ISG Report Ignores U.S. Allies

Much of the hope invested in the Iraq Study Group grew from public confidence in the independence of its chairmen, James Baker and Lee Hamilton, and their reputations as champions of a multilateralist U.S. foreign policy.

Many in the United States (and elsewhere) hoped that the group would provide the Bush administration with sound recommendations for a new strategy in Iraq -- one that shared burdens and decision-making power with U.S. allies and reflected careful consideration of their interests. It's disappointing then that the group's final report offers little more than a unilateral retreat from a unilateralist war.

When an American president commits U.S. troops to an extended stay in harm's way, his plan must have substantial support at home. Its prospects improve further if it wins support from allies capable of helping it succeed. A genuinely multilateralist approach requires that America's friends and partners wield some real influence in U.S. decision-making, something the Bush administration is philosophically loath to concede. But the lifting needed to rebuild Iraq has always been too heavy for one nation -- even one that is believed to spend as much on its military as all other countries combined.

The United States needed little help in toppling Saddam Hussein, but it certainly needed help rebuilding Iraq. It now needs help withdrawing from the country if it is to leave behind an Iraq with any hope of reconstructing its stability. The five Democrats and five Republicans who make up the Iraq Study Group have offered the Bush administration a bipartisan approach to the problem, but they plainly failed to take into account what's best for the people of Iraq.

Following 15 more months of training, Iraq's fledgling army and police will be asked to accomplish what the U.S. military couldn't over the last three years -- the pacification of the country. The study group has recommended that even if they fail, the United States should withdraw the bulk of its troops from frontline positions. In truth, the group's work was not meant so much to save Iraq as to pull the U.S. government from the quicksand of its failed effort there. But Iraqis will live with the consequences of President Bush's choices, and the United States will feel the fallout if Iraq descends fully into chaos.

Nor do the group's recommendations adequately take into account the interests of Iraq's neighbors. The verdict I encountered again and again during the Arab Strategy Forum held earlier this month in Dubai is that "the United States broke Iraq and the United States should fix it." But the Iraq Study Group argues, in effect, that Washington must be prepared to cut its losses. That will leave Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors to face a possible explosion of sectarian violence inside the country -- and to manage regional tensions with a newly empowered Iran.

One important reason that state-building has failed so badly in Iraq is that Washington did not allow its allies, Britain in particular, a leadership role in the process. Nor apparently did the British play any meaningful role in formulating the study group's recommendations. Despite the considerable contribution (and sacrifices) that British soldiers have made to fighting the war and helping to restore stability in many areas -- to say nothing of the political capital that Prime Minister Tony Blair has invested (and lost) in support of the war -- the report relegates the British to the status of junior partner in nation-building.

The study group has also generated considerable anxiety in Israel. The report's recommendation that U.S. diplomats sit down for direct talks on Iraq's future with their counterparts from Iran and Syria have some in the Israeli media wondering if Washington intends "to pay for Iraqi security in Israeli currency." Only President Bush's reluctance to submit America to face-to-face talks with her traditional regional enemies gives Israelis some cause for comfort.

The 10 distinguished Americans who made up the study group literally risked their lives to produce the report. According to The New York Times, their harrowing fact-finding visit to Baghdad included flak jackets, Humvees and "a plunging corkscrew maneuver to avoid insurgent fire" as their plane approached Baghdad's airport. Still, it's disappointing that the group spent so little time in the country and that most of it was confined to the Green Zone, the heavily fortified enclave in which coalition officials live. The area's high concrete blast walls cannot have allowed the group a particularly good view of conditions in the rest of the country.

Perhaps the most delicate and difficult task facing the study group was to ensure as far as possible that the American servicemen and women who have died in Iraq have not sacrificed their lives in vain. But the surest way to accomplish this goal would have been to produce a set of recommendations that might leave Iraq better off and the Middle East a safer place. The best way to have achieved that goal would have been to invite America's allies to have a voice (and a role) in what happens next in Iraq.