and New Hampshire - but it just so happens that the calendar was changed in a year with so many high-profile candidates. The seeming causal effect of the calendar is, I think, largely spurious. The candidates are causing most of whatever diminution there actually is. They are different this year. Never have we seen a field so packed with bona fide celebrities. I count six. Six! This is unprecedented in the whole history of American politics. Never have there been six candidates who are essentially household names. They are the kinds of Goliaths who could lose both Iowa and New Hampshire and still win the nomination in any year.

So - two points emerge from these considerations. (a) Iowa and New Hampshire have only ever been important in a limited sense. It has only ever been that a win in both implies the nomination. (b) Their importance this year may or may not be diminished, but little of this is probably due to the compressed calendar. There are candidates with enough money and enough prestige that - should they lose Iowa and New Hampshire to a single opponent - we should not expect their chances to be affected significantly by the primary schedule.

Posted by Jay Cost at 12:01 AM | Permalink

In response to today's column, a few people have written to point out:

(a) Bill Clinton's job approval was somewhere between 55% and 60% at the end of his term.
(b) George W. Bush lost the popular vote.

Both of these are true. I was aware of both of them - but did not think that they offered fundamental challenges to my point that the public in 2000 was "tired of President Clinton['s mode of representation]."

I think the real issue is whether - when the law mandates that a new person take the office - the public would prefer somebody who acts differently. The fact that it approved of Clinton is not relevant. It is also not surprising, considering how he so consciously tacked to the median. You can enjoy your vacation, but still feel - when it comes to an end - that you are glad to go home. The fact that the public largely voted for his vice-president is not necessarily relevant, either. It might have been that the vice-president was conscious of the public's feelings about the Clinton Administration, and took steps to inoculate himself. Indeed, Gore did precisely that.

You see, the evidence that I had in mind was the actions of the political elites. George W. Bush made the argument that he did in his convention address only because he perceived that it would resonate with the public. Obviously, this perception was predicated upon knowledge that his campaign derived from polling and focus group testing. Meanwhile, Al Gore made essentially the same argument as Bush! Gore - like Bush - felt the need to argue that we need to do something socially positive with all of this prosperity. He chose to run a "populist" campaign rather than a "let's keep the good times a'rollin'" campaign. He could have said, "I'm Clinton minus the sexual indiscretions." But he chose not to.

A parallel I had in mind was the election of 1960. Kennedy did not win just because Nixon was a relatively poor candidate, though Nixon was. Kennedy won in part because he promised that we would do something. His "New Frontier" was a contrast to Eisenhower as much as it was a contrast to Nixon. Thus, even though people loved Ike - the election of 1960 should be viewed, at least in part, as a rejection of Eisenhower's way of governing (which was, in many respects, to do very little). The public embraced change that year, even though they loved and supported the outgoing President.

Posted by Jay Cost at 11:55 AM | Permalink

As I mentioned earlier in the week, my intention with these essays on the presidential candidates is not to handicap them per se. Quite frankly, I do not think that exercise is possible at the moment. Instead, what I would like to do is merely frame these candidates in illuminating ways.

I'll start with Hillary Clinton. The hypothesis I offer is the following. While all of the major candidates present themselves, one way or another, as alternatives to President Bush, Senator Clinton's campaign stands in the greatest contrast to the President.

Consider two items. The first is Senator Clinton's video that accompanies the announcement of her campaign song.

The second is two selections from George W. Bush's acceptance speech at the 2000 Republican National Convention.

Little more than a decade ago, the Cold War thawed, and with the leadership of Presidents Reagan and Bush, that wall came down.

But instead of seizing this moment, the Clinton-Gore administration has squandered it. We have seen a steady erosion of American power and an unsteady exercise of American influence. Our military is low on parts, pay and morale. If called on by the commander-in-chief today, two entire divisions of the Army would have to report, "Not ready for duty, sir."

This administration had its moment, they had their chance, they have not led. We will.

[SNIP]

I believe great decisions are made with care, made with conviction, not made with polls.

I do not need to take your pulse before I know my own mind. I do not reinvent myself at every turn. I am not running in borrowed clothes.

When I act, you will know my reasons. And when I speak, you will know my heart.

On a methodological level, these two vignettes are very similar: both are excellent examples of political theater. In fact, you could probably call them textbook examples. The Clinton video is very funny. It plays off The Sopranos series finale in a clever way. It is also cute and disarming. It portrays the Clinton family in a sweet, amenable light: Bill wants onion rings, Hillary orders carrot sticks. The Bush vignette is equally effective (I could not find a video clip, so you'll have to trust your memories). It is a fairly harsh critique of the Clinton Administration that does not seem like bitter mud slinging. At the same time, it paints Bush as an alternative to the present administration - but one that recalls previous administrations that had since come to great esteem.

But - on a philosophical level - there are vast differences here. Obviously, the implied political ideologies are different, but that is not what I am on about. What I mean is that these vignettes demonstrate their actors' deeply divergent views on what constitutes the proper relationship between governors and the governed.

The Clinton vignette is understandable in this light if we recall its purpose: to introduce the results of an online poll to select Senator Clinton's campaign song. This is a very specific example of a general view that the Clintons - both of them - have about governing. They are of the people. They embody what has been called the delegate model of representation. They reflect the views, opinions, and preferences of the greater public. The Clintons seem always and everywhere ready to follow the articulated interests of the public at large. The campaign song is a trivial feature of the campaign, but it is still revealing. If you had to choose a song that you would hear at least once a day for the next 450 or so days of your life - would you place its selection up for a vote? The Clintons would. That says a lot.

