Conventional
wisdom has long been that without security in Iraq, political
and economic progress would be stymied. But a corollary is becoming
equally true: Halting advances in reconstruction and economic
development are hampering progress on the political and security
fronts.
Just last week, in
Senate hearings on Iraqi reconstruction and stabilization, Sen.
Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) said: "If Iraqis perceive that their
daily lives are improving, they are more likely to take risks
to oppose insurgents and restrain factional groups that seek to
fragment the country."
Lugar is right: While
many factors likely doom the insurgents' cause, their bloody campaign
gains from the absence of marked progress in improving the lives
of everyday Iraqis — especially the Sunnis.
The insurgency remains
significant — but near-hopeless. It has failed to develop
any clear ideology beyond spilling blood and twisting metal. None
of its groups proposes anything resembling a positive agenda for
Iraq's future.
At the moment,
the insurgents offer Iraqis either: a) an authoritarian Saddamist
jackboot once again set squarely on their collective Sunni/Shia/Kurdish
necks, or b) the imposition of al Qaeda's repressive Islamist
sharia law. What kind of choice is that?
Unfortunately,
the good guys — that's us — face the same sort of
dilemma. We've done a solid job of providing the Iraqis with a
positive vision for their political future and improving security
for most Iraqis — but haven't done as well in convincing
the average Iraqi that the prospects for his economic
future are bright.
My sources
in Iraq say that the greatest danger is that we're losing the
active support of the common Iraqi, especially the Sunnis. Without
economic development, this swing group could become wholly passive
toward — or actively support — the insurgency, allowing
the Saddamist dead-enders and al Qaeda killers to prosper.
As recent audits and
congressional testimony reveal, progress in reconstruction and
economic development has been (to be kind) less than adequate.
Some programs are riddled with both mismanagement and corruption.
In testimony
to the Senate last week, the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
noted some was grim: Only about one-third of planned water/sewage
projects and two-thirds of electricity projects will be completed
without more funding, beyond the $18 billion already
allocated to reconstruction.
And the State Department's
senior advisor on Iraq, James Jeffrey, told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that nearly half of U.S. funding for Iraqi
reconstruction to date — meaning $6 billion of $13 billion
— has been diverted to security.
Despite a massive
effort that has brought lights, clean water and sewage disposal
to millions of Iraqis, the insurgents have kept oil production
and electricity generation below pre-war levels by masterfully
attacking Iraq's 4,350 miles of pipelines, high-voltage lines
and power plants.
Credit the
U.S. government, and most contractors, with good intentions. Cut
some slack for the fact that the Coalition has had to work with
three different Iraqi governments, countless ministries
and contractors over the last few years. But the bottom line is:
These results aren't good enough.
So what needs to be
done?
Get
deadbeat donors to pay up: The international community
pledged $13 billion toward Iraqi reconstruction at the 2003 Madrid
donor conference. To date, those nations have delivered just $3
billion; the Middle East states are the worst offenders. Arm twisting
to pay up is needed — now!
Increase
hi-visibility projects: Schools, clinics, hospitals —
even generators — are a great way to make the locals stakeholders
in the community's future. These crowd-pleasing, tangible projects
also give Iraqis a key reason to oppose the insurgency's destructive
ways.
Publicize
plans and results: All Iraqis need to see that
there is both an economic-development strategy and progress on
the ground, especially in the 13 stable provinces. People in the
five restive provinces will take back the streets to ensure they're
not left out — or behind.
The three strategic
tracks to success in Iraq remain the same as ever: security, political
and economic. Progress along all three vectors is essential to
victory; each is dependent upon the other — like it or not.
The challenge is to
advance them as concurrently as possible.
While Iraqi politics
seem to be moving forward at a reasonable pace, the fact is that
we'll never get the Iraqi insurgency monkey off our back (and
our troops home) if we don't drive forward more efficiently and
effectively with reconstruction and economic development.
Peter
Brookes is a Heritage
Foundation senior fellow and author of "A Devil's Triangle:
Terrorism, WMD and Rogue States." This article originally
appeared in The New York Post.
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