Recently, some analysts have suggested that the lack of major policy breakthroughs in the last year is due to the fact that America has become ungovernable. Ezra Klein argued that it was time to reform the filibuster because the government cannot function with it intact anymore. Tom Friedman suggested that America's "political instability" was making people abroad nervous. And Michael Cohen of Newsweek blamed "obstructionist Republicans," "spineless Democrats," and an "incoherent public" for the problem.

Nonsense. America is not ungovernable. Her President has simply not been up to the job.

Let's acknowledge that governing the United States of America is an extremely difficult task. Intentionally so. When designing our system, the Founders were faced with a dilemma. How to empower a vigorous government without endangering liberty or true republicanism? On the one hand, George III's government was effective at satisfying the will of the sovereign, but that will had become tyrannical. On the other hand, the Articles of Confederation acknowledged the rights of the states, but so much so that the federal government was incapable of solving basic problems.

The solution the country ultimately settled on had five important features: checks and balances so that the branches would police one another; a large republic so that majority sentiment was fleeting and not intensely felt; a Senate where the states would be equal; enumerated congressional powers to limit the scope of governmental authority; and the Bill of Rights to offer extra protection against the government.

The end result was a government that is powerful, but not infinitely so. Additionally, it is schizophrenic. It can do great things when it is of a single mind - but quite often it is not of one mind. So, to govern, our leaders need to build a broad consensus. When there is no such consensus, the most likely outcome is that the government will do nothing.

The President's two major initiatives - cap-and-trade and health care - have failed because there was not a broad consensus to enact them. Our system is heavily biased against such proposals. That's a good thing.

It's not accurate to blame this on the Republicans. From Arlen Specter's defection to Scott Brown's swearing in, Democrats had total control over the policy-making process. The only recourse the Republicans had was the First Amendment. They used it well, but don't let it be said that the President lacked access to it. Given Mr. Obama's bully pulpit and his omnipresence on the national stage, his voice has been louder than anybody's. If Mr. Obama has lost the public debate to the beleaguered rump that is the congressional GOP, he has nobody to blame but himself.

It's not accurate to blame this on "spineless Democrats," i.e. rank-and-file legislators who balked at the various solutions offered by Mr. Obama. Moderate Democrats might have defected because they were worried about their jobs - but the point of popular elections is to link the personal interests of legislators with the interests of their constituents. It often fails to work - but in a situation where "spineless Democrats" clearly voted with their districts, it seems to have been working pretty well. One might argue that they should have shown some leadership - voted for unpopular bills because they were good for the country. But ask those thirty to forty House Democratic defectors on the health care, cap-and-trade, and jobs bills whether they thought the bills were good for the country, and you'll hear a different answer than the one Newsweek is quick to give.

It's not accurate to blame this on the people. This country is most certainly divided, but not deeply so. Consider, for instance, the enormous goodwill that greeted Mr. Obama upon his inauguration. It is not tenable to suggest that there was no way to turn that into a broad consensus for policy solutions.

The responsibility for the government's failure in the last year rests with President Obama. Two significant blunders stand out.

First, President Obama has installed Nancy Pelosi as de facto Prime Minister - giving her leave to dominate not only the House, but also the entire domestic policy agenda. The indefatigable Speaker Pelosi has taken advantage of the President's laissez-faire attitude by governing from the left.

That's not to say that the left has been happy with the domestic proposals that have come up for a vote. Instead, the point is that policy has consistently been built from the left - thanks in no small part to the very liberal chairs of key committees - with compromises made to win just enough centrist votes to get passage. On the jobs bill, the health care bill, and the cap-and-trade bill, the Democrats won only narrow victories due to mass defections on their own side. Almost all of these defections were from the center. Faced with a choice between losing a moderate or a liberal, the Speaker has consistently chosen to sacrifice the moderate.

It's easy to blame the Senate for inactivity - but the problem is the House. It has consistently passed legislation that is too far to the left for the Senate and the country. Ultimate responsibility rests with the President, whose expressed indifference toward policy details has allowed the more vigorous House Democrats, led by an extraordinarily vigorous Speaker, to dominate. That the President consistently praised the House and blamed the Senate in his State of the Union address suggests that he remains unaware of this problem.

The President's second major failing has been his stubborn insistence on comprehensive reforms. Perhaps this is due to his inexperience in the federal lawmaking process, or his extraordinary vanity, or both. Still, this has been a grave mistake. If the truly great Henry Clay could not pass the Compromise of 1850 through the Congress in a single package, what made Barack Obama think he could sign comprehensive energy and health care reforms?

President Obama's desire for comprehensive legislation seriously damaged the chances for bipartisanship, given his decision to let Nancy Pelosi and her allies write the bills. Republican "extremism" is an easy rhetorical foil - but when we're talking about Mike Castle and Olympia Snowe voting against the President, it fails to explain the full story. Bipartisanship implies legislators with different world views working together. The larger a bill's scope, the more likely it favors one worldview over another, and the less likely it will attract bipartisan support. With an extremely liberal Speaker and a supporting cast of left wing committee chairs running the process, comprehensive legislation was bound to favor heavily the liberal worldview. Even the most moderate of Republicans would always have trouble with that. In fact, thirty to forty House Democrats have defected on the President's key items, meaning that the bipartisan position has been opposition to President Obama. This has made it difficult for a centrist public to support reforms. With very limited information on specifics, the public took unanimous Republican and substantial moderate Democratic opposition as cues about the merits of the bills. Public opposition is what ultimately ended the Democratic supermajority - in Massachusetts, of all places.

Both of these failures get back to the idea that this country can only be led effectively when there is a broad coalition supporting her leaders. That requires those leaders to have a breadth of vision that this President has so far lacked. He has allowed a very liberal Speaker to lead the House too far to the left, and he has demanded comprehensive reforms that were destined to alienate a significant portion of the country.

He has been narrow, not broad. He has been partial, not post-partisan. He has been ideological, not pragmatic. No number of "eloquent" speeches can alter these facts. This is why his major initiatives have failed, why his net job approval has dropped 50 points in 12 months, and why he is substantially weaker now than he was a year ago.

This strategy might have made sense if the country was really in the midst of a "liberal moment." But it is not. While the President won a decisive victory in 2008, his congressional majority in both chambers depends entirely upon members whose constituents voted for John McCain. In fact, the President's election 16 months ago was one of the most polarizing in recent history. This remains a divided country, which creates complications in a system such as ours. The President should have recognized this, and governed with a view to building a broad coalition. But he has not.

America is not ungovernable. Barack Obama has so far failed to govern it.

As I wrote last week, a political party is an extra-governmental conspiracy to control the government. Partisans coordinate their efforts across branches to centralize power in a system that otherwise disperses it far and wide.

Partisanship is simply partiality to one conspiracy over another. It's a bias or an inclination. Partisans are more receptive to arguments from their own side than those proffered by the opposition. They are more apt to notice the malfeasances of those on the other side, while often ignoring the sins on their own side. They're willing to give their side credit, but are stingy when it comes to praising the other side. And so on.

For as much as partisan Democrats and Republicans disagree on policy - their views of the political process are often mirror images of one another. This is especially true when it comes to attitudes about the public discourse.

The public discourse is simply the national political conversation. Dominated by the two parties, it consists of partisan arguers who make partisan arguments. Partisan Democrats and Republicans often hold exactly opposite views on both. Let's examine each in turn.

First, regarding the arguers, what motivates them to be partisan?

There are two basic motivations. The first is a commitment to the party's public policy goals. This is the belief that one's own side has correct solutions to public problems, and the opposition has wrong ones. The other motivation is not as noble. To get people to sacrifice private profit, society has made work in representative government prestigious. This breeds private reasons for partisanship - something to the effect of, "I want to keep my awesome job. Those guys are trying to take it from me. So, to hell with them!"

It's fair to say that public and private interests have motivated officials on both sides in roughly equal measure. Yet Republicans and Democrats often act as though their side is vastly superior to the other. Republicans often see their members as representing their views fairly and accurately, but Democrats accuse Republicans of being pawns of the business interests. Democrats see their members as public-spirited; Republicans paint them as the tools of the labor unions.

Second, what kind of arguments are the partisans making?

Arguments can be rationally developed in an attempt to persuade a thoughtful public. On the other hand, they can make recourse to propaganda - one-sided, tendentious appeals, often to the passions rather than reason.

Reason and propaganda have comingled throughout the history of the American political debate. For instance, Federalist #10 is James Madison's reasoned disquisition on the value of a large republic. But in Federalists #6, 7, and 8 Alexander Hamilton sets the gold standard for partisan fear-mongering - warning that if the states do not unite under the Constitution, war will be followed by plunder, permanent armies, and even monarchy. Partisan discourse today often follows the example set by the Federalist Papers: a mix of cool rationality with heated propaganda as partisans try to persuade an undecided, uninformed, and indifferent public.

Yet here again, Democrats and Republicans often have exactly opposite views of who is using what type of argument. Partisan Republicans are inclined to dismiss Democratic assertions as the product of faulty data, specious reasoning, and an appeal to some set of base emotions. Meanwhile, they view their own arguments as derived from self-evident principles and grounded in the finest traditions of American history. Partisan Democrats, of course, see themselves as the keepers of the American faith, and the Republicans as the purveyors of propaganda.

