February 9, 2006
A Balanced Approach in U.S.-China Relations
By Richard
Halloran
After five
years of erratic course changes in China policy, the Bush Administration
has finally set its rudder amidships to steer a middle-of-the-road,
pragmatic, and balanced approach in U.S. relations with Beijing.
In an unvarnished
warning, the administration said in its Quadrennial Defense Review,
or QDR, published by the Pentagon: "Of the major and emerging
powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily
with the United States."
In a more
accommodating tone, however, the QDR said: "U.S. policy seeks
to encourage China to choose a path of peaceful economic growth
and political liberalization, rather than military threat and
intimidation."
The Chinese,
in response, choose to emphasize the arrow brandished rather than
the olive branch proffered by the QDR. A spokesman for the foreign
ministry in Beijing, Kong Quan, said his government had made "solemn
representations to the U.S. side."
"We
are an important force that promotes the peace and stability of
the Asia-Pacific region and the world," the spokesman contended.
"We have not, do not and will not pose a threat."
In relations
with China, Americans divide into three. On the right are demonizers
who see China as a threat. On the left are panda huggers who would
appease China. In the center are pragmatists who assert that Washington
should keep its guard up even as it tries to build better relations
with Beijing.
A fourth
group includes business executives and investors who are generally
apolitical as they go about trading with or investing in China.
When President
Bush took office in 2001, he surrounded himself with foreign policy
and national security advisers who called themselves the Vulcans,
after the Roman god of fire. Chief among them: Vice President
Richard Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
An essential
element of their doctrine pertinent to China, wrote James Mann,
a longtime China watcher, drew on the U.S. experience in defeating
the Soviet Union in the Cold War: "America would build up
its military power to such an extent that it would be fruitless
and financially crippling for any other country to hope to compete
with it."
The president
underscored this point early in his tenure by declaring that the
United States would do "whatever it takes" to maintain
the freedom of Taiwan, the island off the coast of China over
which Beijing claims sovereignty but whose people have shown,
in poll after poll, that they prefer to remain apart from the
mainland.
In contrast,
President Bush shifted course to go far toward accommodating the
Chinese when Premier Wen Jiabao visited Washington in December
2004. The president publicly rebuked the president of Taiwan,
Chen Shui-bian, in the presence of Wen.
"We
oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change
the status quo," Bush said. "And the comments and actions
made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to
make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we
oppose."
In the last
eight months, the Bush policy has evolved between those courses.
Rumsfeld said at an international forum in Singapore in June 2005:
"China appears to be expanding its missile forces, allowing
them to reach targets in many areas of the world, not just the
Pacific region, while also expanding its missile capabilities
within this region."
"Since
no nation threatens China," Rumsfeld said, "one must
wonder: Why this growing investment? Why these continuing large
and expanding arms purchases? Why these continuing robust deployments?"
He added, however, that he did not see China as an immediate danger.
Then Robert
Zoellick, the deputy secretary of state, set a tone in September
that was echoed in the QDR. "Many Americans worry that the
Chinese dragon will prove to be a fire-breather. There is a cauldron
of anxiety about China," he said in New York, adding: "If
China wants to lessen anxieties, it should openly explain its
defense spending, intentions, doctrine, and military exercises."
The QDR,
issued on Feb. 3, carried that argument forward, saying the United
States would "attempt to dissuade any military competitor
from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could enable
regional hegemony or hostile action against the United States
or other friendly countries, and it will seek to deter aggression
or coercion."
The review,
which has been many months in the drafting, concluded on an upbeat
note: "Shaping the choices of major and emerging powers requires
a balanced approach, one that seeks cooperation but also creates
prudent hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches
by themselves may fail to preclude future conflict."
Richard Halloran, formerly
with The New York Times as a foreign correspondent in Asia and
military correspondent in Washington, writes from Honolulu. He
can be reached at oranhall@hawaii.rr.com
