 | Special Report Roundtable - January 31 | |
| The Threat of a Nuclear Iran | |
| Mr. Bush: Meet Walter Jones | |
| To Win in Baghdad, Strike at Tehran | |
| Iran's Ahmadinejad Far Weaker Than He Lets On |
| Rising Wage Gap, But No Squeeze | |
| Health Care, Not Social Security, the Third Rail of 2008 | |
| Will Democrats Keep the Faith? | |
| Turning Toward Iran | |
| Can Republicans Count on a House Snapback? |
April 21, 2006
The Archetype Fallacy
By Jon Henke1990: "We're dealing with Hitler revisited." --George HW Bush, on Saddam Hussein
1999: "I want to talk to you about Kosovo today, but just remember this -- it's about our values. What if someone had listened to Winston Churchill and stood up to Adolph Hitler earlier?" -President Clinton, on Slobodan Milosevic
2002: "[A]n action to remove Saddam could precipitate the very thing we are most anxious to prevent: his use of chemical or biological weapons. But the danger that springs from his capabilities will only grow as he expands his arsenal. A pre-emptive strike against Hitler at the time of Munich would have meant an immediate war, as opposed to the one that came later. Later was much worse." - Richard Perle, on Saddam Hussein
Here we go again...
Washington Times: "What did Hitler sound like to those hearing him speak in the 1930s? Did he sound any less menacing than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran?"
Rush Limbaugh: "Winston Churchill had this problem back in the thirties with Hitler. It's eerie how similar this [Iran situation] is."
Bill O'Reilly: "Neville Chamberlain loved diplomacy and so did Hitler. Remember, the Iran mullahs are Nazis. There's no difference."
This invocation of a "new Hitler" -- what Glenn Greenwald calls a "cheap equivalence between Hitler and the tyrant de jour" -- has long been an unfortunate component of US foreign policy debate. Such hyperbole produces an "It's Munich again, see, and the times require gumption and spine and fortitude--not the cowardice of the Eastern Establishment" kind of juvenile chest-thumping that Gregory Djerejian fears will overwhelm serious foreign policy analysis within the punditocracy.
Cato Institute Foreign Policy Analyst Justin Logan called the nonsensical "objectively pro-Hitler" aspect of this argument "The Fallacy of '39"...
...can we get a name for inappropriately invoking the appeasement of Nazis? This is a tactic frequently used by neocons and various sundry warmongers who wish to portray opposing various wars as morally equivalent to pulling up a lawn chair and a Corona to watch the Holocaust.
The other main aspect of this argument is what I'll call The Archetype Fallacy: the tendency, when confronted with a foreign enemy, to "assume Hitler."
It is, of course, manifestly true that there are important lessons to be learned from WWII, in which an overly conciliatory foreign policy allowed a clear threat to grow out of control. But before we man the barricades against our worst fears, let's recall that there are also lessons to be learned from WWI, in which an overly anxious foreign policy led Europe into a war they did not have to fight.
A foreign policy which assumes the worst may prevent another WWII; or may only start another WWI.
Hitler was the perfect model of an evil threat, and the temptation to use that archetype as a rhetorical bludgeon is powerful. (who, after all, wants to discount the next Hitler or be the next Chamberlain?) Certainly, it's important to incorporate that possibility into our foreign policy calculation of Iran. But that's far from the entire calculation, and there are many reasons to be far more cautious, including...
• The likelihood that Iran is still years away from having a nuclear bomb. US Intelligence estimates place Iran 5-10 years away from nuclear weapons; Arms Control expert Jeffrey Lewis at Armscontrolwonk.com lists various technical problems that offer reason to be skeptical, despite Ahmadinejad's boasts, of any near-term nuclear weapons capability.
• The likelihood that a US attack would only strengthen our enemies and weaken our allies within Iran ("the worst of [Iran's] leaders positively want to be bombed--and are doing their level best to bring that about" -- Edward Luttwak, in Commentary)
• The likely consequences of a US attack on Iran. As a CSIS report by Anthony Cordesman outlined, those consequences include...
"Retaliate against US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan overtly using Shahab-3 missiles armed with CBR warheadsUse proxy groups including al-Zarqawi and Sadr in Iraq to intensify the insurgency and escalate the attacks against US forces and Iraqi Security Forces
Turn the Shi'ite majority in Iraq against the US presence and demand US forces to leave
Attack the US homeland with suicide bombs by proxy groups or deliver CBR weapons to al-Qa'ida to use against the US
Use its asymmetric capabilities to attacks US interests in the region including soft targets: e.g. embassies,commercial centers, and American citizens
Attack US naval forces stationed in the Gulf with anti-ship missiles, asymmetric warfare, and mines
Attack Israel with missile attacks possibly with CBR warheads
Retaliate against energy targets in the Gulf and temporarily shut off the flow of oil from the Strait of Hormuz
Stop all of its oil and gas shipments to increase the price of oil, inflict damage on the global and US economies."
• The likely failure of a US strike against on Iran. In war games, the outcome of a strike was consistently bad...
The experts disagreed on some details but were nearly unanimous on one crucial point: what might seem America's ace in the hole--the ability to destroy Iran's nuclear installations in a pre-emptive air strike--was a fantasy. When exposed to "What then?" analysis, this plan (or a variant in which the United States looked the other way while Israel did the job) held more dangers than rewards for the United States.
Short of gearing up to face the latest Next Hitler, what options remain for the United States? Matt McIntosh has suggested that we pursue the one area in which we still have a comparative advantage over the Iranian regime: soft power. A degree of economic rapprochement could strengthen the pro-American sentiment among the Iranian people, as well as strengthening the Iranian middle class. And, ultimately, a strong middle class with increased economic liberty will, as McIntosh writes, do "more to weaken the grip of an authoritarian government and improve the lot of those stuck under it than any amount of hectoring about human rights and democracy."
Ultimately, we may still decide that the WWII analogy is correct and military intervention necessary. If so, it would be best to have explored every option short of attack. Fortunately, even the oft-dovish Democrats have expressed willingness to do that. In their recent "Real Security" position paper, the Democratic position was that Iran had "no realistic possibility of making its enrichment and reprocessing facilities operational" and that "Iran should understand the existential threat of a military response under some conditions."
At this point, the major difference between Democrats and Republicans on Iran is the historical analogy through which they see Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: either he is the next Hitler....or he is the next Kaiser. If we get it wrong in either direction, we have a war that could have been prevented. As James Fallows writes in The Atlantic, we have "a series of choices--and all of them are bad."
Worst case scenario fear-mongering does not make it any more likely that we will choose wisely from among our bad options.
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