So, on both fronts - arguers and arguments - I would suggest that partisans have exactly opposite views. This enables us to generalize the partisan view of the public discourse into a simple chart:

Importantly, not all Republicans are "partisan Republicans" in this sense, nor are all Democrats "partisan Democrats." One can, at least in theory, hold Republican policy preferences without having these views about the two sides. Ditto if one is a Democrat. In practice, I think it is more accurate to say that at least some partisan bias is inevitable for those who pay close attention to or participate in politics, and that some subscribe less fully to the partisan worldview than others.

President Obama's introductory remarks to the House Republican caucus suggest that he holds a partisan Democrat's view of the public discourse. In that address he regularly cites his desire to turn down the partisan dials and the value of a robust debate, but he couches those gestures to bipartisanship in a very negative view of how the opposition has actually behaved.

The President begins with a broad, philosophical affirmation of the value of the partisan debate:

I'm a big believer not just in the value of a loyal opposition, but in its necessity. Having differences of opinion, having a real debate about matters of domestic policy and national security -- and that's not something that's only good for our country, it's absolutely essential. It's only through the process of disagreement and debate that bad ideas get tossed out and good ideas get refined and made better. And that kind of vigorous back and forth -- that imperfect but well-founded process, messy as it often is -- is at the heart of our democracy. That's what makes us the greatest nation in the world.

This is a heartening statement to hear from any President. Party politics is messy and unpleasant, but ultimately necessary for the good functioning of our democracy. The Election of 1800, for instance, was one of the ugliest in American history. Still, big ideas were discussed, and the country made an important decision. To borrow the title of a recent book on that election, American democracy is a "magnificent catastrophe."

During the subsequent question-and-answer session, the President returns to the value of spirited debate and indicates a hope that the two sides could have a productive dialogue.

But the President starts to lose me shortly thereafter. He says:

I want you to stand up for your beliefs, and knowing this caucus, I have no doubt that you will. I want us to have a constructive debate. The only thing I don't want -- and here I am listening to the American people, and I think they don't want either -- is for Washington to continue being so Washington-like. I know folks, when we're in town there, spend a lot of time reading the polls and looking at focus groups and interpreting which party has the upper hand in November and in 2012...

I'm still technically on board here. I agree that politicians are often out there playing "politics," working for their own self-interest rather than the public good. Yet he soon pivots from trumpeting the virtues of bipartisanship to initiating a partisan attack:

[W]e have a track record of working together. It is possible. But, as John, you mentioned, on some very big things, we've seen party-line votes that, I'm just going to be honest, were disappointing. Let's start with our efforts to jumpstart the economy last winter, when we were losing 700,000 jobs a month. Our financial system teetered on the brink of collapse and the threat of a second Great Depression loomed large. I didn't understand then, and I still don't understand, why we got opposition in this caucus for almost $300 billion in badly needed tax cuts for the American people, or COBRA coverage to help Americans who've lost jobs in this recession to keep the health insurance that they desperately needed, or opposition to putting Americans to work laying broadband and rebuilding roads and bridges and breaking ground on new construction projects.

That's a Democratic view of the public discourse. The President "honest(ly)" expresses "disappointment" at a lack of bipartisanship, which was absent because of inexplicable opposition from the Republican Party. In other words, the Republicans did not offer and have not yet offered valid reasons to oppose the stimulus bill.

Why did they oppose it? The temptation for self-interested political calculation was too great:

And let's face it, some of you have been at the ribbon-cuttings for some of these important projects in your communities. Now, I understand some of you had some philosophical differences perhaps on the just the concept of government spending, but, as I recall, opposition was declared before we had a chance to actually meet and exchange ideas.

The President makes a rhetorical nod to "some philosophical differences perhaps on the concept of government spending" (emphases mine) - but his point here is that bipartisanship has been absent because the Republican caucus has largely been acting out of its own political self-interest.

Interestingly, throughout the session, the President frequently makes use of a form of propaganda to justify this position. His reasoning often goes something like this: you Republicans supported particular items within these bills, so you should have supported the bills; that you did not is a sign that you've been playing politics, and your objections were not tenable. This is a fallacy of composition.

This is how he concludes his introductory remarks:

Bipartisanship -- not for its own sake but to solve problems -- that's what our constituents, the American people, need from us right now. All of us then have a choice to make. We have to choose whether we're going to be politicians first or partners for progress; whether we're going to put success at the polls ahead of the lasting success we can achieve together for America. Just think about it for a while. We don't have to put it up for a vote today.

Let me close by saying this. I was not elected by Democrats or Republicans, but by the American people. That's especially true because the fastest growing group of Americans are independents. That should tell us both something. I'm ready and eager to work with anyone who is willing to proceed in a spirit of goodwill. But understand, if we can't break free from partisan gridlock, if we can't move past a politics of "no," if resistance supplants constructive debate, I still have to meet my responsibilities as President. I've got to act for the greater good -- because that, too, is a commitment that I have made. And that's -- that, too, is what the American people sent me to Washington to do.

His question-and-answer session basically follows the same script. He combines broad appeals for rigorous debate and cooperation with not-so-subtle attacks on Republicans for not participating in a serious manner. It seems that the President's view is that the Republicans are putting "success at the polls ahead of the lasting success we can achieve together for America" and offering irrational arguments that the President "(didn't) understand then, and...still (doesn't) understand" today.

To return to the previous chart, his introductory remarks suggest that this is how the President views the public discourse:

Since he was inaugurated, I have been critical of President Obama's failure to live up to his pledge of bipartisanship. But maybe he has lived up to it, at least on his own terms.

After all, the line of reasoning in this essay suggests a partisan view of bipartisanship, which would go something like this:

We're the ones who are (mostly) public-spirited and rational; they're the ones who are (mostly) self-interested and using propaganda. Thus, bipartisanship will come when they mend their ways.

In so doing, they will start to agree with us. While there may be some lingering divisions, many will disappear. After all, if both sides are motivated by the public interest and making recourse only to rational argument - how much divergence can there possibly be?

This could reconcile Obama's complaints about what he saw as mere gestures from the previous administration with his belief that congressional Republicans should have been happy with the gestures he made to them. This partisan view of bipartisanship doesn't suggest a meeting at the halfway point. The meeting point depends on which party is more virtuous and more reasonable. If the President thinks he has the market cornered on both assets, then the idea that Bush should have given more is quite compatible with the thought that he has given enough.

What to make of this view of the political world? For starters, I do not think it is very peculiar or unique. Most strong partisans, I think, have a partisan view of the public discourse. Plenty of members of Congress do, too. That goes for the whole of American history. So, I don't think there is anything wrong with a President who thinks the other side is full of you-know-what.

What's peculiar and unique is the President's consistent pretensions toward bipartisanship. I'm not sure what to make of the fact that he consistently joins a partisan attack with an appeal to bipartisanship. I do think the political benefits of this are questionable. If this is the President's view of the public discourse - he should not hold his breath for Republican cooperation. It will not be forthcoming. To keep suggesting that it might be forthcoming puts him in danger of being held responsible for its absence.

After all, Republicans do not hold a Democratic view of the public discourse. Most of the congressional caucus probably holds the Republican view. Some - like Susan Collins, Judd Gregg, Lindsay Graham, and Olympia Snowe - have less partisan views and would be willing to meet President Obama halfway. But is Obama prepared to meet them there? His remarks to House Republicans suggest that the answer - despite all his pretensions - is actually no.

What to make of the mini-controversy arising over Justice Alito's apparent "not true" retort to Obama's comment about the Court during the State of the Union address? I have a few thoughts.

The political context is important. The Supreme Court is the weakest branch in our system. There are a few reasons for that.

(1) The Supreme Court is the only court created by the Constitution. The rest are the creation of Congress. The Congress also posseses the power to regulate the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.

(2) The Judicial Branch is the only one that lacks a kind of republican legitimacy. It's purely appointive. That matters in a society where all power flows from the people. To appreciate the implications of this, think of how powerful a President is when he is new in office. This is thanks in large part to the fact that he was just elected, i.e. the people have recently spoken. There's a freshness that he possesses. But after a few years when the public mood changes, yet he's still in office because of that old election, his mandate seems a little stale. The Court is perpetually in an extreme version of the latter case, never having to stand before the people.

(3) The Judicial Branch lacks the power to enforce its rulings. At least on a federal level, it requires the President to execute its rulings, and it requires the Congress to foot the bill. Historically, this has hindered its capacity to make policy. As Andrew Jackson once famously said, "Mr. Marshall has made his ruling. Now let him enforce it!"

The political weakness of the Court leaves me thinking that both Obama and Alito behaved inappropriately. My attitude is that it's like the big kid picking on the little kid in the schoolyard. The big kid should leave the little kid alone. Should the big one decide to take on the weakling, anyway - the little kid should just keep his mouth shut because there's nothing he can do about it.

First, Obama. Granted that he disagrees with the Court's decision, and this disagreement stems from legitimate differences of opinion, the fact remains that it is a good thing for the country that the Supreme Court is so well-regarded. Obama of all people should know this. He talked about the "trust deficit" the country has in its public institutions. There is no trust deficit as regards the Supreme Court. People trust it!

Yet this good reputation is not a guarantee. It could be damaged; indeed, considering the Court's dependence on Congress and the President, as well as its separation from the people and its inability to see its pronouncements through to their intended effect, its public standing is quite vulnerable.

