The group is free
of ideology, though it is reasonable to assume that the principles
of free markets, private property and rule of law dominate their
thought. But they appear to be without bias of an inflammatory
kind, and their patriotism would not appear to outweigh their
judgment.
Here is what they
have now reported at the conclusion of their third trip:
There are four insurgent
groupings at work. The first of these is self-servingly ideological.
It is the group that lost power with Saddam's deposition. They
wish for a restoration of sorts. Democracy is the enemy, and they
will fight any occupying power, like our own, that might advance
self-government.
A second broader group
-- from which the first group largely is drawn -- is identified
as Sunni Arab rejectionists. This is the ethnic/religious group
that under Saddam ruled Iraq -- and despoiled it. These Sunni
rejectionists are up against the majority Shiites. They are not
intrinsically totalitarian, but they feel threatened by the predominance
of the Shiites. They have now become, in the language of the BENS,
"POIs" -- pissed-off Iraqis. They are affected by the
breakdown of services, like electricity, the loss of economic
favors they once enjoyed and the prevailing chaos in the country.
What they want is the re-establishment of an order in which they
would play the principal role.
There is then a third
group: the jihadists, or religious fanatics. They want the restoration
of the ancient caliphate. Their principal agents -- the suicide
bombers -- are mostly not native Iraqis. They come in from Syria,
and though they do not have the backing of any substantial number
of Iraqis, they have the influence generated by the audacity and
critical impact of their feats.
A fourth element is,
quite simply, a criminal class. Eighty thousand criminals were
released from prison by Saddam just before his regime was toppled.
These are abroad in the land and practicing their profession,
and contributing to the disruptions from which they profiteer.
What is clearly needed
is a modus vivendi between such Shiites and Sunnis as seek peace
and order. The Shiites outnumber the Sunnis but desperately need
the Sunnis to make common cause against the insurgents. These
rely on vehicle bombs and on so-called IEDs: Improvised Explosive
Devices. Of the vehicle bombs, 35 percent, it is estimated, are
driven by people with suicide designs. It requires a mere six
days to transport a suicide bomber and his vehicle down the Euphrates
River Valley into Iraq ready for work.
As for the other principal
menace, as many as a hundred IEDs exploded in Baghdad alone in
a single week. Gen. John Abizaid, the U.S. commander, has called
for the equivalent of a Manhattan Project to address that problem.
Efforts are being made to come up with techniques of detection
and immobilization, but it is felt that the awful lag time is
not sufficiently diminishing. "Inability to reverse effectiveness
of this weapon not only costs us casualties, it has a significant
effect on support for the war at home."
The committee of businessmen
pronounces as encouraging the development of the Iraqi forces,
which now include 115 combat battalions and an air force with
four operational squadrons.
But the important
work ahead is not military but political: the firming up of the
civil institutions that will isolate the insurgents and their
firepower. The insurgents reduce by 500,000 barrels a day (that's
about $29 million per day) the revenue that would otherwise flow
to burgeoning institutions.
What is required is
the kind of assurance that is generated by the morale of the military.
We learn that the U.S. re-enlistment rate is substantially above
the goal. What would destroy that morale is any sense that the
American government will not stay the course. The operative assumption
is that the United States can be relied on until the elections
of 2008. The challenge is to restore order in Iraq and to maintain
order in the United States.