Indeed, President Clinton's empathetic campaign of 1992 was largely predicated upon his connection to the people: he feels our pain. Senator Clinton does not cut as empathetic a figure as President Clinton - but there are other effective ways for her to convey that she, too, intends to be a delegate of the people. Her most effective is her "listening tours." This speaks to the same essential idea as President Clinton's empathy, and it plays to one of her natural strengths: she seems like she would be a fantastic listener.

George W. Bush would have none of this, of course. His convention speech was, in part, a critique of this method of representation. It leads, he argued, to small minded politics. The alternative he offered might be called a trustee model of representation. His argument in that excerpt is so close to Edmund Burke's that - were campaign speeches to include footnotes - the great philosopher would probably have been mentioned. On the subject of representation, Burke argued:

My worthy colleague says, his will ought to be subservient to yours. If that be all, the thing is innocent. If government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior. But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination; and what sort of reason is that, in which the determination precedes the discussion; in which one set of men deliberate, and another decide; and where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments?

To deliver an opinion, is the right of all men; that of constituents is a weighty and respectable opinion, which a representative ought always to rejoice to hear; and which he ought always most seriously to consider. But authoritative instructions; mandates issued, which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and conscience,--these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land, and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenor of our constitution.

Burke's clear-minded thinking surely makes this mode of representation seem superior, does it not? However, Burke could be countered with the equally sober writings of Madison in his musings on the House of Representatives. [I would quote him here, but my editors have placed strict limits on the number of times I can quote 18th century political philosophers in a given essay - and I have reached the maximum.] Simply stated: how is tyranny, or even just lousy governance, prevented when the trustee is not Edmund Burke, but Warren Harding? In many instances - the public's reason and judgment will be superior to the trustee's. That's when we'll long for the delegate view!

The point is that there is something to be said for and against the delegate model and the trustee model. The delegate model of representation can indeed be taken to the point at which - as Governor Bush said in 2000 - politics becomes small. But it can also be taken to the point at which - as President Bush's critics say today - government exists independent of the public's will, and against the rationality it often embodies. Taken to extremes, both the delegate model and the trustee model are problematic. In practice, I think it is preferable for leaders to represent a mixture of both. Madison, for his part, thought the government as a whole should embody both views - and that policy should be enacted only when practitioners of both views were in agreement. Otherwise, government becomes far too susceptible to small-minded politics on the one hand, or stubbornness on the other.

People on both the left and the right intuit that Bush and the Clintons do not represent such a mixture. President Bush overuses the trustee model, President and Senator Clinton overuse the delegate model.

This is why I think the left wing of the Democratic Party is now largely opposed to Senator Clinton. This is an important point. While our average gives Senator Clinton a 13.2% lead over her closest opponent nationwide, the fact remains that she loses to the collected opposition by almost the same amount, 13.9%. All of her opponents - Mr. Obama, Mr. Edwards, Mr. Gore - come across as principled in a way that she, as an ardent practitioner of the delegate model, does not. I think liberals are rightly worried that she will govern as her husband governed - with an ever-present mindfulness of the preference of the majority. I think that liberals - in a strange way - have come to agree with Governor Bush. The Clintons had an opportunity to lead, and they did not take it. Great opportunities were missed. Do they want to miss them again?

Of course, the opposite criticism can be leveled at President Bush. It is reasonable to expect the President at least occasionally to follow the public's lead. It is reasonable to expect him to recognize that there is often a wisdom expressed by the collectivity, and that wisdom should at least give one pause if one's own judgment digresses from it. The public today is so conscious of the problems of excessive reliance upon the trustee model that no Republican candidate offers anything approaching what Governor Bush offered in 2000. It is no coincidence that Senator Clinton kicked off her 2008 campaign with yet another listening tour. Her message was unequivocal: the vox populi and its wisdom has been ignored for too long, and it is time to pay attention to it.

I think that most would expect a mixture of the trustee and delegate views in their Chief Executive, just as Madison envisioned the government as a whole to operate. Bush and the Clintons, however, seem inclined to offer only one or the other. I think both have been able to "sell" their monotone views of governance by recourse to political brilliance. In fact, if we take away the political sheens that have been applied to those two vignettes, there are stark messages at the bottom of both of them. Senator Clinton does not even feel comfortable choosing her own song. President Bush is not just attacking President Clinton's shallowness for following the popular will, he is attacking the shallowness of the popular will itself. Neither of these impressions comes across obviously in either vignette because of the beautiful political productions that have been applied to the messages. But they are there.

All of this leads me to the following, final question regarding Hillary Clinton's candidacy. Bush and the Clintons stand at polar opposites in their views of the relationship between the governors and the governed. In 2000, the public was so tired of President Clinton and his view that it embraced Governor Bush. Is it now so tired of President Bush's view that it will embrace Senator Clinton, or will it remember how sick of it it was eight years ago, and select an alternative to these philosophies, one that advocates a more balanced mixture of the two?

Posted by Jay Cost at 12:01 AM | Permalink

It appears that the immigration reform bill is not quite dead. In the last few days - as we all know - there was a deal brokered between Senate Democrats and Republicans to regulate the number of amendments to be offered, and to make way for a final cloture vote. Many pundits expect that the Senate shall pass the bill. Then, it shall head to the House - where it is expected to have a difficult time.

Why is it that House members are less inclined toward the bill? The answer, at least in part, can be found in a review of the intentions of the designers of the upper