Thus, I think it was inappropriate for the President to take a shot at the Court in the way he did. The Court's solid reputation is a public good for the country, and it should not be tampered with, especially over a case such as the one in question. It seems to me that if the Court had rendered a judgment that was truly beyond the pale - akin to Dred Scott - I wouldn't mind if the President took a shot at the Court. But on a campaign finance ruling? That strikes me as irresponsible and short-sighted on the part of a President who wants people to trust their government. It becomes even more irresponsible when one recalls that he blasted the Court right to its face. That particular level of disrespect sends a message that is not conducive to keeping the Court's good reputation intact.

Second, Alito. I'm sure he regrets what was an impetuous response. Obama should not have been so critical because the Court's reputation is important yet fragile. For the same reason, Alito should have kept his counsel. Obama has a republican legitimacy that Alito lacks - and it is politically not smart for a Supreme Court justice to disagree openly with an elected official such as Obama. This is the political equivalent of David going up against Goliath, and this time there is no guarantee that the Lord is on the side of the little guy! Politically, it would be advisable for the whole Court to show up at the next State of the Union address, to listen attentively without any reaction, and to make sure that this mini controversy becomes nothing more than a footnote in the annals of history.

Now, to be clear, I don't think that this whole dust-up is going to affect the Court's reputation. Still, these are the kinds of actions that could affect the Court, especially if they happen again. From my perspective, the best way to secure the good reputation of the Court is for it never to happen even once. So, shame on Obama for picking on the Court, and shame on Alito for not just taking it in stride. Both of them should have recognized that the Court's reputation is tremendously more important than the particular case in question.

Altogether, I'm much more troubled by Obama's comment than Alito's response because Obama is so much more powerful than Alito. I wish the President would appreciate the effect his words can have, and the possible negative consequences that come from attacking the Court in such pointed language (and right to its face!). It is a very positive thing that the Court has a good public reputation. It's due in part to the hard, smart work of many people who have served on the Court over the decades, but it also depends upon the Congress and the President allowing it to remain outside the political battlefield. The Supreme Court is not the Republican House caucus. It should be left alone, unless of course it clearly behaves inappropriately, which it obviously has not in this case.

Was last night's State of the Union address the sort we'd expect to be delivered by a President:

-whose job approval is under 50%,

-whose party is historically overexposed in the upcoming congressional elections,

-whose party was unable to hold a Senate seat in one of the bluest states, previously held by the party's most iconic post-war leaders,

-whose major domestic initiative has just crashed-and-burned as a consequence of that failure,

-and who heads into a midterm election with unemployment close to 10%?

I'd say not.

Implication: either this White House knows more than the rest of us, or it knows less.

Any takers for the "more" side of the ledger?

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At its essential level, a political party is an extra-governmental conspiracy to control the government. Our constitutional system disperses power across three branches, two chambers of Congress, and federal, state, and local levels. The parties are centralizing forces, trying to unite all governmental power under the party banner. They accomplish this task when conspiring officials across the government coordinate their activities with others whose views are similar.

To be successful, a conspiracy requires a shared belief among the conspirators that their interests are linked - something to the effect of, "Whatever happens, we sink or swim together." This is really the only glue that binds a political party together. American party structures are very weak; partisans participate in the "conspiracy" only if they believe it will help them in the long run.

For some time, it's been clear that the efforts to pass the health care bill have tested the Democrats' ability to conspire. With the bill's apparent failure, stories abound suggesting backbiting among party leaders across branches of government. This was the report in a recent Politico story:

President Barack Obama, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid will be all smiles as the president arrives at the Capitol for his State of the Union speech Wednesday night, but the happy faces can't hide relationships that are fraying and fraught.

The anger is most palpable in the House, where Pelosi and her allies believe Obama's reluctance to stake his political capital on health care reform in mid-2009 contributed to the near collapse of negotiations now.

But sources say there are also signs of strain between Reid and White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel, and relations between Democrats in the House and Democrats in the Senate are hovering between thinly veiled disdain and outright hostility.

Senate Democrats are mad at House Democrats. House Democrats are mad at Senate Democrats. And everybody is mad at the President. This is not the mark of a well-functioning conspiracy!

But things could get worse. House roll call votes from late in 2009 suggest that there might be a backbench revolt brewing that could undermine Democratic control of the government.

Remember, the Democrats control the House only because they can muster the needed 218 votes to pass legislation or execute procedural maneuvers. That's the essence of the House conspiracy. But, again, it's an entirely voluntary one. If Blue Dogs, moderates, or at-risk members start defecting in large enough numbers, and Pelosi can't pull in the needed half-plus-one of the chamber - she loses effective control of the legislative appartus.

By the end of December, there was a surprisingly large number of backbench defections. Let's run through a list of the big ones from June onward.

These were all partisan votes in that Republicans mostly voted against the Democratic leadership. Two of the bills - HR 2454 (cap and trade) and HR 3962 (health care reform) - were high profile pieces of legislation that attracted a lot of attention. But the rest did not garner nearly as much focus, and several of them are downright obscure. And yet the number of defectors was still high.

It's striking to see 29 Democrats defect on a concurrent resolution providing for the adjornment of Congress. Or how about 39 Democrats defecting on a bill "to permit continued financing of government operations." That's an increase of the debt limit. How could so many vote against it? After all, the House voted through all the spending that required an increase in the debt limit. Yet Pelosi could only muster 218 Democrats to do what absolutely, positively had to be done!

This is the mark of a partisan conspiracy that is in some jeopardy.

All of these bills passed, defectors aside. Yet the concern for Democrats should be that, as we approach the 2010 midterm, the number of defectors begins to hit 40 or more. That will happen if Democratic backbenchers sense a need to put more distance between themselves and the leadership. In that case, the Democrats will need Republican votes. They got enough on cap-and-trade, but the GOP caucus might not be so amenable in the future.

Something like this happened in the summer of 1994. Rich Lowry referenced it on the Corner recently. What happened was that, in the course of passing President Clinton's crime bill, the Democratic leadership suffered huge defections on what should have been a worry-free procedural vote. Michael Barone offers a recap in the 1996 Almanac of American Politics:

[T]oo many Democrats, lulled by the widespread assumption in Washington that Hillary Rodham Clinton's healthcare package or something like it would inevitably pass, failed to separate themselves from this increasingly popular program until it was too late.

That moment came, ironically, when Democrats were poised to push through a piece of legislation they thought would make them widely popular, the 1994 crime backage. But the House and Senate leadership, trying to please the liberals in their own caucuses who wanted social work and gun control measures more than the large majority of voters who wanted tough law enforcement and punishment, put together a package that House Republican Whip Newt Gingrich could portray as "social work" and "pork." All but 11 Republicans voted against the rule to consider the crime bill, while 58 Democrats, most of them opponents of the control measures insisted on by liberals, voted no also. The Clinton Administration and the Democratic leadership tactic of keeping liberals happy and using their whips to bludgeon enough moderate Democrats to produce 218 votes had definitively failed.

Ultimately, Democrats won enough Republican votes to pass the crime bill. Yet this simple procedural vote exposed a deep crack in the Democratic foundation, as the party leadership was no longer able to keep 218 members together on crucial votes.

If something like this happens in the 111th Congress, what would be the result? Simply put, the Democrats would lose effective control of the House. Nancy Pelosi would continue to be Speaker, top Democrats would still hold all of the key committee chairs, but they would be unable to legislate on the hard stuff. They could still get things like HR 4474, the "Idaho Wilderness Water Facilities Act," passed through the House - but on anything with a whiff of controversy, she and the leadership could be in trouble.

This is something to watch for as we enter an election year with continued high unemployment, a marginally unpopular President, and an economy experiencing only a tepid recovery. It could be a challenge for Speaker Pelosi to keep 218 of her partisans together, and retain effective control over the legislative process in the House of Representatives.

Presidents make political mistakes. Every last one of them. This is an inevitability. It is a rule of political life in the United States of America.

Barack Obama has made some mistakes in the last year. He misjudged the mood of the country. He misjudged the capacity of Congress to legislate with a decent respect for the national interest. He misjudged the extent of the recession - how it would affect unemployment and ultimately the public consciousness.

Tonight's result in Massachusetts is the first price he pays for his political mistakes. It will not be the last. Republicans may or may not take back the House of Representatives next year, but they are set to make big gains in the lower chamber. Only the hardiest of Democratic partisans doubt this, and even they are starting to come around.

No President is beyond making such miscalculations. Many great men have made substantially worse judgments. Thomas Jefferson pursued a short-sighted foreign policy that damaged American interests in a futile attempt to punish Britain and France. James Madison - the father of the Constitution - put the nation into the War of 1812, something for which it was grossly underprepared. Abraham Lincoln tolerated incompetent generals for too long, doubting his instincts and giving only meek exhortations to confront the enemy more aggressively. Franklin Roosevelt thought his landslide reelection in 1936 gave him leave to reshape the Supreme Court and purge his party of dissenters. These were great men to whom we have rightly built stately and impressive monuments. But they were still men, and they made big mistakes.

The real test of a President's mettle is not whether he makes mistakes, or falls into traps of his own making. Again, that's inevitable. Instead, the test of a President is how he handles the jam once he has gotten himself into it. Does he continue to do the same thing, hoping against hope that somehow, someway doing the same-old same-old will yield a different result? Or does he recognize that he has made mistakes, try to learn from them, and ultimately make adaptations? That's the mark of a superior political talent.

