I'm still waiting to hear anything other than speculation about how the DPW deal
is going to adversely impact national security.
The theory, as it's being advanced by folks like Hugh
Hewitt and Michelle
Malkin, is that allowing DPW - or basically any Arab country with even the
most remote ties to al-Qaeda or terrorism, which I think, is another way of
saying all Arab countries - to have access to sensitive and detailed information
about how our ports are run puts the U.S. at additional (and unnecessary) risk
based on the assumption that terrorists would have an easier time infiltrating
an Arab-owned corporation than a multinational from some other country - like
Britain. But as Mark Steyn
pointed out on Hugh's show last night, Britain has had more people directly
involved in committing terrorist acts than the UAE in the last five years.
Hugh admits he's coming around on the DPW deal after speaking with Steyn and
estimable Robert Kaplan, both
of whom think the deal should go through - though perhaps with a delay and/or
more vetting. Now if only Hugh would interview some experts on port operations
and port security as well.
By the way, three new commissioners were sworn in to sit on the board of the
Tampa Port Authority on
Tuesday. A few hours later that board voted 6-1 in favor of purusing a contract
with P&O, the company being acquired by Dubai Ports World. Granted, these
folks are members of the business community with a vested interest in the shipping
industry, but they're also Americans who are intimately involved with port operations
and think the DPW deal has been blown out of proportion:
"The national uproar is not correctly stated in my opinion," said
Steven Pinney, senior vice president for operations with The Mosaic Co., who
was appointed to one of two new positions on the expanded port board. "Very
few have gotten to the core of the real story.
"It's been made out to be an issue of [P&O under new ownership]
taking over ports or taking over security of the ports, and none of those
are real issues."
Don't tell that to Democrats, some of whom are so excited about looking tough
on national security they're willing to demagogue this issue as long and as
hard as they can. Here's Sherrod Brown, current Ohio Congressman and the Dems'
Senate candidate against Mike DeWine in November, issuing
a statement today - long after it's been established by anyone paying even
remote attention that DPW will have nothing whatsoever to do with port security,
which will still be run by the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs Service:
"In response to the proposed outsourcing of America's port security
to the United Arab Emirates, Sherrod calls on United States Trade
Ambassador Rob Portman -- a former Ohio Congressman -- to halt negotiations
with the Mideast nation. Sherrod also plans to introduce legislation that
would strengthen American's national security through trade agreements."
(emphasis added)
Lest you think this is just some sort of careless wording by a snot-nosed staffer,
Brown compounds the offense by posting this gem on The
Huffington Post that includes some real nuttery:
The Bush administration has been outsourcing jobs for five years, and now
they want to outsource our national security...This issue teaches us something
many of us already know -- the Bush administration consistently chooses profits
over people.
Please. Brown's shooting for the national security - trade isolationist bank
shot, which is pathetic but offers a nice segue to a final point: the UAE is
and ally and one of, if not the most modern Arab country in the world. If we're
going to tell them they can't do business in our ports, then we're effectively
tell the entire Arab world they can't do business in our ports.
But aren't we also doing more than that by establishing a slope that could
get very slippery? China is a "strategic competitor" that operates
government-owned companies in our ports. Couldn't they easily exploit the details
of how our port operations work to the detriment of national security? Should
we be concerned about that? South Korea is an ally, but couldn't a North Korean
operative theoretically infilitrate a South Korean owned company just as easily
as a jihadi sympathizer from Yemen could infiltrate DPW?
The flipside to this argument is that we have to draw the line somewhere and
make judgement calls. I'm not saying we should be green-lighting deals for Pakistan
to take over terminal operations at the Port of New York. The point is that
we have legitimate concerns about port security that need to be addressed. But
we shouldn't conflate or confuse the issue of port operations and port security,
nor should we as a country have a knee-jerk, emotional reaction to a deal that
could have long term foreign policy and economic ramifications.
Let me close by saying that I've always been a national security first-type.
Always. People who've visited this space for any extended period of time know
that to be true. Furthermore my initial reaction to the deal was, like most
people's, negative. I remain totally open to being convinced this deal shouldn't
go through because it will adversely impact national security. So far, however,
I just haven't seen anyone produce any evidence to make the case effectively.