January 5, 2006
Options Dwindling With Iran
By Tom Bevan

The New Year is less than a week old and we’ve already reached a crisis with Iran. On Tuesday a top Iranian nuclear official informed the world that Iran would resume ‘peaceful’ nuclear research and development activity on January 9 after suspending the program for two and a half years in the face of international pressure.

Yesterday The Guardian published excerpts from a July 2005 intelligence report gathered by the governments of Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium showing that despite having suspended its official ‘peaceful’ nuclear program, Iran has been “successfully scouring Europe for the sophisticated equipment needed to develop a nuclear bomb.”

What to do? Iran insists it has the right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to enrich uranium to power its new Russian-built nuclear reactor in Bushehr. However, major members of the international community, including the United States, reject the idea Iran wants or needs nuclear power for peaceful purposes and are convinced, with good reason, that Iran’s true desire is to reprocess spent nuclear fuel for the production of nuclear weapons.

All efforts to persuade Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions have failed. Talks with the EU-3 have gone nowhere. Strong words of condemnation from the IAEA and threats of sanctions by the UN have produced nothing. Short of a military strike in the coming months, there appear to be few, if any, options left for preventing – or, more accurately, delaying – Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon.

For those who are paying attention, we’re watching a two-part rerun of history. The first part is a rerun of the “agreed framework” deal with North Korea. Back in 1994 the world celebrated the signing of the framework as a major achievement only to find out years later that Kim Jong Il had begun violating the pact shortly after the ink had dried.

Eleven and half years later North Korea remains an unstable, outlaw regime - but now one most likely with the capacity to inflict mass murder with a nuclear device. Just as importantly, North Korea also has the ability to sell nuclear material and technology to the highest bidders around the globe including terrorist groups like al-Qaeda.

Iran has pursued a similar strategy, using protracted negotiations with the UN and the IAEA as a stalling tactic while racing to fulfill its nuclear ambition covertly. As the primary state sponsor of terrorism in the world, Iran represents a significantly greater threat to the West as a potential proliferator and distributor of nuclear technology and material to terrorist organizations.

The second part of the historical rerun is even more unsettling. In 1925, more than 14 years before the outbreak of World War II in Europe, Hitler published Mein Kampf in which he outlined “the Jewish peril” and stated his desire to rid the world of the evil of Judaism. Few took such fantastic claims literally at the time, but by the end of 1941 when the first concentration camps were completed at Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka to facilitate the “final solution of the Jewish question,” it was clear Hitler had indeed been a man of his word.

Eighty years later the world is faced with a similarly fanatic ruler who has stated in very plain terms that Israel should be “wiped off the map.” The prudent response is not to scoff at Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s extreme utterances but rather to assume that he too is a man of his word.

Ultimately, regime change is the only way to resolve the conflict with Iran. But that’s a long-term strategy not well suited to address our short-term reality: are we prepared to live with the potential consequences of Iran becoming a nuclear power in the near future under the control of a man like Ahmadinejad? Or must we do everything in our power to delay the mullahs in Iran from acquiring the capacity to kill millions of people despite the obvious political consequences of taking such action?

The answer to these questions largely turns on whether the West believes that Ahmadinejad will adhere to the traditional rationales of deterrence and whether he will abstain from providing nuclear assistance to terrorists. So far, there is precious little evidence to suggest he will do either, though we can always hope that a nuclear Iran will act rationally and responsibly. Then again, as history has repeatedly shown, hope isn’t a very effective strategy.

Tom Bevan is the co-founder and Executive Editor of RealClearPolitics.

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