Frankly, I don't know what Obama will do next. His political biography is so slender that none of us really do. Looking back on Bill Clinton's remarkable comeback in 1995-96, none of us should have been very surprised. He pulled off exactly the same feat several times before - bouncing back from losing his reelection bid for Arkansas governor in 1980, then bouncing back after scandal during the 1992 primary. But Obama is a mystery, though he has written two autobiographies about himself.

Democrats should hope that he makes adjustments, that the latest bluster from the White House is just that. Politico reports one senior advisor as saying, "This is not a moment that causes the president or anybody who works for him to express any doubt. It more reinforces the conviction to fight hard." Democrats should hope that this is just aggressive talk designed to buy the White House time to figure out what to do next. If the President really thinks this, they are going to be in a mess of trouble for the rest of his term, for it would mean that he's too stubborn or arrogant to make needed adjustments. It would mean that a comparison to Jimmy Carter is more apt than a comparison to Franklin Roosevelt.

Frankly, all of us should hope that this is just bluster from a typically blustery White House. Barack Obama is going to hold his office for the next three years regardless of whatever happens in congressional elections in November, regardless of how well he governs, regardless of where his job approval numbers go. Let's hope that this untested, young, inexperienced fellow the country elevated to the highest office in the land has the good sense to recognize the message the Bay State sent last night, to understand that messages of similar intensity will be sent in November, and to direct his staff to make necessary changes.

Watch Obama carefully for the next few weeks. How does he react to this Senate defeat? What does he do about health care? Does his message shop change its typically aggressive posture? Answers to these questions are going to teach us a lot about the still-mysterious person who currently holds the office of President of the United States.

If Scott Brown should defeat Martha Coakley in the Massachusetts special election tomorrow, it will be a fitting metaphor for the political trajectory of President Obama's first year in office. A year ago Democrats were talking about Obama as the next Franklin Roosevelt, and suggesting that they were on the cusp of an enduring majority. Today, they are struggling to hold Ted Kennedy's old Senate seat.

Coakley will rightly get most of the blame should Brown actually pull off what once seemed to be an impossible victory. Yet much of the responsibility will have to rest with Barack Obama, who has guided his party so poorly that it is having trouble making an appeal to voters in Massachusetts.

To put it bluntly, the Obama White House has been politically inept in the last year. It has made serious miscalculations, and today it is paying a price.

Ultimately, the reason for these errors goes back to the greenness of the Commander-in-Chief himself, who lacked executive experience and had little first-hand knowledge of the way Washington functions. He put together a team too full of Chicago strongmen, campaign hacks, and sympathetic "Friends of Barack." Accordingly, he and his executive staff were ill prepared for managing the government. This led to three significant political blunders.

***

#1. A Lack of Bipartisanship. Nobody (except perhaps Obama's spinmeisters in the White House) would deny that the President has not been post-partisan. The typical response from the left has been: (a) the Republicans are too crassly political to compromise with; and/or (b) the two parties are now so far apart that there is no middle ground. The problem with this argument is that it fails to account for the near total absence of bipartisanship. Granted that polarization has reduced the number of gettable Republican votes - it surely has not reduced it to zero. Republican legislators like Mike Castle and Susan Collins are fewer in number now than in years past - but such members are still there, and Obama has been hard-pressed to win them over on anything of significance.

An absence of bipartisanship has created two serious problems for the Obama White House. First, it has left the Democratic Party solely responsible for all major legislation - which in turn means that the Democrats have taken on a greater share of the political responsibility for the state of the union. Bipartisanship would have brought Republicans into the governing process, and thus given Obama and his Democratic allies some cover.

Second, it has led to a predictable rise in partisan bickering, which Independent voters hate. If public opinion polling on the Massachusetts Senate race is correct, it will be Independents who swing to Brown in big numbers, which means they'll join Independents in Virginia and New Jersey in voting Republican. If Democrats cannot win back at least some of them, they will suffer major losses in November, 2010.

#2. Installing Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid as de facto prime ministers. A common hobby of political commentators over the last year has been to compare Barack Obama to past presidents. At this point, it's pretty clear who he isn't like - and that's Woodrow Wilson (ironic, considering his background is so similar to Wilson's). During his first year in office, Wilson took an active role in managing the government. He reinstated the practice of delivering the State of the Union in person. He also was a frequent visitor on Capitol Hill, especially when he fought to keep the Senate from gutting his tariff reform.

Obama, on the other hand, has been content to let Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid handle the difficult task of legislating while he hangs back. His lack of involvement in the process has prompted many cries from Democratic legislators that he engage more fully.

His congressional allies are right. Obama has not been involved enough. Congress is not well suited to the task that Obama gave it. It is not a national legislature. Instead, it's a legislature where representatives from the various parts of the country convene. That's a crucial distinction, for it means that there is nobody in Congress who is ultimately responsible to the whole people. Congress has governed in a predictable way - handing out far too many special favors to wavering legislators and privileged interest groups. Congress often resorts to this tactic to stitch together a winnable coalition, but the process makes a mockery of the national interest.

Only the President can claim to represent the national interest, and it's his responsibility to guide Congress in a way that reflects it. Obama has failed to do that. He's let Congress legislate by its own lights, and the process has not been pretty. We talk about legislative "sausage making," but this has been sausage making akin to The Jungle. Accordingly, the public has lost confidence in the government to handle the many problems facing the country.

#3 Pursuing an agenda that doesn't fit the times. I'm talking about health care reform here. For decades, Democratic Presidents have dreamed of comprehensive reform of the nation's health care system. So, it's no surprise that President Obama wanted to try his hand at this, especially considering the outsized majorities his party has in Congress. In itself, this was not a mistake.

The mistake comes when we view this pursuit in context. Namely, 2009 was not a good year to focus the government so intently on health care reform. The public wanted a greater focus on the recession, but it didn't really get one. All it got was a hastily constructed, wasteful stimulus bill that was built on the assumption that unemployment would top out at 8%. As unemployment skyrocketed and the recession dragged on, watching the Senate Finance Committee debate insurance co-operatives and Cadillac taxes made it appear that the government was out of touch.

Additionally, the pursuit of health care reform was difficult to square with a public that has become increasingly deficit conscious. Very few people believe that these reforms will be "deficit neutral," and for good reason. This is a massive new entitlement program the Democrats are proposing, and our existing entitlements cost way more than initial projections, and more than we can today afford. One need not be a policy wonk to suspect that the Democrats' math is more than a little "fuzzy." This would likely not be a concern if the government were running a surplus or just a small deficit. But the 2009 deficit topped out in the trillions. That is bound to make voters wary of new, expensive entitlement programs.

***

These mistakes are all problematic by themselves, but take them together and they become much more powerful: the White House has pursued a partisan agenda and condoned congressional cronyism while ignoring the demands of the public. Martha Coakley's lousy campaign is a big reason why Ted Kennedy's seat is in peril. So is the high unemployment rate. But so also is this. Combined, these mistakes have created a very bad impression.

White Houses make mistakes. Presidents are often inexperienced when they come into the job. They often appoint high-level staffers who are ill prepared to guide the President to success. Corresponding political failures like these are fairly common.

The important questions moving forward are: how will the President respond? Will he acknowledge that his team has made mistakes? Will he correct the way his White House does business? Or will he continue to plunge ahead without recognizing his own faults?

It's inevitable that Presidents run into political trouble - and the kind Obama faces today is not terribly unique in the history of the executive branch. The real test of a President's mettle is not whether he encounters problems, but how reacts to them. As we move forward, I will be watching the President's response to political setbacks just as closely as I'll be watching the unemployment numbers. I think both will determine the course of our politics for the next several years.

Last year around this time, as the liberal world was flush with excitement over the upcoming inauguration of Barack Obama, I dedicated much of the space on this blog to arguing that the new Democratic majority would not be permanent.

I listed a lot of reasons for this, but my biggest argument was that it is very difficult for a single party to govern this country to the satisfaction of its broad, diverse populace. And sooner or later, when the majority party screws up, the other side gets its opening.

Steve Kornacki, writing on his blog this week, suggested that this is exactly what is happening in Massachusetts. He argues that Massachusetts drifted out of the GOP's reach around 1994 when it became dominated by "southern/religious-based conservatism," but now that the Democrats are totally in charge, the GOP finally has an opening. Here's his key graf:

[W]ith Republicans locked out power in Washington, swing voters in Massachusetts -- and every other blue state -- are, for the first time since 1994, ready to blame their problems on Democrats and use the GOP as a protest vehicle. And with 10 percent unemployment, voters have a lot of anger to vent.

This is exactly right. When the country is angry about the state of the union, and it feels that it's time for a change, it will vote for the opposition party as a "protest vehicle." Why? Because in our two-party system there is no place else for the people to go. They might not like the opposition, but it is a choice between them and the status quo.

This is why I'm not a big believer in the "Yeah, but the Republican brand is tarnished" meme that's been floating around out there. I think that could help the Democrats some, but the country tends to take a slightly jaundiced view of both parties to begin with. Neither party could ever credibly claim to have clean hands. As Madison wrote in Federalist 51: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary."

If it's a choice between the status quo and an opposition party that has disappointed in the past, sometimes circumstances demand the opposition. Historically speaking, that's simply a true statement. There have been multiple periods in our country's history when the people have swung back and forth between the parties, casting about for somebody - anybody - who could manage public affairs competently. The most violent swings came in the 1880s-1890s as the country struggled through the latter phases of the industrial revolution, but we saw a more recent one in 1974-1982. In both periods, neither side had given the people much reason for confidence, but that did not stop them from using both as "protest vehicles."

