Though neither would admit that his remarks were aimed at the other, the exchange between UK Prime Minister David Cameron and Pakistani President Asif Zardari gave us a view into the tensions that may result in an October surprise for America.

On July 28, speaking to reporters in Bangalore, India, Cameron said, "We should be very, very clear with Pakistan that we want to see a strong, stable and democratic Pakistan." He added, "We cannot tolerate in any sense the idea that this country is allowed to look both ways and is able, in any way, to promote the export of terror, whether to India or whether to Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world."

A few days later, before his visit with Cameron in London, Zardari told the French newspaper Le Monde, "I believe that the international community, which Pakistan belongs to, is in the process of losing the war against the Taliban," Zardari said. "And that is, above all, because we have lost the battle for hearts and minds."

Both Cameron and Zardari spoke the truth, or at least parts of it. But the tone and context of each statement is more revealing.

Cameron's context is a bit muddled because of Britain's history with Pakistan and India. India has been a blood enemy of Pakistan since the nations were separated by the departing British in 1947. India and Pakistan have been at war over the province of Kashmir ever since.

India has suffered from Pakistani-based terrorism for decades and not only in Kashmir, but from attacks such as the 2008 incident in Mumbai which killed almost 170 people. By choosing India for his venue, Cameron chose India's side, raising Pakistan's fear that it may lose NATO military support against the Taliban. But - more on this in a moment - Cameron's statement will likely be to no avail, because Pakistan's claim to Kashmir trumps even threats to its existence.

Zardari's response was predictable. He began with the claim that Pakistan belongs to the "international community" which, roughly translated, means Pakistan claims legitimacy and is working to avoid the "state sponsor of terrorism" label that attaches to nations such as Iran and Syria. In the following sentence, he stated Pakistan's fear that its government would fall to the Taliban monster it created.

When we sought Pakistan as an ally after 9-11, we did so knowing it had enabled one of its principal nuclear scientists - A.Q. Khan - to spread nuclear weapons technology since at least 1997 and that its ISI intelligence agency had helped create the Taliban government in Afghanistan.

We must have known that Pakistan used the Taliban to train terrorists to operate against Indian forces in Kashmir. Ahmed Rashid's indispensable book on the Taliban, published in 2000, says that when President Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack on al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan in response to the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, "Most of those killed were Pakistanis and Afghans who were training to fight in India-controlled Kashmir." The book cites - and other sources confirm -- many other instances of Pakistani support for terrorists, including the Haqqani network, an al-Qaeda ally with close ties to the Pakistani ISI.

As an American ally, Pakistan's performance has been consistent with its interests in Kashmir, not American interests in Afghanistan. It has been careful to maintain a distance from us that would not be perceived as inconsistent with its Islamic alliances.

After 9-11, when American forces were deploying for an invasion of Afghanistan, we ran into a roadblock on the key highway of invasion: Pakistan's government wouldn't allow us to gather our forces there, supply them, and ready for the operation.

That was in daylight hours. But - with Pakistan's help - thousands of Marines and Special Forces landed every night, moved enormous quantities of supplies across the beachhead, dispatch them toward Afghanistan and then withdrew offshore to be invisible by day.

Flash forward about five years to a conversation I had with a Marine pal recently returned from Afghanistan. He told me how in his presence American intelligence officers handed the Pakistanis about thirteen single-spaced pages of what my friend characterized as actionable intelligence on the Taliban operating in the city of Quetta (the now-infamous "Quetta Shura"). The Pakistanis received the information and then did nothing with it.

Last year, in a conversation with a former Pakistani head of state, I heard that the Pakistanis believe that their government will fall to the Taliban if American forces don't defeat them in Afghanistan. (In that conversation, the question of settling the Kashmir conflict came up repeatedly.)

Even the possibility that Pakistan could fall to a Taliban invasion is apparently not sufficient to make Pakistan change its policy toward terrorism, at least as long as it believes it can walk the tightrope of sponsoring terrorism against India and rely on American and NATO forces to protect them.

The Pakistanis will be searching for ways to relieve the current wave of pressure long enough to turn the world's attention away. Their solution may be an October surprise.

The Obama administration has declined to list the Taliban as a "foreign terrorist organization." Former ISI chief Hamid Gul said, in a Sunday CNN interview, that the only person who can guarantee the end of terrorism in Afghanistan is Taliban founder Mullah Omar. Credible reports of Mullah Omar's capture by the Pakistanis have been circulating for more than a month.

Pakistan could be working to announce some breakthrough in negotiating a peace with the Taliban before the November US elections, perhaps revealing Omar's presence as a legitimate political leader. That would be a diplomatic home run: relieving the Taliban's pressure on Pakistan, forcing Afghanistan's government into a partnership with the Taliban, boosting Obama's war stock and diverting the world's attention from Pakistan's other dangerous actions.

We should expect something like that. It would fit perfectly into Pakistan's desire to be part of the "international community" without having to relinquish its proxy war in Kashmir.