Masterfully
pitting the East versus the West, this week Iran is once again
likely to slip the noose over its nuclear (weapons) program —
avoiding a vote of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board
of Governors, meeting in emergency session in Vienna, to refer
the Iran case to the U.N. Security Council.
It really should come
as no surprise.
Why this failure of
the best efforts of the United States and the European Union to
heel Iran's atomic aspirations? Tehran is countering via increasingly
cozy relationships with China, Russia and India.
And why are Beijing,
Moscow and New Delhi dragging their feet on dealing decisively
with Iran's nuclear program? Raw self-interest.
Take China: Now perhaps
the world's No. 4 economy, China is also the No. 2 energy consumer
— scouring the globe for new energy sources to stoke a decade
of double-digit economic growth. And Iran is now China's third-largest
oil supplier.
Moreover, China has
invested nearly $100 billion in developing Iranian oil/gas fields.
By some estimates, Iran will provide China with over 250 million
tons of natural gas and 150,000 barrels of crude oil per day over
the next 30 years.
Plus, Iran buys Chinese
conventional weapons, including anti-ship cruise missiles and
anti-tank missiles — and technology and equipment for WMDs
and ballistic missiles, such as missile control/guidance systems,
chemical-weapon precursors and nuclear materials and technology.
Iran is also a commercial
cash cow for China. Chinese firms are building Tehran's billion-dollar
subway system. And Beijing plans to invest over $200 million to
help finance a new highway connecting Tehran to the Caspian Sea
coast; other projects are in the works.
And, strategically
speaking, Beijing certainly doesn't mind keeping the United States
off balance in the Middle East with a nuclear-armed Iran (plus
Iraq, Afghanistan and war on terror) while the People's Republic
increases its influence in Asia, Africa and even Latin America.
Russia is also heavily
vested in Iran. Moscow is trying to broker a self-serving deal
to supply and reprocess uranium for Iranian reactors, ostensibly
preventing Tehran from turning nuke fuel into bomb material. Iran
isn't sold on it yet; the next round of talks is Feb. 16.
Russia has already
built a $1 billion nuclear reactor for Iran at Bushehr, and Tehran
has expressed interest in two to three more reactors. Actually,
it's considering building more than 100 nuclear reactors in the
years ahead. Russia unquestionably wants a cut of that fat action
. . .
A security relationship
exists, too. In December — to our horror — Russia
agreed to sell Iran $1 billion in arms, including $700 million
worth of advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), the TOR-M1.
Each TOR unit is capable
of tracking 48 bogies and firing at two targets at the same time.
The SAMs pose a deadly threat to aircraft involved in any strike
against the tens of Iranian nuclear-related targets, including
the high-value sites at Bushehr, Natanz, Arak and Isfahan.
Reportedly, Moscow
and Tehran have also discussed the sale of billions of dollars
of other weapons, including more diesel submarines, air-defense
systems and anti-ship missiles — and fighters, ground-to-ground
missiles and armored infantry vehicles.
India has its own
stake in the Iranian nuclear standoff: Delhi's developing economy
also craves access to world energy supplies. Iran and India, along
with Pakistan, have agreed to build a $7 billion pipeline to move
Iranian natural gas to India via Pakistan.
The pipeline would
ease India's energy crunch by delivering affordable gas, while
providing impoverished Pakistan with much-needed transit-fee income.
The joint project might improve always testy Indo-Pakistani relations,
too.
While India, along
with 21 others, voted last September in favor of referring Iran
from the IAEA to the UNSC, Delhi's stance has softened. (Abetting
Iran's atomic ambitions may come with a high price, such as scuttling
congressional support for a pending U.S.-India civilian-nuclear-cooperation
pact — and forget about gaining a permanent Security Council
seat . . .)
Also working against
U.S.-E.U. efforts is the fact that an IAEA report on Iranian cooperation
with IAEA inspectors isn't due before March. This — and
the pending Russian deal — make decisive IAEA action this
week improbable.
On the merits, this
should (finally!) be the week for referring Iran to the Security
Council for tougher measures such as punitive economic sanctions.
But the diplomatic stars may not yet be quite aligned in our favor.
Worse: The same self-serving
national interests make it less likely that Beijing/Moscow/Delhi
will support action when and if we go to the mat at the United
Nations over Iran.
Peter
Brookes is a Heritage
Foundation senior fellow. This article originally appeared
in The New York Post.
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