Ultimately, this is what dooms a majority party. Sooner or later, it's going to find itself having to deal with voter anger when times turn tough. When that happens, the country will get behind the opposition. Sometimes this happens quickly. Sometimes it takes a while. But it always happens. The only exception comes in the early period of the country when the Federalists were essentially destroyed, but one-party Republican rule did not last, beginning to break down during the War of 1812 as factions within the Jeffersonian Republicans began to differentiate themselves.

Plus, it's important to keep in mind the flip side. The minority party, recently pushed to the sidelines, is not content to stand still. It's struggling to redefine itself, change its strategy, find a way to acquire the majority. Why? Because that is its purpose. Political parties are engaged in an inexorable pursuit of majority status. What we're seeing in Massachusetts is a good indication of what a minority party is prepared to do for that goal. Should he gut out the victory next week, Scott Brown is ultimately going to disappoint the national Republican base. He will want to be reelected next time, which means he'll situate himself well to the left of most of his fellow Republicans. Yet he's raking in dollars hand over first this week. Republicans everywhere know that Brown will be a moderate, so why are they so giving him so much cash? Because he's one more vote closer to the majority (and, more immediately, an end to the filibuster-proof majority that party-switcher Arlen Specter handed the Democrats). Ideological diversity is a problem for a party to worry about only after its returned to the majority. Until then, few on the Republican side will complain about a little adulteration if it hastens the party's return to power.

This is not some sort of new dynamic. Indeed, if you scan the political history of the United States since 1824, you'll see it play itself out again and again. Parties in the majority have trouble hanging on while the opposition gets more crafty in its efforts to climb back to power. That's how American politics works. That's what we're seeing this year.

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David Dayen over at FireDogLake has a clip of Emanuel Cleaver giving a less-than-bullish account of the prospects of health care reform in the House:

As Dayen notes, the math is not a slam dunk for House leadership.

Consider the following.

The bill earned 220 votes the first time around. Yet Robert Wexler has resigned. That puts the total support at 219.

Let's assume that the new bill will lack Stupak language on abortion - a reasonable one, I think. That would lose them Joseph Cao, the sole Republican supporter. Bart Stupak claims that he has 10 to 12 Democrats who would walk away then, too.

Assuming Stupak's number is correct, that puts the bill at 206 to 208, with 218 needed for support. The House leadership would have to find 10 to 12 supporters among the 38 Democrats who voted against it late last year.

TalkingPointsMemo has been keeping careful track of these members, and they have found four who are still nays, seven who are "keeping their options open" (TPM's phrase), and just one "leaning yes." The one leaning yes is Jason Altmire, who appears to have attracted a serious Republican opponent for his western Pennsylvania district. He also voted against the rule for debate and amendment on the original bill. He also didn't vote for it when it was in Education and Labor. These are the sort of things a member does when he's looking to build a track record of opposition. So color me skeptical that he's actually leaning yes.

If TPM's count is correct, and my math is not terribly off the mark, it suggests that Pelosi and the Democratic leadership would have to attract 10 to 12 of the nay votes. Here's the list of those whose votes are still conceivably gettable, from TPM. "BD" indicates a Blue Dog, "F" indicates a freshman:

John Adler (D-NJ): F
Jason Altmire (D-PA): BD
Brian Baird (D-WA)
John Barrow (D-GA): BD
Dan Boren (D-OK): BD
Rick Boucher (D-VA)
Allen Boyd (D-FL): BD
Ben Chandler (D-KY): BD
Travis Childers (D-MS), BD
Artur Davis (D-AL)
Lincoln Davis (D-TN): BD
Chet Edwards (D-TX)
Bart Gordon (D-TN): BD
Stephanie Herseth Sandlin (D-SD): BD
Tim Holden (D-PA): BD
Larry Kissell (D-NC): F
Dennis Kucinich (D-OH)
Suzanne Kosmas (D-FL): F
Frank Kratovil Jr. (D-MD): F, BD
Betsy Markey (D-CO): F, BD
Jim Marshall (D-GA): BD
Jim Matheson (D-UT): BD
Charlie Melancon (D-LA): BD
Michael McMahon (D-NY): F
Walt Minnick (D-ID): F, BD
Scott Murphy (D-NY): F
Glenn Nye (D-VA): F, BD
Colin Peterson (D-MN): BD
Mike Ross (D-AR): BD
Heath Shuler (D-NC): BD
Ike Skelton (D-MO)
John Tanner (D-TN): BD
Gene Taylor (D-MS): BD
Harry Teague (D-NM): F

Scanning this list, it's easy to tick off a bunch of people who are going to be all but impossible to win over: Boren, Artur Davis, Edwards, Kratovil, Kucinich, Melancon, Minnick, Shuler, Taylor come instantly to mind. I'd put some more on that list. Eliminating the Stupak language is not going to help them when one looks at the places where most of these people come from. 19 of these members are from the South. And if we cross-reference this list with CQ's ">chart of "McCain Democrats," we find that 25 of them hail from districts that voted for John McCain for President, some by very large margins. That's important because, for as unpopular as health care reform is nationwide, we should expect it to be less so in these districts. On this point, it's worth noting that a recent Public Policy Polling survey of Larry Kissell's North Carolina district produced some cross-tabs that suggest a yea on health care reform is harmful. Voters who (correctly) believed he voted against the bill in November were more likely to support him than those who (incorrectly) believed he voted against it.

Also, we're assuming that Kucinich is the only one who votes nay because the bill is not liberal enough. So far, I haven't heard a credible threat of defection from another progressive member, though Dayen suggests it's a possibility.

There are many factors that should help Obama and Pelosi pick up some of these nays. Eliminating the public option might make it easier for many of these moderates to vote yea. Stupak might not actually have 10 to 12 votes. Pelosi might have had some votes in her pocket should push come to shove (although probably less than the number who are really committed to Stupak language - otherwise she would not have acceded to his demands in November). Three of these members (Baird, Gordon, and Tanner) have announced retirement plans, so they might be disposed to vote with the party now that electoral pressure is gone. Others might be planning to retire but have not yet announced it, giving her more possible votes. Above all, the political pressure on these members to support the bill will be tremendous - and even if they are actually hurting their electoral prospects by voting for the bill, you can bet the White House and the House leadership will make a very strong argument that this will help them. See, for instance, Ben Nelson's pre-Christmas negotiations.

Still, I think it is far to hasty to say that this reform is inevitable. Minimally, the margin in the House is going to be razor-thin either way. We know that for sure, which in turn suggests that we shouldn't take final passage for granted. Emanuel Cleaver apparently isn't.

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When President Obama indicated that he had no problem with secretive House-Senate negotiations on health care - there was outrage from several quarters. Rich Lowry wrote that it's a sign that Obama is "insincere to the point of cynicism." Peter Wehner suggested that this broken pledge "annihilates...the belief that he embodied a new, uplifting kind of politics." Outrage was not confined to the right. CNN's Jack Cafferty ripped Obama's openness pledge as a "lie," and the whole affair pushed C-SPAN from its usual role as sideline observer to active participant.

Outrage aside, was anybody surprised by this broken pledge? After all, this is the President who promised to find a campaign finance agreement with John McCain, then never tried. This is the President who said that the old ways wouldn't do, then staffed his new administration with Clinton era retreads. This is the President who promised a post-partisan era, but waited less than a week into his new term to initiate a "message war" against his political opponents.

Politicians break their campaign promises all the time. It's part of an age-old electoral strategy: promise everything to the voters during the campaign, and leave the worry about breaking them for the next election.

What's noteworthy about President Obama is that his campaign acknowledged this bad habit, then earnestly pledged that he would be so very different. The sounds and images of his campaign - from the chants of "Yes We Can" to the stage for his convention address to the artwork - suggested that the country was about to elect somebody more special than Rutherford Hayes or Hillary Clinton or Warren Harding or John McCain. Barack Obama wasn't like other politicians. He was superior.

This is what he said when he announced his presidential campaign in Springfield, Illinois in February, 2007:

I know there are those who don't believe we can do all these things. I understand the skepticism. After all, every four years, candidates from both parties make similar promises, and I expect this year will be no different...

That is why this campaign can't only be about me. It must be about us - it must be about what we can do together. This campaign must be the occasion, the vehicle, of your hopes, and your dreams...This campaign has to be about reclaiming the meaning of citizenship, restoring our sense of common purpose, and realizing that few obstacles can withstand the power of millions of voices calling for change.

By ourselves, this change will not happen. Divided, we are bound to fail.

But the life of a tall, gangly, self-made Springfield lawyer tells us that a different future is possible....

As Lincoln organized the forces arrayed against slavery, he was heard to say: "Of strange, discordant, and even hostile elements, we gathered from the four winds, and formed and fought to battle through."

That is our purpose here today.

That's why I'm in this race.

The implication of this rhetoric is clear. Most candidates overpromise then underdeliver. That's precisely why we need Barack Obama. He will be the next Abraham Lincoln, an extraordinary leader who will not only bring peace and prosperity, but will restore our sense of common purpose.

Since he burst onto the national scene years ago, people have wondered who is the real Barack Obama? What makes him tick? What's the true story?

