A nuclear Iran is dangerous, but don't jump to conclusions.

Startling progress has been achieved in the past few weeks concerning Iran's nuclear program. A tough stance by the international community, led by the United States, has apparently convinced Iran to open its previously secret second nuclear facility to United Nations inspectors later this month. Iran also has indicated a willingness to export much of its low-enriched uranium to Russia for conversion into nuclear fuel.

These are important steps that could ease tensions and signal a significant, positive shift in Iranian policy. But it remains to be seen whether the Iranian regime will keep its word and fully cooperate. The concern has been that Iran, a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, was enriching uranium to create nuclear weapons rather than for peaceful nuclear energy as it claimed. The regime's long record of duplicity on this issue, combined with its ballistic missile program and its belligerent stance toward Israel, all have exacerbated these concerns.

If Iran acquired nuclear weapons, it would radically alter the status quo in the Middle East. Israel has possessed nuclear weapons for more than 40 years, about as long as China. Although Israel does not officially acknowledge it, everyone in the Middle East knows it has nukes. Its possession of such weapons has not been destabilizing to the region. But should Iran get nukes, some Arab states, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have indicated they might seek their own nuclear capability for deterrence purposes. They are not afraid of a nuclear Israel -- they are used to that -- but they are very afraid of a nuclear Iran. If Iran goes nuclear, an escalating arms race might occur in one of the most volatile parts of the world.

I learned first hand of the concern Sunni Arab elites have about Iran when I visited Jordan a year after the Iraq war began. I met with a retired Jordanian general who ran a pro-Western, U.S.-funded think tank in Amman. His words resonate to this day. "As bad as Saddam was," he told me, "Iraq was the only regional deterrent to Iran. Who is going to deter Iran now? Is the U.S. going to stay in Iraq forever?" The Jordanian general saw Iran as a strategic threat to the Arab world and to the United States -- a far greater threat than was Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

We now know that Saddam Hussein did not possess weapons of mass destruction nor was he developing nuclear weapons when the United States invaded in 2003. So why didn't he allow in the U.N. inspectors and confirm to the world that he had no WMD? Had he done so, the U.S. invasion might never have occurred, and Saddam might still be alive and in power today. According to FBI documents declassified last year, the Iraqi dictator told American interrogators after he was captured that he feared Iran more than he feared the United States. He did not want Iran to learn of Iraq's strategic weakness, which would have been made clear by international inspections. Instead, he let the world believe he had WMD in order to deter Iran. Saddam, always a reckless gambler, incorrectly believed that the United States was bluffing and wouldn't actually invade Iraq.

Should Iran's new "openness" prove to be false, the United States and the international community would be wise not to jump to conclusions about Iran's intentions based solely on its refusal to cooperate. The intelligence failure in Iraq teaches us that one should not discount the possibility that a regime is bluffing about its weaponry in order to deter a rival, and that critical decisions should be based on solid intelligence, not conjecture.

Yet, the Iranian regime is viewed as a serious threat by many Arab states as well as Israel. If Iran is able to acquire nukes, it could spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East -- and in the process make it easier for terrorist groups to get their hands on fissionable materials. It is in the interests of the region and the world that such developments not be allowed to occur.