President
Bush finds himself in a bit of a "proliferation pickle"
as he begins an historic visit to South Asia this week.
The United States
wants to deepen strategic relations with India, while New Delhi
wants Washington to overlook its nuclear-weapons program. The
challenge for Bush is to advance ties between the world's largest
democracies while holding together the tattered U.N. system for
limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and technology, especially
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
First, a little background:
During Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington
Last July, the two sides agreed to expand cooperation in a number
of areas, including defense and space. Surprisingly, the meeting
also proposed nuclear collaboration.
Under the
agreement, America would supply India with civilian nuclear technology;
India would place its civilian nuclear facilities under international
(i.e., International Atomic Energy Agency) monitoring.
But that announcement
caused tremors, especially in Congress, because U.S. law prohibits
sharing nuclear materials/tech- nology with nations that haven't
signed the NPT or possess nukes. (India hasn't signed, and has
150-200 nuclear weapons).
Plus, the agreement
wouldn't put India's nuclear-weapons facilities — or its
prototype fast-breeder reactor — under international safeguards.
(Fast-breeders aren't great for electricity, but are top-notch
for producing plutonium for weapons.)
Rep. Ed Markey (D-Mass.),
a well-known nonproliferation advocate, said: "If India is
allowed to have a nuclear program that is half safeguarded and
half not, it will be ridiculed as half-baked and would make a
mockery of the IAEA and the NPT."
So why did the president
sign off on such an accord, knowing he'd face opposition from
Congress, proliferation experts — and standing American
law?
Chalk it up to good,
old-fashioned (proliferation) pragmatism. Bush can't put the Indian
nuclear genie back in the bottle — at least for the moment.
And a futile drive to try anyway — which current U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation policy would seem to dictate — causes problems
for other U.S. national interests.
U.S. security policy,
while not abandoning the NPT (which bans the spread of nuclear
weapons, not nuclear energy), must also recognize a nuclear Iran
or North Korea poses different dangers than does democratic, peaceful
India.
Moreover, improving
relations with India will assist U.S. efforts to stabilize South
Asia (including Pakistan and Afghanistan), fight global terrorism
and balance China's growing might. But a couple of other policy
issues are in play as well.
Energy: India's population
is 1.1 billion. Like China, it has an insatiable — and growing
— energy appetite. Today's high U.S. pump prices have as
much to do with spiking Indian/Chinese demand as anything else.
India also produces
significant greenhouse gases. India (and China's) continued fossil-fuel
use thus threatens global ecological disaster. Clean, safe, economical
nuclear energy for India makes sense for all of us.
Iran: India buys billions
of dollars in Iranian oil and natural gas, refines 40 percent
of Iran's domestic gasoline — and still craves a proposed
$7 billion Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.
While India supported
the U.S. earlier this month at the IAEA in reporting Iran's nuclear
program to the U.N. Security Council, New Delhi's continued collaboration
isn't guaranteed. Nuclear-energy assistance could help India kick
its Iranian energy habit, further isolating intransigent Tehran.
Naturally, there are
downsides, too. For starters, Pakistan sees a zero-sum game in
relation to its great rival — i.e., anything that rewards
India punishes Pakistan. Islamabad, also a nuclear weapons state
and NPT nonsignatory, is clamoring for equal treatment.
Treating Pakistan
differently could drive Islamabad further into Beijing's arms
— and away from the West. But Pakistani nuclear cooperation
is more problematic — the country has a serious problem
of domestic Islamic radicalism/terrorism, and has made only halting
progress toward democracy. (India, of course, is the world's largest
democracy.)
And don't forget:
Iran and North Korea will also be watching how the Indian deal
is cut.
So Bush has his work
cut out for himself on his South Asian sojourn. He has to convince
the Indians that they must join the international nuclear mainstream,
fully separating its peaceful and military nuclear programs.
Then the White House
will have to convince Congress that altering longstanding nuclear-nonproliferation
law is essential to managing relations in the new security environment.
Getting Congress on board is doable, but no small task.
Some Indian skeptics,
suspicious of Washington in general, will also belabor the deal
from the New Delhi side, so implementing any nuclear agreement
will likely be slow.
It's all worth it,
though. Strengthening ties with India, a nation of growing importance
in Asia — and globally — will pay dividends for American
interests well into the 21st century.
Peter
Brookes is a Heritage
Foundation senior fellow and author of "A Devil's Triangle:
Terrorism, WMD and Rogue States." This article originally
appeared in The New York Post.
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