The answer should be clear by now: he's just a politician. There's no secret, hidden mystery to the 44th President. He's not a crypto-communist nor is he the next Abraham Lincoln. He's a politician just like any other. He said what he thought he needed to say to get into office, now he's doing what he thinks he needs to be do to stay there. If that creates problems for 2012, he'll cross that bridge when he comes to it.

Hats off to him for a near-flawless execution of an audacious campaign strategy. Since nobody knew anything about him, why not claim the mantle of Lincoln? Nobody could point to a governing record to suggest that he was not in fact a leader for the ages - so why not claim to be? Other pols promise the sun, the moon, and the stars in the sky, but Barack Obama would do them one better: he'd promise the eschaton. Not only would an Obama administration grow the economy and end the war, it would reclaim the meaning of citizenship!

This strategy was either cynical or arrogant, depending upon whether the President really thought he could do all these amazing things. Let's hope he didn't. Let's hope he was being cynical, for at least it would suggest the President's sense of himself is not wildly out of proportion to reality.

To function well, this country does not require great leaders who will reclaim the meaning of citizenship, but it has use for good ones who can leave things a little better than when they found them. History has shown that good leaders are often cynical, crafty politicians who are motivated by their own ambitions. Our superior system of government expertly links their private interests to the public good, and thus can bring out the best in them.

But if this President is so vainglorious as to believe his campaign's claims about his greatness, we have reason to worry. With problem piling up on top of problem, the last thing we need is a leader so hopelessly enamored of himself that he actually presumes to be the next Lincoln.

Matt Bai recently penned a somewhat confused essay that attempts to argue that Obama is a bona fide progressive, but not really a populist (which apparently for Bai comes down to little more than differences in tone). Yet in this piece he inserts an intriguing aside.

A year into Obama's presidency, it is no longer inconceivable, if still unlikely, that he could face a challenge within his own party in 2012, especially if Democrats suffer sizable losses next November. (When Howard Dean made a point of trying to scuttle health care reform altogether, was he simply trying to get a better bill, or was he setting himself up as a populist insurgent?)

The tossaway quality of these lines makes them so interesting. It's as if this is what people are talking about. Are they? I don't really run in the same circles as writers from the New York Times Magazine, so I don't have a clue. Yet I did notice that Politico has a generally sympathetic entry on "The resurrection of Howard Dean." It also mentions a possible 2012 challenge of the President. Just as you need two data points to have a trend, you need two MSM articles to have a meme!

So, it's worth asking on this cold January day: could Howard Dean primary Barack Obama?

Of course he could, but nobody should expect him to topple the President. If Theodore Roosevelt couldn't successfully primary Howard Taft in 1912, what hope does any insurgent have, especially one who lost out to John Kerry?

Now, the nomination battle has changed quite a bit in the 98 years since Teddy took on the Big Lub, but the following is most definitely true. Incumbent presidents who were elected to office were often denied their party's re-nomination in the 19th century (the first loser being the drunk, incompetent Franklin Pierce in 1856), but it is a very rare occurrence these days. And by rare I mean it hasn't happened in over a century.

The power of selecting the next nominee has generally fallen to the people - via the primaries and caucuses - but make no mistake: the party establishment still has a dominant role, and an incumbent President almost always has the establishment on his side. That makes him near impossible to defeat - you have to go back to the corruption of the Gilded Age or the political breakdown of the antebellum years to find incumbents who couldn't secure the support of the insiders whose jobs depend on the incumbent's continued success.

That's not to say Dean (or somebody) wouldn't try. It's just to say that if he has any sense in his head, his goal wouldn't be to become the 45th President. When Pat Buchanan took on George H.W. Bush in 1992, I doubt his purpose was actually to become the next President. More likely, it was about making public the dissatisfaction a faction within the Republican Party was feeling by 1992.

That points to what makes these primary contests so noteworthy: they are more a symptom of failure than a cause. If a President cannot lock down all the major parts of his own party, and instead must slug it out in a primary - it's a sign that he's going to have trouble building a majority coalition in the fall. Taft, Carter, and Bush all lost their general election contests after beating back big time challenges for the nomination. So did Hubert Humphrey, LBJ's stand-in in 1968, after Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy launched insurgent candidacies for the White House.

This is probably why we're seeing talk about Dean about the moment: many progressives are frustrated with the course of the Obama administration to date. There are hairline fractures in the Obama coalition. It's improbable that progressives would ever seriously challenge its structural foundations. They are also the most partisan Democrats, and thus would never aid the Republicans. But if Obama should find his job approval ratings in Carter or Bush territory come mid-2011, i.e. he's doomed anyway, a progressive candidate like Dean could conceivably challenge him.

I'd say the probability of Obama having to face a serious challenge from Howard Dean or anybody in 2012 are about as good as the probability that the Pittsburgh Pirates will have a winning season by then. Put it in the 5-10% range.

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Ezra Klein had a provocative column in Sunday's Washington Post, arguing that it's time to eliminate or substantially weaken the filibuster in the United States Senate. He writes:

The modern Senate is a radically different institution than the Senate of the 1960s, and the dysfunction exhibited in its debate over health care -- the absence of bipartisanship, the use of the filibuster to obstruct progress rather than protect debate, the ability of any given senator to hold the bill hostage to his or her demands -- has convinced many, both inside and outside the chamber, that it needs to be fixed.

Klein cites a study from Barbara Sinclair showing that the filibuster is used much more frequently now - up from 8% of "major bills" to 70%. This is as sure a sign as any that reform is needed, that the two parties can't be allowed to succeed by using the politics of obstruction anymore.

Yet Klein's reasoning is imprecise. After all, the legislative process has not become "broken." It is largely the same process as it was decades ago. The real change has occurred within the two Senate parties. They are using the filibuster more aggressively in their quest for political success. This raises an important question that Klein leaves unaddressed: if the parties are more unrelentingly partisan now than in ages past, is it prudent to lower the barriers that prevent them from enacting sweeping policy changes?

On this question, I come down squarely in the negative. The increased use of the filibuster is not so much a consequence of Senate "dysfunction" as it is a desirable check upon it. Given this, it makes much more sense to leave the filibuster intact.

The following chart demonstrates that the two political parties have become substantially more polarized over the last 45 years. It uses the DW-Nominate methodology to track the ideological distribution of Democrats and Republicans in the Senate from the 89th Congress (1965-1967) to the 110th (2007-2009):

Three important trends are evident from this picture. First, the party extremes have grown farther apart. Second, there are now fewer genuine moderates in the United States Senate than at any point in the last half century. Third, there used to be a sizeable ideological overlap between the two parties in the Senate. It no longer exists. Put simply, the Senate parties have become ideologically polarized.

This helps explain the increasing use of the filibuster. As the parties drift apart ideologically, the majority party will more likely introduce legislation that the minority party can't accept, giving the latter a stronger incentive to block it via the filibuster. Using the filibuster is thus a rational response when one finds oneself in the smaller half of a polarized chamber, which is more likely to be the case today than 45 years ago.

This points to a highly beneficial purpose the filibuster can serve. Per Klein, it is indeed an obstructionist tool, but it is also a way to promote moderate policies, even as the parties have become more ideologically extreme. In other words, thanks to the filibuster, an ideologically extreme majority party cannot simply enact its policy preferences as it sees fit. Instead, it must either find common ground with some on the other side, or do nothing. In other words, the filibuster has an effect similar to that of a large body of water on the climate of the neighboring coast, keeping the temperature from getting too hot or too cold.

Think of it this way. When Democrats are in charge, they will endeavor to pull the policy needle to the left. To succeed, they will have to negotiate with the pivotal legislator. If the status quo is retained, that would be the 60th senator, who will sustain a filibuster if he is not satisfied. On the other hand, if the filibuster is eliminated, the Democrats will only have to appeal to the 50th senator, who will by definition be more liberal than the 60th. Policy outputs would thus shift leftward, perhaps dramatically so. The same goes for the GOP. When Republicans are in charge, they must find common ground with the 60th senator, which will result in much more moderate policies than what we'd see if the filibuster is eliminated. I would point to the 109th Congress. If George W. Bush had to appeal to Norm Coleman rather than Mary Landrieu, the Republicans would have gotten plenty more done, and their policy outputs would have been much more conservative.

Over time, this suggests that changes in control of the Senate will not yield big swings in policy output so long as the filibuster is allowed to remain largely as is. Liberal majorities will have to negotiate with a center-right senator, and conservative majorities will have to negotiate with a center-left senator. Eliminate it, and you'll see bigger swings in policy as control of the upper chamber changes hands.

We are thus faced with a choice. We can get rid of the filibuster to facilitate legislative policymaking, but we should brace ourselves for ideologically polarizing laws that will leave a third to a half of the country deeply unsatisfied. Democrats will enact very liberal policies; Republicans very conservative ones. On the other hand, keeping the filibuster in place will mean less gets done - as the two polarized parties have trouble finding common ground - but whatever policies are produced will be more moderate and less offensive to the losing faction.

I strongly favor moderate-if-infrequent policy changes. It is not ideal - I find the compromised, moderate Senate health care bill highly objectionable, and of course the filibuster can be used for narrowly partisan purposes - but it is preferable to the alternative of ideologically polarized policy-making.

An institutionalized filibuster was not a provision that the Framers implemented when they created the government. Still, it has tended to crop up during highly polarized periods in American political history: the fight between Democrats and Whigs over the Bank of the United States, the ante-bellum political breakdown of the 1850s, the post-war fights over civil rights, and of course today.

While the Framers did not make provisions for a filibuster, the procedure nevertheless reminds me of Madison's thinking in Federalist #10:

Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction...

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

Madison argues in this consequential essay that "the latent causes of faction are...sown in the nature of man." Thus, the only way to control its ill effects is by proper management within the government. Madison believed that a large republic characterized by a system of checks and balances could accomplish this task.

I would suggest that the increased use of the filibuster is a way to check two political parties that resemble factional cliques, neither of which broadly appeals to the whole country. Eliminating it would allow for more legislation to be passed into law, but I fear this legislation would have a factional element to it - and like Madison I believe that a well constructed government should "break and control" the "violence of faction."

That's an interesting phrase Madison uses - "violence of faction." It turned out to be quite prescient. After all, the Civil War was more of a sectional war or a factional war than anything else. Today, with the two parties so divided, it is not unreasonable to worry about the long-term effects of one side pulling the policy needle so far in one direction. Eliminating the filibuster might mean that the victorious party gets a lot more done, but how will the losers react over time?

I doubt very much that there would be another civil war! Still, "violence" doesn't necessarily imply war, or even physical confrontation. We could instead see ever more violent passions on the two ideological poles, as the losing side is increasingly outraged by the many "tyrannies" of the majority party. It's easy to take for granted the bonds that hold the national Union together, but that does not mean they are indestructible. Allowing one side or the other to enact root-and-branch changes via a bare majority could, over time, weaken them as the losers become more frustrated and angry.

There could also be violent swings in the policy needle. If nothing more than a simple majority is necessary for sweeping changes, what stops a newly victorious party from undoing all the reforms implemented by the old majority, and instituting its own set of big changes? What would be the long-term consequences of that? If every biennial or quadrennial election brought the prospect of big changes in public policy - how could we practically plan for the future? We all expect things in 2013 to be generally the same as things in 2009. Eliminate the filibuster, empower a bare majority to impose ideologically extreme policies, and that expectation could become unreasonable.

Meanwhile, if we keep the filibuster in place, we will likely stop major policy reforms from being implemented today - but that does not mean that we have prohibited them forever. After all, we have biennial elections in this country, which means that those whose policy goals have been thwarted can re-litigate their case before the electorate as many times as they like. They can hit the stump, advocate for their policy proposals, try to convince constituents of filibustering senators to vote them out of office, and send a more favorable majority to the new Congress. If the opposition has been crassly political, filibustering not out of honest disagreements but narrow partisan calculations - the policy advocates will have a strong case to take to the voters. Additionally, advocates can always return to the drawing board, and come up with a better policy proposal, one that can forge the kind of broad coalition that the filibuster requires. Put simply, retaining the filibuster makes it harder to solve problems, but certainly not impossible.

So, I'm drawn to the following conclusion. As much as I would like to see Congress solve big problems more ably, I do not want to see solutions that are ideologically extreme, as I think that over the long run they could cause more trouble than they solve. In the absence of broad policy agreements - which are clearly lacking here at the end of 2009 - I am glad for the institution of the filibuster and would staunchly oppose attempts to modify it substantially. Keeping it as is will mean fewer reforms are ultimately passed, but those that are passed stand a better chance of succeeding in a broad, diverse republic such as ours. So long as the two parties are so far apart ideologically, I will support the filibuster, regardless of which side is in charge.

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Parker Griffith (D-AL) will announce today that he is switching to the Republican Party. For a President who thrives on "keeping the ball rolling," this is an unfortunate loss of momentum as Senate Democrats get set to pass their health reform bill.

Griffith is but one of more than 250 House Democrats, and he was a certain nay on next month's health care vote - yet his switch is still interesting. It indicates that the decades-long geographical and ideological sorting of both parties is ongoing.

Media pundits have been quick to focus on how the Republican Party has become too conservative for moderate Northeastern Republicans, leaving people like Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins as outliers and making it difficult for the GOP to win seats in Connecticut, New Hampshire, or upstate New York. This is most certainly true. From 2001 to 2008, George W. Bush was in charge of the Republican Party, and he had all the qualities of a Southern Republican. This made it difficult for Northeastern Republicans to stay in the party. It was a matter of politics (Bush's appeal in the Northeast was quite limited) and policy (southern Republicans controlled the agenda and wrote legislation that they preferred). All of this put pressure on Northeastern Republicans, whose survival rate in the 2006-08 electoral wipeouts was virtually nil.

Now that the Democrats are in charge, we're seeing a similar dynamic on their side of the aisle. Northern, urban liberals control the Democratic Party. They hold the key committee chairs, most of the big leadership posts, and of course the presidency. These sorts of Democrats are not politically popular in the South, which makes life difficult for moderate Southern Democrats. Plus, the Northern liberal leaders write policy that is well to the left of Parker Griffith, who hails from northern Alabama. It's not easy for a guy like Griffith to remain in the Democratic Party, especially in light of the fact that many believe next year will be a bad election for Democrats. Griffith is exactly the kind of member most in danger of being swept away - just like Republicans Nancy Johnson, Chris Shays, and Rob Simmons all lost their Connecticut House seats between 2006 and 2006. He is new to Congress, having won his seat by the narrowest of margins in 2008 while his district gave John McCain 61% of the vote.

Bottom line: while we shouldn't expect any MSM pundit discussions about how Griffith's departure is a sign of the "narrowing" of the Democratic Party, this is still a noteworthy development. Just as the Republican Party's rightward and Southern shift has placed a burden on moderate Northeastern Republicans, so the Democratic Party's leftward and Northern shift has put pressure on moderate Southern Democrats. Now that the liberal Democrats are in charge - pushing their agenda and taking responsibility for the state of the Union - this pressure has become more salient. Griffith may or may not be the only Democrat to make an actual jump to the GOP, but his departure from the Democratic Party underscores the tension between the liberal leadership and many Southern moderates as the House prepares for a big health care vote.

We saw a similar dynamic in 1993-95, as moderate Democrats in the House (e.g. Billy Tauzin of Louisiana) and the Senate (e.g. Richard Shelby of Alabama) jumped to the GOP. That sets up the following expectation: if the GOP picks up 35 to 39 seats next year, John Boehner and Eric Cantor will work like the dickens to convince some disgruntled moderate Democrats to make the jump to the GOP.

As a final point, I'd note with interest that the difference between Speaker Pelosi and Minority Leader Pelosi actually depends on Democrats who, like Griffith, hail from McCain districts. Forty-nine districts voted for John McCain but sent Democrats to the House of Representatives. Liberal votes on cap-and-trade, health care, the jobs bill, and so on puts a strain on many of them. Griffith might not be the last party-switcher when it's all said and done.

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Several years ago, I traveled to Washington, D.C. for the first time as an adult. My most vivid memory from that journey was walking away from Union Station - looking to my left at the United States Capitol, then looking to my right to see...the Teamster's Union building.

It was a disheartening sight - not because I have anything against the Teamsters, but because it reminded me that they're down there: the lobbyists, the special interests, the rent-seekers - all looking to extract favors from the Congress.

Like all Americans, I know that they're down there, and I don't think it is a good way for a government to function. Yet, I tolerate it - because I believe they're mostly just tinkering at the margins. Sure, they're diverting some of my tax dollars to things that have nothing to do with me - but it's a tiny portion. As long as they're not actively getting in my way - I'm inclined to shake my head, but let it be. I reckon that many Americans feel the same.

This is why Democratic leaders are courting disaster with this health care bill. With it, they've moved their questionable wheelings and dealings from the margins to the center of American life. And because of this, they risk being swept away in another Jacksonian moment.

Make no mistake. This bill is so unpopular because it has all the characteristics that most Americans find so noxious about Washington.

It stinks of politics. Why is there such a rush to pass this bill now? It's because the President of the United States recognizes that it is hurting his numbers, and he wants it off the agenda. It might not be ready to be passed. In fact, it's obviously not ready! Yet that doesn't matter. The President wants this out of the way by his State of the Union Address. This is nakedly self-interested political calculation by the President - nothing more and nothing less.

What makes this all the more perversely political is that the bill's benefits do not kick in for years. Why? Politics again! Democrats wish to claim that the bill reduces the deficit, so they collect ten years worth of revenue but only pay five years worth of benefits.

The Congress and the President are rushing to wait - not because that's best for health care, but best for the political careers of Washington Democrats.

It stinks of influence peddlers. Reviewing winners and losers in the Senate health care bill shows clearly that it was written with the full advice and consent of privileged interest groups. Here are some of the most amazing provisions, courtesy of the AP:

-Nebraska, Louisiana, Vermont and Massachusetts. These states are getting more federal help with Medicaid than other states. In the case of Nebraska -- represented by Sen. Ben Nelson, who's providing the critical 60th vote for the legislation to pass -- the federal government is picking up 100 percent of the tab of a planned expansion of the program, in perpetuity.

-Beneficiaries of Medicare Advantage plans -- the private managed-care plans within Medicare -- in Florida. Hundreds of thousands of them will have their benefits grandfathered in thanks to a provision tailored by Sen. Bill Nelson.

-Longshoremen. They were added to the list of workers in high-risk professions who are shielded from the full impact of a proposed new tax on high-value insurance plans.

Big corporations get nice paydays, too. Private insurance industries get the public option eliminated. Meanwhile, PhRMA made sure that there would be no significant prescription drug re-importation provision in the bill. Byron Dorgan said the FDA might have put the kibosh on it because of pressure from the White House.

Yet when it comes to big, wet kisses for entrenched interests, you can't beat the individual mandate. People will soon have to buy health insurance from private companies, or else face a tax penalty from Uncle Sam. Democrats who think they can come back later to fix this perverse result are kidding themselves. The insurance lobby is already so powerful that Democrats couldn't get the public option through now - what makes them think they'll be able to later, after they've given insurers 30 million additional customers, and required every last American to do business with them? The insurance companies are going to be to the 21st century what Standard Oil was to the 19th.

It stinks of partisanship. Not a single Republican will vote for this bill in the Senate. I doubt it will get a single House Republican if the Stupak language is excluded. Partisan Democrats like to think that this is because Republicans are too partisan. That's ridiculous. Nobody can seriously accuse Olympia Snowe or Susan Collins of partisan hackery. Plus, Orin Hatch has been a major player in health care reform over the years, and Chuck Grassley made a good faith effort this summer to find common ground.

The fact that the President can't find a single Republican vote out of more than 200 potential supporters is a strong indication that this is a bad bill. The only people willing to vote for it are people who share with the President interests that are unrelated to health care. The biggest shared interest is their political livelihood: Democrats sink or swim together. But that's a horrible reason to vote for a bill that will affect so many people in such a profound way.

Ben Nelson sits in the middle of the Senate. He could be a Democrat or a Republican. If he were a Republican, but everything else about him were the same, would he have voted for this? Of course not. That should tell you everything you need to know about this bill.

People in Congress and the lobbyists who court them have pretty good gigs. They have nice offices, make big salaries, and have lots of people hop to at their say so. Yet ultimately, all of their money, power, and prestige come from the people. The people are the sole source of sovereignty in our nation. Our Constitution opens, "We the people of the United States" - not "We the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of the United States" or "We the senior members of Congress with plum committee assignments." Everything about our system is the way it is because the people allow it to be that way. This is why it's best for the entrenched interests and the politicians to keep their under-handed means and particularistic ends from affecting the people. They can take it all away in a single instant - so the smart approach is not to give them a reason.

This Congress and this President seem hell-bent on ignoring that maxim. It started last year with TARP. It continued into this year with the pork-laden, wasteful stimulus bill. It moved to the auto bailouts, reckless deficit spending, and coziness with Wall Street. And now, it has moved to health care "reform." The people are taking notice, they don't like it, and they're starting to blame the government for the weakened state of the union.

We might be on the verge of another Jacksonian moment: a time when the people awake from their slumber, angrily exercise their sovereign authority, and mercilessly fire the leaders who have for too long catered to the elites rather than average people. The first time this happened was in 1828 - when the people rallied to the cause of Old Hickory to avenge the "Corrupt Bargain" of four years prior. It's happened several times throughout the centuries. Most relevant to today, it happened time and again in the 1880s and 1890s, as the people hired then fired one Republican and Democratic majority after another in search of leaders who could attend to the people's interests instead of the special interests. That age saw the birth of the Populist Party. It was a time when so many felt so disgruntled by the political process that young William Jennings Bryan - just thirty-six years old and with only two terms in the House - came within a hundred thousand votes of the presidency.

I wonder if we've returned to that kind of dynamic. In true Jacksonian fashion, the country fired the Republicans in 2006 and 2008 because they bungled the war in Iraq and allowed the economy to sink into recession. They might soon have another Jacksonian moment, and fire these equally useless Democrats for hampering the recovery, exploding the deficit, and playing politics with health care.

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Ben Nelson's reticence to vote for a bill that does not satisfy Nebraska Right to Life is a perfect example of American pluralism - the idea that our system grants a seat at the table to a wide array of diverse groups, each of which is empowered with a veto over policies that affect them. It's also a sign that the resolution of the health care fight will be trickier than many pundits have suggested.

I have frequently heard analysts propose that the Democrats will pass a bill because they must, because the party requires it to retain an appearance of competence (or, at a minimum, to avoid the appearance of incompetence). I would not dispute that this is a vital part of the calculus, but it is not the whole game. The way I view the politics of the health care debate is akin to a potential collective action dilemma. This type of interaction presents several complications to the "they will because they must" argument.

Before we get into those, it's important to remember two basic points about our system. First, the United States Congress does not represent the interests of the whole country. That's a fallacy of composition. Instead, it's the meeting place of all the representatives of the parts of the country. Thus, individual senators and congressmen ultimately rise or fall based not on how they serve the nation, but their local constituents. Second, and relatedly, nobody in Congress is electorally responsible to a national political party. Party affiliation in Congress is membership in a "long coalition" based on mutual interests. There is no blood oath to be taken, and a member of Congress can defect from the national party line and suffer few consequences if local constituents are comfortable with that decision. The bonds of partisan affiliation certainly help major legislation get passed, but they are rarely sufficient.

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So, with those preliminaries out of the way, I'd suggest that there are three issues that complicate "they will because they must."

Complicating issue number one: each Democratic senator enjoys the benefit of an improved reputation individually, but some might enjoy it less than others. The most obvious way this point operates is that a third of the Senate is not up for reelection until 2014, by which point any reputational benefit for passing health care reform will have been greatly diminished. But the reputational benefit also depends on a senator's constituents. For instance, Pat Leahy is the senior senator from Vermont, one of the most liberal states in the country. His chances of reelection are near 100%, and any changes in the party's reputation will barely affect that. Meanwhile, Ben Nelson is the senior senator from Nebraska, one of the most conservative states in the country. He survives by cultivating his own reputation. Most Nebraska voters are Republican sympathizers, so Nelson wins reelection because they like him, not necessarily his party. Improving the Democratic Party's reputation will probably help Nelson, but only marginally.

In reality, the person whose reputation depends most upon the passage of a bill is Barack Obama. Yet he doesn't have a vote in the Senate anymore!

Complicating issue number two: each Democratic senator has to do something to deliver this reputational benefit. Namely, each must vote for final passage. For many Democrats, this is not going to be a problem. Their constituents like the bill, or at least trust their senators that it is the right thing to do. But that's not the case for other senators, who might face the wrath of their voters. Again, Pat Leahy won't pay a political cost for voting for the bill, but Blanche Lincoln of Arkansas probably will. Remember: Lincoln will have to pay an individual cost to help provide this collective benefit. Her chances of reelection in Arkansas are affected, not Pat Leahy's!

Complicating issue number three: the party leadership has very few carrots or sticks to coerce members. Joe Lieberman is a great case in point. He went so far as to endorse John McCain last year, and yet he has retained the gavel in the Homeland Security Committee. That's a sign that in the Senate the party leadership is very weak.

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Here is how these three items add up to a potential collective action dilemma. Again, grant that Democrats will enjoy some benefit from an enhanced party reputation if they pass this bill. However, that's just one potential benefit of many, as well as many potential costs. Each senator must evaluate how these potential benefits and costs affect them personally, and then decide how to vote. If just one Democratic senator decides that the costs outweigh the benefits, the bill fails the cloture vote. Remember also: if a senator decides that the costs outweigh the benefits, there is very little that the relatively weak party leadership can do to alter his payoff calculus.

For instance, suppose Ben Nelson agrees that a better reputation for the Democratic party nationally will give him some benefit, but he also believes a yea vote will turn his constituents against him. Thus, he decides that his benefit from the party's reputation can't match the cost he suffers from his own diminished reputation. Harry Reid lacks the ability to alter this evaluation, so Nelson votes nay. Such an outcome would be another example of the the age-old problem of collective action, or how self-interested individuals (like senators) have trouble supporting the goals of a larger group (like a political party).

So far, we've outlined this dilemma in purely political terms: senators calculate their benefits and costs as a function of reelection. But the dilemma persists when we open up the analysis to include policy considerations. In fact, it begins to make even more sense. For instance, consider Bernie Sanders, also of Vermont. His position in the Senate is all but guaranteed, too. This means that he has only small political stakes in this. If he thinks that this bill will produce a policy result that is worse than the status quo - then he'll count that as a major cost. His electoral security means that an enhanced reputation for the party probably cannot overcome it. If it can't, Sanders will vote nay.

This is why the public option is such a big deal. Include the public option and you create a political and policy nightmare for moderate Democrats who do not want to see an expansion of the government's provision of health care. So, their costs start to outweigh the benefits. Remove it and you create a policy nightmare for liberal Democrats who see the result as a payoff to big business. Their costs start to outweigh the benefits. Ditto abortion. The leadership's choice on whether to include or exclude the Stupak language dramatically shifts the payoff calculus for both sides. It's on these massively important issues where the party's reputation starts to become a secondary consideration.

There is little that the party establishment can do besides patiently cajole members to keep searching for that middle ground. Majority Leader Harry Reid simply lacks the power to say to Ben Nelson, "Vote for this or else!" There is no "or else" in the United States Senate. So, his strategy thus far has been to (a) stay optimistic and talk up the progress being made; (b) say nice things about all 60 of his senators; (c) emphasize timelines to keep the players working diligently; (d) continue to negotiate on a piecemeal basis in the hope that this is not a zero-sum game, that making one senator happy does not necessarily aggravate another, and that common ground can ultimately be found.

This is as good a strategy as can be employed when dealing with an institution like the United States Senate. It's as if Harry Reid is trying to herd cats here. It remains to be seen whether he will succeed.

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